Riemvasmaak is an example of how the military benefited from apartheid forced removals. It also highlights the need for clear policy and mechanisms to guide the process of restitution of military land.

The case of Riemvasmaak indicates that there are many lessons to be learnt about the development process:

• resettlement should not be allowed without the provision of basic infrastructure;
• development capacity needs to be built in communities and government, and is a process in which NGOs could be more involved; and
• in the case of large-scale returns, the appointment of a development
  planner could ensure co-ordination among all the role-players.

A number of recommendations can also be made about military land.

• Policy needs to be developed about the principles, process and mechanisms of restitution and redistribution of military land.
• This policy needs to be co-ordinated between the Ministries of Land Affairs, Defence and Public Works.
• The defence force should indicate its commitment to social justice by returning land from which people were forcibly removed to its rightful owners, through a process of negotiation.
• The defence force should commit itself to clearing land of military debris when land is returned.
• Educational programmes and material should be developed to empower civilians who return to former military land.
• Sound environmental management of military properties is essential – particularly to ensure the continuous clean-up of military debris to prevent restitution and redistribution being hindered at a later stage.
• Environmental education should be incorporated into the basic training of all soldiers and in the core management functions of all officers.
• Ongoing research and monitoring of the impact of military activities on the environment must be undertaken.
• The capacity of communities needs to be built to manage the conversion of bases to civilian purposes.

THE SANDF: CONSERVATION OR CONTAMINATION

Penny Mckenzie

South Africa has experienced little local debate about the relationship between defence and the environment. This is partly the result of the narrow way in which both defence and environmental issues have been understood in South Africa. The military emerges from a repressive and secret past, while environmental issues have historically been viewed as white, middle-class concerns. The relationship between the SANDF and the environment has been ambiguous and contradictory. While it has prided itself on being environmentally conscious, it has also been implicated in such environmental scandals as ivory and rhinohorn smuggling. Furthermore, it both benefited from and was directly involved in dispossession to acquire some of its land.

The SANDF does not own land but is allocated land by the Department of Public Works. In theory, the SANDF recognises the responsibility of this relationship, arguing that ‘defence force land should be considered a national asset given in trust to the NDF to utilise for national purposes. Therefore, this land should be utilised and managed in such a way as to ensure its long term potential for non-military use after the NDF does not require it anymore for military use’ (SANDF, n.d.). However, communities involved with the SANDF have alleged that the military often conducts negotiations as if they own, rather than control, the land (Mckenzie, 1996).

In 1991, the SANDF was the fourth-largest single land-controlling authority in South Africa (Godschalk, 1991:10). Until 1993, the SANDF controlled 600 000 hectares or approximately 0,5 per cent of the land in South Africa. In 1993, the SADF stated: ‘Of this, 500 000 ha is undeveloped and is used for training areas, bombing ranges, shooting ranges and buffer zones around airstrips and ammunition depots’ (Farmer’s Weekly, 1993:10).

Subsequent rationalisation of military land has indicated the SANDF’s recognition of the increasing pressures to use the land for other purposes. General Meiring, Chief of the SANDF, said at the 1995 awards for nature conservation, ‘Land and the utilisation of land has become a very prominent issue in the Republic of South Africa. Demands and pressures to utilise land under control of the defence force for other purposes are increasing daily’ (SANDF, 1995). Since 1986, the defence force has returned 227 680 hectares of land to the Department of Public Works (Defence Secretariat, 1997:2). The Riemvasmaak Training Area (70 000 hectares) has been returned to the community and there is agreement to hand over the Schmidtsdrift training area. The defence force currently controls 492 140 hectares of land (Defence Secretariat, 1997:2).

Some of the larger defence force areas are:

• Lohatla 135 854 ha
• Touwsrivier Training Area (Cape) 14 857 ha
• Oudtshoorn Training Area 13 393 ha
• Vastrap Weapons Range (Upington) 49 994 ha
• Schmidtsdrift Training Area (Kimberley) 34 986 ha
• General de Wet Training Area / De Brug (Bloemfontein) 16 974 ha
• General de la Rey Training Area (Potchefstroom) 23 599 ha
• General Piet Joubert Training Area (Wallmansthal) 13 706 ha
• Madimbo Training Area 27 899 ha
• Hell’s Gate Training Area (St Lucia) 3 800 ha
• Boschhoek Training Area (Dundee) 3 381 ha
• Grahamstown Training Area 5 970 ha AFB Hoedspruit 5 375 ha
• 97 Ammunition Depot (De Aar) 6 284 ha
• Pomfret Training Area 5 192 ha
• Mosita Training Area 4 043 ha
• 91 Ammunition Depot (Roedtan) 3 895 ha
• Sterkrivier Training Area (Gravelotte) 5 648 ha
• AFB Louis Trichardt 4 032 ha
• Artonvilla Training Area (Messina) 3 135 ha
• Roodewal Weapons Range (Pietersburg) 3 240 ha

There are a number of indicators that the SANDF is concerned about environmental issues. These include the existence of an environmental unit, the management of some facilities as conservation areas, and the running of an annual competition for units that show the best progress in certain aspects of environmental services.

