Document(s) 7 of 11

Introduction

This study is divided into four parts. The first part discusses historical trends of the eviction-centred-redevelopment policies of the 1950s and 1960­70s relevant to the joint-redevelopment policy of the 1980s. The second part — the case of Sang Kye Dong — analyzes the socioeconomic malfunction of the eviction policy adopted in the joint-redevelopment plan. The third part describes the rise and fall of the poor people's movement in response to the evictions; the right to housing is also discussed. The final section presents the conclusions.

This research was conducted using two methods: a literature survey; and an intensive verbal, qualitative case study, compiled through directed interviews. The literature survey provided general macrolevel facts regarding urban redevelopment and evictions. The case study focused on individual experiences of evictions at the microlevel.

The recent history of redevelopment policy

1950s

1960–70s

Because the political ideology of the government was to put national economic growth first, basic urban facilities, including housing, water supply, and a sewage system, received the least funding. The poorer groups were obliged to solve their housing problems by themselves. Their squatter houses were located near the downtown area, close to their workplaces (Figure 1). The eviction-centred policy of the SMG continued. The SMG looked on the residents of squatter settlements as criminals trespassing on government land and constructing illegal houses. This caused an asymmetrical antagonism between the government and the squatters. As a result, the "nonprovision eviction policy" of the 1950s and the subsequent "coercive relocation," enforced by bulldozers, continued.

During the 1960s, while the relocation project of the SMG was under way, it was regarded as a plan for the temporary accommodation of those evicted. Eviction was emphasized, but resettlement was overlooked. Because the evicted had no incentives to settle down permanently, most sold the land distributed to them and moved back to the midtown area of Seoul.

In the 1970s, the SMG, faced with the shortage of vacant land in the inner city, built a large-scale settlement town, Kwangju complex, in Kwangju county, Kyong Ki province, 25 km from downtown Seoul. But the area was just a vast tract of land without opportunities for employment, education, or commerce. This was the motive for the large-scale demonstration of the residents on 10 August 1971, known as the "people's collective protest for the right to the city," which showed potential for developing into an urban social movement that would challenge the government's legitimacy.³ In response, the government started to design new ways to take full advantage of the existing housing facilities and the idle labour force. The plan was to mobilize the participation of the residents and, at the same time, to discern any signs of community movements before they got out of hand. In this context, during the 1970s, the housing-redevelopment policy reached a new phase, legitimizing squatter dwellings or reforming them into normal residencies. This policy was legitimized in 1973, when the Interim Housing Improvement Act was passed.

Under the new Act, change of land use in redevelopment areas was permitted. This enabled illegal buildings to become legitimate and the unlicenced plot of land to be approved with preemptive rights. Also, by selling the unlicenced shacks to the squatter dwellers, the SMG sought to reduce the financial burdens of providing the urban infrastructure. By transferring state property to private ownership, "efficient" land use was made possible. The policy also provided ideological legitimation externally, with the catchphrase "improvement of housing conditions by self-help," in the face of opposing community movements. But this was only a strategy to change the status of the squatter settlements by enacting an improvement policy that legitimized illegal housing.

In the meantime, realizing that "eviction without provisions" would bring about antieviction struggles, the SMG devised a plan to compensate the evicted just enough to avoid community movements. So in the 1970s, the eviction policy included a variety of policy instruments such as financial aid for the evicted, rights to purchase municipally managed apartments, and a collective resettlement policy, as detailed below (see also Table 1):

• Policy of collective resettlement in the suburban areas — This was a policy promoting housing districts in undeveloped areas and the construction of tenement houses in allocated areas. Squatters, mostly living within 2 km of Seoul city hall, were collectively moved to outer parts of the city, yet to be urbanized, about 10–14 km from city hall (Lee 1977; Kim 1989). But, as with the collective-relocation policy of the 1960s, most of the residents moved back into the central parts of the city after selling their rights to the newly built residences.
• Policy of offering municipally managed apartments — This was a redevelopment policy to compensate evictees by offering them municipally managed apartments. Municipally managed apartments were the result of on-site redevelopment. In this case, the squatter areas were mostly in radial areas 5 km from Seoul city hall (Lee 1977; Kim 1989). Especially in the late 1970s, when there was a real-estate investment boom, a takji (certificate or ticket giving the right to purchase an apartment) was sold well above its original price, and eventually owners were persuaded to sell theirs. The evicted people's poverty was another incentive for them to sell their tickets. The purchase rights were mostly sold to middle-class people, including lower-level white-collar workers.
• Policy of financial aid — This policy was what the SMG called the "provision to protect the poor," which meant granting the evicted people 100 000–500 000 KPW (in 1998, 1 278 won [KPW] = 1 United States dollar [USD]). At an earlier stage, this policy served as a subsidiary to other policies, but as living costs rose as a result of overinvestment in real estate, this financial aid was far too little to compensate for high rents. 

