Document(s) 11 of 16

For more than 30 years, land-mines have claimed civilian victims in southern Africa. In 1961, in northern Angola, a land-mine claimed its first human victim. By 1997, all countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have had land-mine incidents on their soil, with the exceptions of Mauritius, the Seychelles and Lesotho. All countries in southern Africa maintain stockpiles of land-mines.¹ It is the most mine-affected region in the world (Human Rights Watch, 1997:1-16).

‘Mines may be described as fighters that never miss, strike blindly, do not carry weapons openly, and go on killing long after hostilities have ended. In short, mines are the greatest violators of international humanitarian law, practising blind terrorism.’

– International Committee of the Red Cross

¹ South Africa announced in 1997 that it will destroy most of its stockpile and retain a small number for training of troops in demining.

The production and importation of land-mines

Anti-personnel land-mines have featured prominently in the colonial and post-colonial wars that have plagued much of southern Africa for the last three decades. During this period, many millions of landmines were imported into southern Africa; others were manufactured in the region. More than 66 different types of anti-personnel mines from 21 countries have been found in southern Africa. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Cuba, China, former Czechoslovakia, France, former East Germany, former West Germany, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Romania, South Africa, former Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Britain, United States, former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

Most of these land-mines reached southern Africa in direct sales, although in the case of former Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa land-mines were purchased in contravention of United Nations sanctions. South Africa used stocks of land-mines captured in its invasions of southern Angola in the 1980s to supply insurgent forces in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In covert aid up to 1991, the United States supplied land-mines to Unit a rebels in Angola. The Malawian military has received United States-manufactured mines as part of a military co-operation agreement. More recently, in 1993-4, Unita rebels in Angola purchased weapons, including land-mines, on the open market and in contravention of United Nations sanctions.

The transfer of land-mines to southern Africa has been complex. Stocks of French land-mines cleared in Algeria were sold to Mozambique in the 1970s. In Mozambique, government and Renamo mine clearance has not resulted consistently in their destruction; they have been preserved for re-use or sale. Algeria’s re-sale demonstrates clearly why land-mines should be destroyed as soon as they are lifted (Human Rights Watch, 1997:75).

Two countries in southern Africa have certainly produced anti-personnel land-mines: South Africa and Zimbabwe. Namibia may also have been a producer according to United States military assessments. The only other countries in Africa to produce land-mines are Egypt and Uganda. Zimbabwe Defence Industries produced an anti-personnel claymore mine, the ZAP, inheriting the capacity from the Rhodesians. Officials say that they stopped producing these mines in 1992, after Mozambique’s Rome General Peace Accord, but ZAPs were for sale at the Bulawayo International Trade Fair in 1993, and in 1996 the London-based Centre for Defence Studies reported that Zimbabwean- manufactured anti-personnel mines had been exported to Sudan’s Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Smith, 1996:13). Zimbabwe Defence Industries recently opened its factory to inspection by the Zimbabwe Campaign to Ban Land-mines to prove it was no longer manufacturing anti-personnel land-mines.

BACKYARD LAND-MINE SALES

Sue Wixley

Campaigners against anti-personnel land-mines were horrified by an advertisement that appeared in a newspaper’s classified section offering land-mines as ‘do-it-yourself’ protection for South African home-owners. A Cape Town-based man who described himself as a ‘commodities dealer’ placed an advertisement in the ‘Under R200’ column of The Star for M-18 Claymore, SPM, PMN and PMD-2 mines. He claimed to have already sold a stock of mines to South Africans for about R150 each. He said that one or two people ‘would be placing them in strategic places in their gardens near high security walls’. He did not feel that land-mines were a serious danger to people since, in his view, they would explode only if an object or body weighing more than 45 kilograms was placed on them.

The South African Campaign to Ban Land-mines was quick to condemn the advertisement and to point out the deadly dangers of mines. ‘Mines cause loss of limbs, burning, blinding and death. Injuries are difficult to treat because mine explosions drive dirt, cloth, metal and plastic fragments into the tissue and bone of the victim.’ The Campaign also argued that the incident underlines why it is important for governments to destroy stockpiles to ensure there is no leakage from state armouries.

Zimbabwe’s mines have been used in Namibia and Mozambique, although the date and method of transfer are uncertain.

