The SANDF provided for social reintegration through the Service Corps (SC), which caters particularly for soldiers who do not have the necessary skills required in civilian society.

The idea of the SC was first mooted during the time of the TEC. Options were investigated to accommodate the personnel who would be rationalised following integration. The SC was launched on 31 January 1995, ostensibly to help ex-combatants to integrate into civilian life and contribute to rebuilding the country. It was described by the Minister of Defence as one of the largest contributions the military could make to the RDP (The Star, 1 February 1995). Initially targeted at demobilised soldiers, it aimed to extend its services to training the unemployed and the youth. Its objectives are:

• to help prepare people for civilian life through assessment and career profiling;
• to help trainees investigate career path options;
• to assist trainees to reflect and gain more self-knowledge;
• to provide information about career options inside and outside the SC; and
• to sensitise trainees about issues in the broader environment that have an impact on the decisions they make (SANDF, 1995:11).

The SC consists of a headquarters, a vocational training centre and a service corps unit in each region. It falls under the ambit of the army although its headquarters are located at defence force headquarters. It is a military structure in that its members wear the uniform of the old Venda Defence Force, it is staffed entirely by seconded SANDF personnel, and its culture and ethos are military-dominated (Williams, 1996:17).

The SC provides 18 months of training, comprising 3 months literacy and adult life-skills training, 3 months of vocational training, and 12 months of practical experience. Introductory training covers issues such as career development, leadership, outdoor activities, social initiatives, technological issues, personal and organisational behaviour, personal and functional discipline, physical training and sport, and routine. Life skills taught in this phase include communication, conflict handling, life-planning, problem solving, social interaction, self-esteem, decision making, personal stock-taking and work ethos.

Vocational training is linked to the Department of Labour’s national training centres and includes building, catering, transport and engineering. The SC has established its own vocational training centre in Gauteng. Practical training occurs through contributions to SANDF, RDP and the national public works programme projects. These include the building and repairing of houses and schools, the provision of sanitation and other urban services, and rural development programmes (SANDF, n.d.: 12-14).

By the end of April 1997, 788 demobilised soldiers – of which 44 were women – had received training through the sc.

Problems with the Service Corps

The SC has been hampered in supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society by its location in the military and its narrow focus. These problems need to be considered when determining the role of the SC in the rationalisation process.

There are compelling arguments why the military is not the most appropriate vehicle for reintegrating soldiers into civilian life. The demobilisation programme needs many components, including psychological counselling, career counselling, life skills and employment advice, and military people are often not equipped for these tasks. Also, the military ethos of command, discipline and hierarchy is not conducive to encouraging people to think critically and take responsibility for their lives, which is essential for successful social reinte gration. ‘People tend to have an approach which is militaristic; there is a military culture and discipline, but these people in the Service Corps are not in the army – they have been demobbed and are re-entering society’ (interview with Service Corps officer, 1996). This view has motivated the military to transform the SC into a civilian body.

Non-military organisations may be seen as more legitimate than a military structure by soldiers whose relationship with the military may be strained. ‘People who go to the Service Corps are people who failed the potential tests, the disabled; the system designs who goes there and basically it is people who feel let down. There is bitterness, anger and hurt, and people feel worthless. And in that situation, they are moved from one section of the defence force to another’ (interview with MK soldier, 1996).

Role-players in civil society may also relate more easily to a civilian structure that shares similar organisational cultures and practices. Non-military organisations have consultation experience and are more flexible in their operations than the military.

The location of the SC in the military also limits funding possibilities. The military is unlikely to be able to increase funding, given reduced defence budgets, and there would be public opposition to using other development resources – for example, from education on a military structure.

For these reasons, it is preferable that a non-military structure, which has the support and co-operation of the military, be charged with the task of social reintegration. In practice, this may mean retaining the SC structure but locating it in another government department or making it a quasi-government body.

A major weakness of the SC is that it focuses primarily on non-statutory force soldiers and only offers basic-level skills training. There is concern that it does not provide quality training, experience and employment opportunities, and perceptions exist that it is the ‘dumping ground’ for ex-MK and APLA soldiers.

There are questions about the SC in the rationalisation process. Future education and training programmes need to take into account the varied levels of skills and training in the defence force, as soldiers from all ranks will be rationalised. In particular, there are opportunities to retrain officers with a range of managerial, technical and organisational skills which may be useful in the private and public sector. The SC may need to re-orientate itself to deal with rationalisation.