Although the government partially accepted the residents' demands for eviction compensation and housing rehabilitation, the policy had changed in form only. The government's goal was to win over the residents by concealing any opposition to its policy (Table 2). The strategy to raise the quality of the physical environment, without consideration for the welfare of the squatters, resulted in the reduction of the relative and absolute housing space of the poor, sacrificing it to the housing space of the middle class. The poorer group, constantly threatened by evictions, moved away to the outer parts of the city, eventually causing the enlargement of the city. Although squatter tenants made up more than half the population of the eviction areas, no compensation was provided for them because they were not considered as experiencing any adverse consequences.

The new mode of eviction policy in the 1980s: joint redevelopment

The change of direction and the development of the joint-redevelopment plan

It wasn't long before the SMG grew interested in those areas. As the conflict between the state and the urban poor spread to the outer city, the shortage of vacant undeveloped land grew even worse. During 1965–85, housing prices rose by a factor of 50.5, whereas land prices rose by a factor of 163.7. This was due to the land-exhaustion phenomenon (KNHC 1987). Especially in the early 1980s, the increase in the urban population demanded new development and redevelopment of decent districts. To legitimize the government, which was jeopardized in the course of seizing political power, the 5th Republican Government (1980–87) tried to win over the middle class by helping them realize their dream of owning their own homes. In the early 1980s, a construction plan for 5 million houses was devised, and the redevelopment of illegal-squatter areas in the outer city was also discussed. But, of course, this policy, which had only political slogans, without any administrative and financial support, couldn't be promoted and was buried under the economic-stabilization policy.

As the need to redevelop the "underdeveloped area" in the outer city increased, conflicts between the government and the squatters became more frequent. So the key to the eviction policy was to reduce any conflict between the government and the residents and, at the same time, consolidate the city space efficiently. To solve the latter problem, a "public-managed development" strategy was planned, and to solve the former, the privatization of the eviction plan was prepared.

In the public-management strategy, the state mobilized administrative and financial resources and took full responsibility for redevelopment, including efficiency, costs, and property acquisition. The Mok Dong area (Figure 2) was a case in which that policy was applied. The Mok Dong area was located on the side of an arterial road to Seoul's Kimpo International Airport. The road parallels the Han river. This area, including much of the river banks, remained underutilized, although it was occupied sparsely by squatters. And the area was visible to foreign visitors using the airport. From the standpoint of the city managers, this made it a priority spot to be redeveloped. But the public-management plan only resulted in the organized resistance of the residents and damage to the legitimacy of the state's development policy because of its failure to socialize the development profits (Chang 1990).

After the failure of this public-management policy, the SMG adopted a policy of privatization, but with indirect state intervention. Although privatization was inevitable, the SMG didn't want full privatization. Thus, to leave room for indirect intervention and to vitalize redevelopment, the participants were diversified. The idea was to have interest groups, such as those with investment or speculative capital, intervene. At the same time, the SMG had a divide-and-control strategy to limit the residents' organized resistance.

In the late 1970s, the flow of oil money from the prospering Middle East came to a halt, and this led to a stagnation of the construction industry in the early 1980s. The redevelopment project was promoted in 1983 to make use of the idle construction personnel and capital. In the midst of the squatter-area redevelopment, the newly built apartments became objects of speculation for small- to mid-scale capital owners, known as pokbuin (fortune women). The SMG also invested idle capital to assist the residents who couldn't afford the development.

But the poor people collectively resisted the state's eviction policy, claiming that their right to the city was at stake in the course of the eviction redevelopment. The SMG needed a plan to dissolve the residents' solidarity and thus weaken their resistance. This brought about the plan to use part of development profits as a device for amelioration. Soon there was a split between the squatter owners, who received slight compensation, and squatter tenants, who received nothing. This was the so-called joint-redevelopment plan, in which the construction company took responsibility for the project, including payment for the residents' land, and the residents supplied the land.

The characteristics of the joint-redevelopment policy

• The redevelopment cooperative, constituted by squatter owners in the region, was to be the main agent of the joint redevelopment;
• The construction company was to be selected by the cooperative;
• The construction company was to lend each household 5 million KPW, free of interest, and ensure that the area was completely vacated; and
• The construction company was to make a profit by selling the houses left after distributing houses to the previous home owners and should therefore build 1.5–2 times more houses than the number of previous owners. 

The SMG was responsible only for managing the redevelopment process and for selling some parts of unsold government properties. In this respect, the joint redevelopment could be characterized as "privatization of housing redevelopment." The government's intervention decreased, and the construction company's interest in maximizing its profits was to take its place.

As the profits that the construction company would make depended on there being units left over after distribution to the cooperative members, the company wanted to construct as many apartments as possible. The SMG, to ensure that it could "anticipate the construction company's participation," responded to the company's requests. The former building law permitted only a 50% volumetric ratio, so the building-to-land ratio was increased to 400%, enabling the company to construct highrise buildings (Kim 1985). The housing redevelopment was reactivated after being delayed by many obstacles. As a result, the SMG was able to raise more revenue by collecting taxes from the newly built legal houses and by selling government land. For instance, in 1984, the SMG made 10 billion KPW from selling government land in Kuro District 1 and Cheon Ho District 1, where redevelopment was occurring.