South Africa has also produced a series of anti-personnel mines: the M2A2; the R2M2; the No.69 MK.l; Shrapnel Mine No.2; SA NonMetallic AP and the MIM MS-803. All were produced by Armscor. South Africa’s mines have been found in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and exported further afield to Cambodia, Rwanda and Somalia. There is no evidence that South Africa has exported anti-personnel mines since March 1994.

In 1996, the Minister of Defence stated in parliament that South Africa had 261 423 anti-personnel mines and 49756 anti-tank mines. In addition to its own mines, the country had stocks of more than 20 other types of mines from six other nations. In South Africa, Spescom (part of Denel) has a project to develop three separate mechanisms to self-detonate or self-destruct mines after a stipulated period.

On 19 February 1997, the South African government announced its decision to ban anti-personnel mines comprehensively. On 21 May the South African National Defence Force detonated the first of 211 controlled explosions of the stockpile, which consisted of 186 408 anti-personnel mines, 13 038 practice mines, 48 484 jumping mines, 2 059 practice jumping mines and 11 434 foreign mines. During a further stocktaking an extra 51 346 mines were discovered in state arsenals, bringing the total inventory to 312 779 anti-personnel mines. These stocks were valued at R47 million.

On 31 October 1997, local NGOs and the media witnessed the final destruction of the last of South Africa’s 1 000 operational mines. The SANDF maintains a stockpile of 5 000 mines, which are kept for research and development work on mine-protected vehicles and for the continued development of mine-clearance techniques. A further 13 000 training mines have been kept and used for training personnel in techniques of how to breach a minefield and how to remove mines.

The consequences of land-mines

Angola is the most affected country in the SADC; it has many millions of mines in its soil. Only Afghanistan is more heavily mined. Angola also has one of the highest rates of land-mine injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about 9 million, it has over 70 000 amputees (1 in 470 people), the majority injured by land-mines (Africa Watch, 1993:2).

A conservative estimate is that southern Africa has some 20 million mines in its soil, of which some 400 000 have been cleared since mine clearance efforts began in 1991. Land-mines have claimed more than 250000 victims since 1961. Despite international clearance efforts in Angola, land-mines continue to be planted by both Unita and government forces. In 1996, land-mines were used in criminal acts in Angola and Mozambique. The re-laying of land-mines in central Mozambique by criminal groups linked to drug- and gun-running, to stop the restoration of state control in remote areas, worried the government, particularly because some of these mines have been on access roads to the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric powerline rehabilitation project.

Child victim of a land-mine in Angola, 1994 (Photo: JCRCI Thierry Gassmann)

A close look at southern Africa’s land-mine legacy over the last 30 years reveals few examples where anti-personnel mines have provided real and lasting military advantages. The Kariba power station in Zimbabwe was protected by minefields by the Rhodesians in the 1960s and 1970s, but was ineffective unless also protected by observation and direct fire. Saboteurs simply shovelled their way across the minefield, did damage and left (Rupiah, 1996:112). Defensive minefields in Mozambique were quickly breached by Renamo rebels during the 1977-92 war, and in Angola the defensive mine-belts around the main towns did not stop Unita from capturing several of them.

Only when anti-personnel mines have been used in contravention of humanitarian law, and with tremendous civilian cost, have they provided short-term military advantages – such as Frelimo, during 1972-3, in its Tete offensive against the aldeamentos (protected villages) in its nationalist struggle against Portuguese colonialism (Vines & Borges, 1995:21-2). In the 1976-92 war and in the 1992-4 war, Unita also used land-mines to deny food production and access to water sources in certain areas of Angola, resulting in tremendous civilian suffering. Soldiers and guerrillas alike fear and dislike land-mines. Renamo had to offer special privileges to its forces to clear and use them (Human Rights Watch, 1994:30). An Angolan sapper from the Forcas Armadas Angolanas admitted in October 1996, ‘I hate mines. They destroy the lives of Angolans on a daily basis and make our country poorer. They are the worst sort of environmental pollution you can find.’

The land-mine legacy in southern Africa has serious environmental consequences too. In Zimbabwe, the border minefields have become a haven for tsetse fly. Wildlife also suffers. Mines used by poachers in Angola’s Mupa National Park have decimated elephant stocks, while in Zimbabwe since 1980,9084 cattle have been reported killed in minefields. The Hwange and Gonarezhou national game parks have reported many mine incidents involving wildlife and there have been several cases of wounded buffalo attacking people living near the parks.