The defence force established a Nature and Environmental Conservation Unit in the early 1980s. Initially, the environment was conceived of mainly as an area for nature conservation and the preservation of flora and fauna. The scope was later extended and functions such as environmental planning were incorporated. The name of the unit was changed to the Environmental Services Unit (interview with SANDF officer 1995).

The unit has six areas of activity:

• integration of environmental planning into military activities;
• research into the environmental impacts of military activity;
• ecological management of military properties;
• environmental management of the built-up military environment (base areas);
• cultural resource management at defence force facilities; and
• environmental education (SANDF, n.d.).

There are gaps in the unit’s work which might be the result of low staffing (there were between 20 and 25 people in the unit in 1996) and resource constraints. ‘The lack of sufficient funds for environmental services has to a large extent prevented the development of effective environmental service support for the military utilisation of NDF facilities’ (SANDF, n.d.). The unit has done little research into the impact of military activities on the environment. ‘We know very little of the impact of the military . . . There is a need to give more attention to military impacts on properties and involve external people in this’ (interview with SANDF officer, 1995).

Another positive aspect of the SANDF’s approach to the environment is that all military facilities are managed as conservation areas. Five areas have been proclaimed nature reserves and seven have been registered as Natural Heritage Sites because they contain rare fauna and flora. The Heidelberg Training Area is one of only two places where the Heidelberg copper butterfly is found. The heath Erica heleogena is only found in its natural state at the Klawer Valley military area near Simon’s Town. Middelburg has cycads and Boschhoek has an indigenous forest (Godschalk, 1991: 1 0; Deacon, 1994:28).

Ecological management includes ‘soil erosion control, veld management, invasive plant and bush encroachment control, controlled burning programmes, wildlife management and special conservation measures for numerous rare or endangered species on military property’ (Godschalk, 1991: 11).

There is a range of game on SANDF land including kudu, springbok, gemsbok, giraffe, elephant, cheetah, rhino and sable. The SANDF regards its record for managing game populations on training areas as one of the ‘most outstanding success stories’. For example, at the General de Wet Training Area near Bloemfontein there were only 32 springbok when the land was acquired for military purposes in 1955. The number of springbok increased to the point where 14 000 had to be removed between 1976 and 1991 (Godschalk, 1991: 12). The SANDF’s pride is perhaps reflected in the naming of military equipment after animals such as the Buffel, Ratel and Cheetah.

Among some conservationists, the SANDF is regarded as having a good conservation record. For example, a review of SANDF bases concluded that ‘even if the impossible happened and the SADF disbanded entirely, its priceless natural assets would be handed back to the nation with a clear conscience’ (Deacon, 1994:30). As demonstrated in the case studies, the positive impact of military activities on the environment lies in the fact that it ‘protected’ areas from human impact. The flip side of ‘protection’ is that people were disadvantaged by being denied access to the land.

Two issues highlight the negative side of the SANDF’s environmental record: the militarisation of conservation areas through the activities of the SADF and its role in rhino and ivory poaching.

The activities of the SADF have resulted in the militarisation of conservation areas. Close links existed historically between the military and some national parks. Game reserves situated near borders – such as the Kruger National Park and the Ndumu Game Reserve – were regarded by the SADF as buffer zones preventing the entry of illegal immigrants and guerrilla soldiers. The SADF had two units in the Kruger National Park – one to protect wildlife against poachers and the other to arrest Mozambican refugees. Some of the park staff were former members of the SADF, and some Kruger National Park rangers were former reconnaissance unit members (interview with National Parks Board official, 1995). The militarisation of some parks is visually demonstrated by the military-style uniforms worn by staff, saluting and the military approach to wildlife protection. Militarisation of nature reserves led to a perception among neighbouring rural people that the parks were linked to the apartheid security apparatus (interview with development worker, 1995). Direct evidence of this link is that reserves under the control of the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Nature Conservation were used to train the Inkatha Freedom Party’s Self-Protection Units (Mail & Guardian, 22-28 September 1995).