It would be unwise to consider extending the SC as it is currently structured to the unemployed and youth. At a public seminar, the Chief of the Service Corps, General Moloi, argued that the SADF had played an important role in instilling discipline in white youth under apartheid, and that the SANDF was the only institution able to do this (presentation to an Institute for Defence Policy seminar, 3 February 1995). Others countered that, given the extent to which civil society was militarised, the challenge was to demilitarise rather than remilitarise youth. In establishing the National Youth Service Initiative in 1994, there was discussion about whether the military should be involved in a service corps for the youth. This was unanimously rejected (interview with ANCYL leader, 1995). Extending the programme to the youth and the unemployed would require extra capacity and resources which are unavailable.

The rationalisation process

Despite its flaws, the demobilisation process is complete and many soldiers anxiously await the rationalisation process. Demobilisation was limited to 3 770 people, but the rationalisation process may involve upwards of 30 000 people. It is likely to be a more complex and difficult process. The rationalisation process needs to build on the experience and lessons learnt from demobilisation.

Critical to the success of rationalisation are the following: defining policy, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, in a participatory and transparent manner, involving all major stakeholders. The range of interested and affected parties includes parliamentarians, Departments of Defence, Labour, Social Welfare and Education, unions, religious bodies and non-governmental organisations. It is important that the soldiers who are directly affected by rationalisation, and veteran’s organisations, are consulted. Consultation is important to build political support for the process, which is bound to be politically contentious and potentially divisive.

Conclusion

Politicians and defence force officials should not be lulled into the false belief that the process of demobilisation is over and that they are ‘rid’ of the problem. Although the small number of people demobilised means that they are unlikely to constitute a major political threat, the rationalisation process will see that number increase ten-fold. If the rationalisation process does not address the problems of demobilisation, there is bound to be increased social conflict and tension.

The formulation of the rationalisation policy and its planning must be transparent and inclusive of all role-players. There needs to be extensive pre-planning, including surveys of the soldiers’ biographical details, training needs and career aspirations. Rationalisation programmes should take into account the differing needs of soldiers. There should be emphasis on education and training programmes which allow for the conversion of military skills to civilian purposes, and packages should not consist solely of one-off cash payments. Psychological counselling should be offered. The military needs to monitor whether its objectives are being achieved.

Rationalisation is a challenge requiring resources, but it also presents a significant opportunity to free human and financial resources, for productive, civilian use. Investment in the process will payoff in increased security, peace and development.

DEMOBILISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ‘NO FORGOTTEN MEN’

Jacklyn Cock

On 28 April 1944, Harry Lawrence announced in the House of Assembly the government’s demobilisation plans amounting to a ‘soldiers’ charter’. ‘Besides monetary benefits such as war gratuities and civilian clothing grants, the government plans include provisions for post-discharge employment for all classes of ex-soldier; financial assistance to re-establish the soldier in civilian life, such as by sending him to a university or a technical college for professional, vocational or technical training; training for the disabled soldier; the provision of temporary housing . . . and the cost of transporting families and effects’ (Lawrence, 1944).

Demobilisation was a massive task. Between 1939 and the end of 1945, a total of 334 224 people had volunteered for full-time service in the South African land, air and naval forces (Martin & Orpen, 1979:346). Of these, 197 875 were white males (Gibbs, 1990:13). At the end of the war, some 245 668 ex-volunteers passed through the dispersal depots and 155 330 had been placed in employment by the Directorate of Demobilisation (Martin & Orpen, 1979:356).

The programme was characterised by the following:

1. An extensive administrative infrastructure was set up which included some degree of participation from those most affected. In 1944, a Directorate of Demobilisation was established. An Advisory Council on Demobilisation was also established to advise the Directorate. This was composed of ‘representatives of serving men and women, representatives of the coloured and native forces, of commerce and industry, and of the trade unions’. A country-wide network of 325 demobilisation committees was established and some five thousand voluntary workers sat on these committees.

2. Benefits were differentiated according to length of service, race and gender – not according to military rank or type of military activity, or exposure to danger. The ex-volunteer soldier was entitled to:

• Gratuities. The government was ‘aware of the honourable tradition of paying a war gratuity as a token recognition of the nation’s appreciation to the volunteers who have served it faithfully in time of war’ (Lawrence, 1944). The gratuity amounted to £1/10s for each completed month of service in the case of European male volunteers; 15s for each completed month of service for European female volunteers; 10s for coloured volunteers; and 5s for native volunteers. According to Gibbs, ‘the white volunteer who had been away for several years was paid about £18 per year of service, while a black volunteer was paid a mere £3 per year of service, which is a sixth of that paid to his white compatriot’ (Gibbs, 1990:25).
• Civilian clothing and cash allowances of £15 to Europeans; £9 to coloureds; and ‘each native will receive specified articles of civilian clothing and a cash allowance of £2’.
• A preferential employment policy. ‘The right to employment was considered a corner-stone of the whole demobilisation scheme’ (Gibbs, 1990:26). Most volunteers returned to the jobs they held before the war. Others were ‘kept on military strength’, and paid at the appropriate
  scale until they found suitable employment. The government aimed to set an example to other employers. It safeguarded the interests of public and railways workers and the public service kept open clerical, professional and technical posts for some 2 000 to 3 000 ex-volunteer soldiers not previously in the public service. Generally, the government policy was to employ ex-volunteers.
• Transport expenses of family and effects. Rail warrants were provided for travel to the place of employment.
• Access to vocational and technical training at technical colleges and universities. The agricultural colleges at Cedara in Natal and at Potchefstroom in the Transvaal were reserved exclusively for training returned volunteers.
• A financial assistance scheme ‘provided for special measures to enable an ex-volunteer to adjust to civilian life in the form of loans of £1 250 which were interest-free for 5 years or grants of up to £250. Ex-volunteer students at university were eligible for a total grant of £250. The money could only be used to pay for specific items, such as university or technical training fees, to purchase a house or farm, for tools or machinery, furniture and motor vehicles, and each application had to be passed by the executive of the directorate, before being granted.
• Housing. According to the then Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation, ‘When our men return from their war service, it is essential to arrange that they and their families will not be harassed by housing needs and that suitable accommodation is available for them.’ Government therefore embarked on a national house building programme. Priority was given to ex-volunteers in the allocation of houses or flats built by public bodies or utility companies. Applications from ex-volunteers for assistance in building their own houses fell within the scope of the scheme.
• Some military camps were converted into temporary villages housing ex-volunteers and their families. Residents were able to hire furniture for these dwellings from the Department of Defence.
• Agricultural land. ‘The Lands Department has schemes for those who wish to farm but who have not the necessary capital and need state assistance to buy. There are established Land Settlement Acts under which land will be allotted to returned soldiers.’ There were 1 500 to 2 000 holdings available as settlements and 1 000 individual farms available in all parts of the Union.
• War pensions were paid to ‘a volunteer who is disabled or to his dependants if he is killed or dies’. The 1944 War Pensions Act was described as ‘one of the most liberal in the world’ (Army Education Section, UDF Repatriation Unit, 1945:86).

3. The benefits were rationalised by government appeals to notions of ‘honour’ and ‘patriotism’. ‘We have set out to provide, as far as it is humanly possible, a policy of social insurance for those men and women who have been willing to serve South Africa in her need. For many the help we shall be able to offer may be incommensurate with their sacrifices. There are some things incapable of compensation. And patriotism is above nicely calculated monetary evaluation.’ The prime minister said that demobilisation would be ‘a very costly business indeed’, but he went on to say, ‘There is no doubt we are in honour bound and in duty bound to do everything that we can for the men who volunteered to support the honour of this country and the cause of freedom for which we are fighting’ (Lawrence, 1944).

4. The United Party government pursued what it saw to be its political interests. One Minister said in parliament, ‘If I gauge public opinion correctly in this country, then it may well be said that the manner in which the government tackles this task will be the
acid test of its ability to retain public support’ (Hansard, 28 April 1944).

5. The demobilisation policy must be located within the wider context of social transformation. ‘In seeking to solve the problems of demobilisation, the government and its critics repeatedly stressed the importance of addressing the housing crisis, unemployment and poverty in general’ (Gibbs, 1990:11).

6. Overall, the policy privileged a special social category. The outcome was that white South African males enjoyed a system of social security and range of opportunities which did not exist for other social groups. As Gibbs has argued, the demobilisation scheme ‘was neither neutral nor fair in its conception and application’ (Gibbs, 1990:19). Furthermore, there was an exceptionally high number of discharges among members of the Native Military Corps, to ‘purge the non-European army services of “unsatisfactory elements” which inevitably forced such individuals to resort to crime in order to survive, rather than assisting them to rehabilitate themselves’ (Gibbs, 1990:24).

The discrimination against women and against coloured and African volunteer soldiers was dramatic. Bertha Solomon pointed out in parliament that the gratuity payments indicated that ‘the country is only half as grateful to the women volunteers as it is to the men’.

7. The policy was based on extensive social investigation. Questionnaires were sent both to volunteers and employers and completed by a total of 119 355 men and 13 883 women (Gibbs, 1990:27).