Unlike many other weapons, land-mines are blind weapons that cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of a person gathering firewood. Casualty rates indicate that they recognise no cease-fire and, long after the cease-fire has stopped, they can maim or kill the children and grandchildren of the soldiers who laid them.

Distinguishing features of land-mines

Two characteristics distinguish land-mines from other weapons and cause them to be particularly insidious. First, they are delayed-action weapons. They are not meant for immediate effect, but are primed, concealed, and lie dormant until triggered. In theory, mines can be directed at legitimate targets. However, because of the time lapse between when mines are laid and when they explode, they frequently strike civilians. Land-mines are indiscriminate weapons or, at least, are weapons indiscriminate in their effects (McGrath, 1994:1-20).

The lifespan of a land-mine is long. A man who planted a landmine in northern Angola in 1965 returned 30 years later with a sapper. The mine was still operational and could have killed or maimed during that time. In many cases, those responsible for laying the mines have died, which makes locating them more difficult.

The ongoing threat created by live land-mines can prevent civilians from living in their homes and using their fields, and can seriously threaten the ability of an entire country to rebuild long after war has ended. Fear of land-mines, whether present or not, denies land and homes to people who are hesitant to return. In Mozambique’s Maputo province, the village of Mapulenge, which had been the centre of a community of 10 000 people, was deserted for four years because local people had been told it was mined. A mine clearance operation in 1994 took three months and uncovered only four mines; these, and the spreading of rumours, had been sufficient to depopulate an area for four years. Four anti-personnel mines, costing US$40, resulted in years of fear and tens of thousands of dollars spent, before the community felt safe to return. In Mozambique, the United Nations concluded a contract for the clearance of 2010 kilometres of roads in 1994. Many of these roads had been closed for years, yet the clearance produced only 28 mines; other less hazardous ordnance items were also uncovered.

The SADF used mines in northern Namibia during their occupation, primarily in fenced and marked areas around military encampments and installations, but also around powerlines. Despite the strict precautions taken, maintaining the fields proved difficult and dangerous. Maintenance was important because animals and the effects of the weather had an impact on the fields. Soldiers involved in maintenance suffered accidents because, on occasion, mines moved some 30 centimetres in the ground. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996:31-2). The difficulty of maintaining minefields ensured that the SADF scrapped plans in 1988 to build a 30-kilometre-long minefield along Namibia’s northern border. It was also assessed that such a barrier would only delay any potential invasion by 30 minutes.

The land-mines planted by the SADF in northern Namibia still disrupt civilian life. South African-manufactured anti-personnel land-mines were not properly cleared when the forces withdrew just prior to independence in 1990. These have continued to result in the injury of people and livestock. On Friday, 22 December 1995, at 10.10 a.m., a 12-year-old boy, Absolom Luuwa, lost his left leg when he stepped on a South African R2M2 anti-personnel mine in the minefield South Africans had laid around Ruacana before Namibian independence in 1990. Absolom’s family was devastated. He could no longer walk to school and was sent 80 miles away to a hostel. His family cannot afford to pay for his medical treatment. The community is frightened by the threat of land-mines and has relocated the local school, causing children to lose study time. The councillor of Ruacana, Absolom’s uncle, explained in April 1996: ‘This minefield has been cleared twice by the South Africans and now by the Namibian Defence Force with United States military help. But these mines still kill and maim. We don’t trust anybody now about these mines – Americans, South Africans and our government. The solution is to ban these mines, and those who make these killers should pay for their legacy. Ruacana cries because of mines. Our families want them eradicated. If you can do it for smallpox, you can do it for land-mines.’

The second distinguishing feature of land-mine use is the particularly egregious nature of mine injuries. The majority of land-mine explosions that do not cause death result in traumatic or surgical amputation. In Angola, there could be some 70 000 victims seriously maimed by land-mine injuries. As reported in the British Medical

ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND-MINES FRIEND OR FOE?

One of the key arguments against a ban on anti-personnel land-mines is that these are weapons of high military value and that the indiscriminate effects can be moderated through compliance with military doctrine and the rules of international humanitarian law. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) surveyed the actual use and effectiveness of these weapons in conflicts.

The study concluded that there were few instances where anti-personnel land-mines have been used according to international law. ‘Mines are rarely used “correctly”, whether by “developed” armies, “Third World” armies or insurgents and their effects cannot easily be limited as law and doctrine presume’ (ICRC, 1996:7). The study argued that it is unwise to justify the continued use of anti-personnel land-mines on the premise that they will be deployed in a carefully controlled manner.

The following conclusions were drawn about land-mines placed in a traditional manner in marked minefields:

• Establishing, monitoring and maintaining an extensive border minefield is time-consuming, expensive and dangerous. These minefields have not proved successful in preventing infiltration.
• Effective marking and mapping of land-mines is extremely difficult under battlefield conditions.
• The cost to forces using anti-personnel mines in terms of casualties, limitations of tactical flexibility, and loss of sympathy of the indigenous population is higher than has been generally acknowledged.

The evidence suggests that, even when used on a massive scale, anti-personnel land-mines had little or no effect on the outcome of hostilities. No case was found in which the use of anti-personnel land-mines played a major role in determining the outcome of a conflict.

The study described a number of alternatives to anti-personnel land-mines, such as fences, physical obstacles and direct fire, as well as improved intelligence, mobility and observation. It argued that these means have already been employed and found effective by military forces.

Many military veterans would support these conclusions and a ban on anti-personnel land-mines. Military veterans in South Africa from the Council of Military Veteran Organisations, the APLA Military Veterans’ Organisation and the MK Military Veterans’ Association favour a world-wide ban. They argue that the horrendous humanitarian impact of land-mines is far outweighed by any limited military usefulness.

(Source: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996)

Journal in 1991: ‘Land-mines . . . have ruinous effects on the human body: they drive dirt, bacteria, clothing and metal and plastic fragments into the tissue causing secondary infections. The shock wave from an exploding mine can destroy blood vessels well up the leg, causing surgeons to amputate much higher than the site of the primary wound’ (Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993:6-7).

The result for the individual is not one but, typically, a series of painful operations, often followed by a life at the margins of a society heavily dependent on manual labour. In Zambia, Sylvia Maphosa, a pregnant housewife, stepped on a land-mine laid over 15 years ago, while collecting firewood outside Lusaka. She sustained severe head wounds and had her right limbs shattered in the explosion. She cannot walk and speaks with difficulty.

Clearing land-mines

Mine clearance cannot effectively deal with the crisis; it is too little, too late. When undertaken at all, efforts are badly funded and poorly co-ordinated. Only US$45 million has been invested in mine clearance in southern Africa since May 1991, resulting in less than 400 000 mines being cleared, the majority from large defensive minefields.

Clearance efforts are not without controversy. In Mozambique, United Nations mine-clearance efforts became a victim of interagency competition for control over funds and bureaucratic delays. It was also thrown into disrepute when a US$7,5 million humanitarian contract for clearing priority roads went to a consortium consisting of the British weapons manufacturer Royal Ordnance, Lomho de Moçambique and Mechem of South Africa, a subsidiary of Denel. Royal Ordnance and Mechem are companies which have produced land-mines in the past, some of which, in all likelihood, have been found in Mozambique. Awarding mine manufacturers with clearance contracts is known as ‘double dipping’. In mid-1995, Mechem received a further United Nations contract for clearing priority roads in Angola and, in 1996, a new contract for Mozambique.

Even if de-mining was given top priority, it would not be a solution. World-wide, mines are being laid faster than they are being removed. Moreover, while the average mine costs between US$10 and $20, the average direct and indirect costs of removal range from US$300 to $1 000 per mine – a ratio frightening in its implications for a region with roughly 20 million uncleared mines and new ones still being planted. Even if technology and economies of scale brought mine-removal costs down by a factor of ten, the cost of mine clearance would still be so prohibitive that clearance alone could not ameliorate the crisis.

The Land-mines Protocol

The Land-mines Protocol, an international treaty intended to diminish land-mine use against civilians, has proved utterly ineffective in stemming the crisis. Although the original Land-mines Protocol of 1980 contained provisions to curb certain kinds of use, it had many failings. It did not touch upon the problem of temporal indiscrimination inherent in mine warfare: the effects of mines that outlast their military utility and place civilians at risk, typically on a long-term basis. In failing to take into account that mines will strike civilians and combatants without distinction, and that the effects of land-mine use cannot be controlled, the Land-mines Protocol failed to conform to existing customary international law, particularly as set forth in Additional Protocol I (1997) to the Geneva Convention of 1949.