8. The policy was not well administered and took 5 years to implement. Some individuals spent more than six months waiting in dispersal depots, either for employment or for financial assistance (The Star, 26 October 1945, cited by Gibbs, 1990:31). According to one informant, ‘it was badly applied, chaotic; the implementation was shoddy’ (interview with military historian).

The benefits and procedures were too complicated and cumbersome. They created confusion and disappointment. ‘Had it [the demobilisation scheme] treated everyone equally, and paid out lump sum grants instead of attempting to assess the individual merits of each application, the scheme would have stood a greater chance of success. Instead of making demobilisation simple and efficient, the scheme adopted in 1944 was complicated by too much bureaucratic red tape and too many possibilities for misunderstanding and disappointment. Most of the time there was confusion over what soldiers were entitled to, and what procedures should be followed. The result of this was disillusionment and frustration, the very sentiments the government had hoped to avoid’ (Gibbs, 1990:62).

9. The policy was extremely expensive. The cost was in the order of £60 500 000 (Gibbs, 1990:40). According to one informant, ‘it would have been simpler if the money had been divided among volunteers’ (interview with military historian).

10. It was claimed that the policy was a success. ‘The promise has been carried out: there have been no forgotten men. South Africa’s demobilisation scheme, probably the best in the world, has reinstated nearly 300 000 ex-volunteers in civilian life’ (Sunday Times, 2 January 1949). According to two historians, ‘gradually thousands of servicemen, some of whom had never before earned a living except in uniform, were placed in a position to support themselves in useful occupations in peacetime commerce and industry, as farmers or in the civil service, or in any capacity suited to their individual talents’ (Martin & Orpen, 1979:356).

The programme was favourably compared with that after the First World War. ‘The present comprehensive and scientific approach to demobilisation is in marked contrast to the position during and after the
Great War of 1914-18. In relation to the Great War, demobilisation had its bare dictionary meaning – the disbanding of troops. Such plans as were made for the returned soldier were haphazard, uncoordinated and completely inadequate. In the final result, demobilisation as a process for promoting the effective return of the soldier to civilian life failed completely. History has not repeated itself’ (Directorate of Demobilisation, 1945: 1155).

At that time, ‘Unemployment, together with a lack of housing and an economic depression, led many ex-servicemen to feel that they had been let down by the government. This disillusionment contributed significantly to the defeat of Smuts’s South African Party in 1924’ (Gibbs, 1990:20).

11. The 1944 policy also caused disillusion, dissatisfaction and social tensions. For instance, there were tensions between those who volunteered and those who did not. In the public service ‘there was a considerable amount of ill-feeling between returned soldiers and their fellow employees who had not “joined up’“ (Gibbs, 1990:58). Some non-volunteers who were employed in key areas and responded to an appeal by General Smuts to remain in their jobs were especially disgruntled. ‘We feel we are getting a raw deal from the government by just being cast side and treated in the same category as people who opposed our entry into the war’ (cited by Gibbs, 1990:58). ‘The resentment of those displaced or economically disadvantaged by the return of ex-volunteers was not easily dissipated’ (Gibbs, 1990: 60). In fact, the policy contributed in some measure to the defeat of the United Party in 1948. The United Party had ‘made a calculated investment in the white ex-serviceman and woman through its demobilisation scheme. Compared to the benefits offered by the other Allied nations, the scheme was generous and comprehensive. However, the hoped-for political dividends at the election polls were negligible in comparison to the other liabilities which brought about its downfall. In the re-fashioned post-war world, ex-soldiers and their votes were not a major concern’ (Gibbs, 1990:61).

12. Demobilisation was part of the process of demilitarisation of the economy and society. Commenting on the total involvement of the nation in the war, J.H. Hofmeyr said, ‘This war is a people’s war if ever there has been one. Never has the civilian had to bear so large a share of the burden of war as members of the various women’s and men’s units, as war workers, as civilians. The plain ordinary citizen should have an overwhelming predominant claim to whatever fruits of peace there may be’ (cited by Gibbs, 1990: 1).

Much can be learned from this policy at this point in South African history. Phillip van Niekerk has posed the question, ‘How will the new South Africa remember those who died in Angola and Namibia, fighting to win wars that history will proclaim to have been unjust? Perhaps the SADF has realised its only hope is a neutral commemoration where courage in battle alone will be recognised – where those South Africans who drowned on board the Mendi will be honoured alongside those who perished at Cuito Cuanavale. By finding a way to honour the long-forgotten Mendi, they are finding a way to honour their own wars’

(Weekly Mail, 19 February 1993).