Angolan victim of a land-mine (Photo: Mail & Guardian)

Complex rules, discretionary language, and broad exceptions and qualifications further limit the utility of the Land-mines Protocol. It contains no enforcement mechanisms. Even its limited rules are rarely followed. Armies both regularly use mines deliberately against noncombatants and fail to take even minimal precautions to safeguard against collateral harm to civilians. For example, Zimbabwe inherited a lengthy border minefield, which the Rhodesians boasted was the second largest human-made barrier in the world, second only to the Great Wall of China. More than a million anti-personnel mines were laid in this minefield. The early minefields were constructed in a conventional manner, demarcated on both sides by security fencing on which were prominently displayed warning signs. By 1977, the Rhodesians stopped demarcating the minefield on the hostile side and stopped maintaining them. Mine laying became uncontrolled and unrecorded, and booby trapping flourished. This is in direct contravention of the Land-mines Protocol. These minefields remain lethal today, frequently claiming new victims. Clearing the minefield will be dangerous, costly and time-consuming.

The Land-mines Protocol is part of the 1980 United Nations Inhumane Weapons Convention and was reviewed from October 1995 in a three-stage process, ending in Geneva in May 1996. The revised Protocol continued to be weak, the result of the lowest common denominator being agreed upon in the search for consensus. Military considerations dominated the discussion, to the almost complete exclusion of humanitarian concerns. Nations concentrated on negotiating loopholes to restrictions on use, while giving no attention to negotiating the elimination of the weapon.

Perhaps the most objectionable part of the revised Protocol was its support of the continued use of anti-personnel mines. Rather than stigmatising their use as indiscriminate killers of civilians, the Protocol encourages nations to use a certain kind of mine that is promoted as having less impact on civilian populations: those that self-destruct and self-deactivate, and are detectable – ‘smart mines’, as they are often called. But the ‘smart mine’ technological solution to the problem is not a lasting one. The southern African experience indicates that land-mines are rarely used responsibly, that there are often complications, and that a single mine accident can affect a community for years. Smart mines continue to have a failure rate that results in civilian casualties.

Among the other serious flaws in the Protocol are the absence of any verification provisions and the lengthy transition period. Many governments acknowledge its weaknesses, but argue that it is a modest step forward. The scope of the Protocol has been extended to internal conflicts, the cause of much of southern Africa’s land-mine contamination. Problematically, it is the state that will determine if and when an ‘internal disturbance’ becomes an ‘internal conflict’. The provision that all anti-personnel mines are detectable was welcomed but it will take eight years to come into force. The new article on suppression of serious violations is also welcomed, but may have little effect without accompanying verification measures.

To those unfamiliar with the consequences, mines may not initially evoke the nightmarish visions of warfare conducted, for example, with chemical or biological weapons, traditionally thought of as weapons of mass destruction. However, in their inability to distinguish between civilian and military targets, the numerous deaths and terrible injuries they cause, and their potential for massive long-term devastation, land-mines are not very different.

The use, production, stockpiling and transfer of biological and toxic weapons were banned by international treaty in 1972 as ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind’. Mounting evidence of the destruction caused by land-mines has led human rights groups, and humanitarian and development organisations throughout the world, to call for a similar total ban on land-mines. A total ban on production, stockpiling, transfer and use of land-mines is preferable to the existing restrictions contained in the Land-mines Protocol.

A total ban on land-mines

Only a ban on all uses of land-mines comports with customary humanitarian law, particularly as expressed in Protocol!. The experience of recent decades in southern Africa has been that if combatants have access to land-mines, they will use them in abundance, typically without regard for the limited, but quite complex, rules prescribed by the Land-mines Protocol. Since 1961, in every war, every group has used land-mines indiscriminately.

The Portuguese colonial military forces, apartheid South African units, Rhodesian forces, MPLA, FNLA and Unita in Angola, PLAN in Namibia, MK in South Africa, Coremo and Frelimo in Mozambique, and ZANLA and ZIPRA in the Rhodesian war all used land-mines in disregard of the rules prescribed by the Land-mines Protocol. The same is true in the post-colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique, where the governments, supporting forces such as Cubans, Tanzanians and Zimbabweans, rebel groups Unita and Renamo, and FLEC separatist groups have used land-mines in a manner in which civilians were the greatest victims.

A complete ban would be easier to monitor and enforce than intricate regulations that will always engender debate on whether a particular use is permissible or not. The current Protocol does not provide for monitoring respect of its conditions or penalties for violations.

Given the magnitude of the crisis, the only way to affect use is to attach to land-mines the same stigma attached to chemical and biological weapons. Such a stigma cannot come about if some uses of land-mines are legal and others illegal, with interminable arguments over particular cases. The stigma must be attached to the weapon itself. But it is not really possible to create universal revulsion against land-mines without a simultaneous ban on production, stockpiling and transfer.

Seeking a total ban is not based on idealism but on a realistic assessment of the facts. Experience has indicated again and again that if combatants have ready access to land-mines, they will use them. Only a squeeze on supply can affect use.

A ban on production and export will not drive all suppliers from the field. Nevertheless, it is easier to create international revulsion against the weapon if the number of supplier countries is reduced from the current estimated 50 to perhaps fewer than half a dozen. While 50 suppliers cannot be treated as international pariahs, a handful can. If the number of producers and exporters is reduced, remaining suppliers will see land-mines not as the relatively cheap commodity they are today, but as a weapon for which a premium can be charged. The premium would represent the monetised cost of breaking a political and legal ban on the weapon. The greater the revulsion, the greater the premium. No one knows how far the number of producers and exporters must drop to cause an increase in the unit cost of land-mines. No one knows how much the cost of land-mines would have to be raised to affect combatant behaviour and reduce land-mine use. The combination of a total ban, international stigmatisation of users and suppliers, and the possibility of censure or sanctions against producers makes the proposal for a complete proscription more viable than simply proposing further modest, and likely unenforceable, restrictions.

The move to a ban appears to have overtaken the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) as the approach to control mines, making the new Land-mines Protocol already irrelevant. Fifty nations support the call for an immediate ban. At the end of the CCW process, the Canadian government announced that it would hold an Ottawa Conference in October 1996, to which countries sympathetic towards a ban of land-mines would be invited. From 3 to 5 October 1996, the Canadian government sponsored a pro-ban meeting. This historic conference brought together 50 governments that pledged support for a total ban on anti-personnel mines, as well as 24 observer states, dozens of non-governmental organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other international groups. The Ottawa Conference yielded three significant results: a final declaration recognising the need to ban anti-personnel mines by the 50 government participants; the conference chairperson’s agenda for action, an outline of steps needed for reaching a ban; and the historic announcement by Canada’s Foreign Minister at the closing session that Canada was prepared to hold a treaty-signing conference for a total ban in December 1997. The conference also featured perhaps unprecedented co-operation between governments and NGOs, which has continued to the present day.

The Ottawa process

The success of this ‘Ottawa process’ has been stunning. On 10 December 1996, UN General Assembly Resolution 51/455, which urged all states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning anti-personnel land-mines, was passed by 156-0, with ten abstentions. No African states abstained. Austria hosted a preparatory meeting from 12 to 14 February 1997 to begin discussions of the elements of a ban treaty. In all, 111 governments participated, though many of them were not prepared to commit to a December 1997 deadline. South Africa, the first nation to speak, made a particularly strong statement in support of the Ottawa process. Austria circulated a draft ban treaty prior to the conference that served as the basis for discussion.

Belgium hosted a conference in late June 1997 in which 107 governments endorsed a declaration supporting the principles of the Austrian draft ban treaty, the negotiation of the treaty in Oslo in September 1997, and the signing of the ban treaty in Ottawa in December. Some 29 African nations endorsed the Brussels Declaration.

In all, 89 governments came to Oslo as full participants, and another 32 as observers. The negotiations, which lasted from 1 to 18 September, produced a treaty that drew high praise from NGOs. South Africa chaired the conference. The treaty prohibits the use, production, import and export of anti-personnel land-mines. It requires destruction of existing stockpiles of anti-personnel mines within four years and destruction of mines in the ground within ten years. It also requires governments to provide detailed information about anti-personnel mine stockpiles and minefields. It calls on states to provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation of mine victims. Some 25 African countries were participants, and 5 were observers.

After Oslo, Canada introduced a UN General Assembly resolution supporting the December treaty signing. This resolution was passed by 106 countries, 30 of them African. Finally, on 3-4 December in Ottawa, two thousand people from 155 nations gathered to be present at the signing ceremony. Altogether 122 countries signed the treaty. Out of Africa’s 53 states, 37 signed; all SADC countries signed except the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. South Africa was the third country to sign the Ottawa treaty, in recognition of its leadership in the Ottawa process. Mauritius also made history by being one of the three countries that immediately ratified the treaty: there need to be 40 ratifications before the treaty enters into force.

Conclusion

On 20 February 1997, South Africa demonstrated bold leadership by announcing a comprehensive ban on the use, production and trade of anti-personnel mines, effective immediately, and its intention to destroy existing stocks, except for ‘a very limited and verifiable number . . . solely for training specific military personnel in de mining techniques and for research into assisting the demining process’.

South Africa’s ban announcement was preceded by other important steps. In March 1994, South Africa announced a formal moratorium on anti-personnel mine exports. The moratorium was turned into a permanent ban in May 1996, when it was announced that all use of anti-personnel mines was suspended. South Africa has also played a prominent role in supporting the Canadian initiative.

On 26 February 1997, the Mozambique government announced an immediate ban on the production, sale, use and unauthorised transportation of anti-personnel mines. The previous day, President Chissano had told the opening session of the 4th International NGO Conference on Land-mines that Mozambique would propose a land-mine ban to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the SADC. A representative of the Swaziland government said it would sign the Ottawa ban treaty in December and Malawi said it also supported a total ban and is waiting for parliament’s approval. Tanzania’s Foreign Minister stated in a letter to the conference that it would urge the SADC members to sign a protocol banning anti-personnel land-mines.

Although the Angolan and Zimbabwean governments have made diplomatic signals that they are interested in a ban, they are finding their militaries reluctant to deny themselves the option of using anti-personnel mines in the future, despite clear evidence that they have little utility, and that they are disliked by soldiers.

Various coalitions of non-governmental organisations and concerned people have formed campaigns to ban land-mines in southern Africa, the oldest being the Mozambique Campaign Against Land-mines. The South African Campaign to Ban Land-mines began in July 1995, followed in September 1996 by Zambia and, in October, Zimbabwe. A campaign began in Angola in November 1996. The movement has rapidly spread beyond just NGOs and has been endorsed by the ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDHA, the United Nations Secretary-General, the most influential media sources and, increasingly, governments around the world.

The OAU has endorsed a total ban, first with a resolution of the 62nd Council of Ministers in June 1995, and again in 1996. The Organisation of American States adopted a resolution in June 1996 calling for the establishment of a hemispheric mine-free zone. The six Central American states declared themselves the first mine-free zone in September 1996 and the CARICOM (Caribbean) states followed suit in December.

A region-wide ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines in southern Africa is an achievable goal. An OAU meeting held in Johannesburg in May 1997 examined a ban proposal as well as mine clearance and victim assistance issues, and drew international attention to the fact that, since 1961, when the first land-mine was laid in southern Africa, land-mines have never been used responsibly. On the few occasions when they have, they have continued to kill and maim years after their perceived ‘military utility’ has expired. The rogue use of land-mines by insurgent groups and criminal gangs is also easier to police if stockpiles are destroyed and anti-personnel mines are eradicated in the SADC.

International and regional momentum is growing rapidly. The SADC nations should follow the example of the Central American and Caribbean states to become the world’s third mine-free zone. This is what many of their citizens seek. In Mozambique, a petition campaign in 1994 obtained over 100 000 signatures for a ban, while in South Africa over 12 000 have signed a petition. Angola obtained 70 000 signatures.

SADC has committed itself to the concept of a regional ban. During its summit in September in Lilongwe the member states signed a protocol committing themselves to creating a mine-free southern Africa. The new members of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Seychelles were also obliged to sign the SADC treaty and other legal documents which would make them formally adhere to all decisions taken by SADC, including joining the Ottawa process, and signing the treaty in December and the commitments it envisaged.

But there is much that SADC can still do. All SADC countries need to ratify the Ottawa treaty. To get all countries that signed in Ottawa to ratify the land-mine treaty could take a long time. There also needs to be pressure on the countries that hold out, the US, China, Russia, Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, Eritrea and the two SADC members, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. Ensuring compliance among those who sign and ratify may be a problem too. There needs to be international monitoring, and civil society in southern Africa will play an important role in this.

Afonso Lumbala, a 32-year-old farmer from Caxito in Angola, has first hand-experience of land-mines: he stepped on an anti-personnel mine in April 1995. ‘His view is: ‘All soldiers lay these mines. They don’t care about us, the people. We suffer for them. They never warn us about mines; we find out by losing our limbs. We want them to clear the mine mess and leave us alone. The leaders and their soldiers are responsible for this. So are the people who make these evil weapons.’ SADC governments should listen to this advice.

Document(s) 11 of 16