The government could also minimize the political costs of discordance with the residents because, with the new plan, the conflict was between the cooperative and the residents. Thus, the SMG could efficiently achieve its goals while mobilizing the least number of administrative forces and providing the least amount of financial support. The practical precipitators in the redevelopment were the speculative capitalists, a hidden factor. The urban poor, who lived on a day-to-day basis, could only feel intimidated by the moving costs and the long wait for construction.

Speculators took advantage of the prolonged redevelopment process. They sold takji, at a slightly higher price, to appease the former residents and also to enable outsiders to infiltrate the community as home owners and convince the residents to agree to the redevelopment.

Let us now consider the social and economic outcome of the joint redevelopment. In March 1987, apartments for 29 564 households, had been or were being constructed on a land space of 445 000 pyong in 44 redevelopment districts. This was about three times the scale of the 4 010 apartments on 140 000 pyong in 15 districts anticipated in the original November 1985 plan and 1.5 times all of the housing development executed from 1974 to 1985.

The joint-redevelopment plan seemed to be more rational than the approach taken in the past. Nearly all the illegally occupied government or public land was put on the market and included in the capitalistic system through the development plan. Housing construction increased immensely because the profit depended on the number of high-density apartments built. For example, in 1987, the number of apartments to be built was 29 564, more than twice as many as the households to be evicted (14 446).

But on the whole, the joint redevelopment not only ignored the poorer groups' housing problems but actually aggravated them. During the first 2 years of joint redevelopment, the evicted households numbered 4 666, which represented 48% of the newly built apartments. This showed that the increased housing stock was of little use.

It can be noted that each of the illegal shelters had an average of 2.5 households, including both owner and tenants. Before, the owner and tenants maintained friendly relations. In most cases, the tenants' deposit represented part of the payment for the house. Also, the rental income formed a considerable proportion of the owner's total income. In times of crisis, such as unemployment or long-term disability, home owners could easily become tenants. Tenants, through savings, could become home owners. As the owner­tenant relationship was interchangeable, there was little cause for conflict surrounding the ownership of the house.

The tenants began to distrust the redevelopment plan when the profits were distributed in an unequal way, and soon the tenants' movement evolved. As they were excluded from the redevelopment benefits, the tenants organized a movement, claiming the right to the city (Lee 1986; Hong 1990). The tenants' struggle, which had started as an owner–tenant conflict, eventually developed into a political struggle against the redevelopment plan itself.

The owner–tenant conflict concerning evictions spread as the home owners were displaced by speculative-capitalist outsiders, who hastened the redevelopment to pursue their own profits. What had apparently been a conflict between tenants and owners became more a matter of tenants versus outsiders as the eviction period drew nearer. The residents' inner conflict was in fact a conflict between the tenants, who stressed the utility value of the houses, and the capitalists, who emphasized the exchange value of the houses.

But actually, the owners were victims, too. The owners usually disposed of their houses at a slightly higher price than the market price to speculators who had information before the public notice. So the former owners received only a small proportion of the redevelopment profits. In the course of disposal, the owner often became a tenant of the outsider who bought the house. Eventually, the residents moved to squatter areas. At the time of joint redevelopment, the clearance of squatter areas increased, which meant that the home owners had no option but to use up all their allocations when the shortage of houses caused housing costs to soar (Cho and Cho 1988).

In conclusion, the public authorities had developed a new model, joint redevelopment, to appropriate redevelopment costs by introducing both construction and speculative capital. The government's intention was to transfer all the rights concerning the redevelopment to the redevelopment cooperative, thus enabling the privatization of the plan while remaining a third party. This strategy, which partially included the owners but excluded the tenants, served as a device to divide and control the owners and tenants. In the course of the joint redevelopment, people were evicted from their accommodations by brute force and replaced by the middle class. This fact was revealed in the case of the eviction gangs mobilized for coercive eviction in some areas where there was resistance.

Joint redevelopment: the case of Sang Kye Dong

The overall situation of Sang Kye Dong

The beginning of the evictions: the enforcement of joint redevelopment

The situation of the area before redevelopment

Despite lacking basic urban services, such as public transportation, water supply, and sewage systems, the residents enjoyed a comfortable atmosphere in which the neighbours were always willing to help and cooperate with one another.

The characteristics of the joint-redevelopment plan

The tenants had no rights to the redevelopment area, causing many of them to leave spontaneously and individually. During the initial stage of redevelopment, up to 271 squatter-tenant households left without even claiming any housing rights. Some of the tenants organized struggles, asserting their housing rights. The main issue was to build a community in a new place. In response, the redevelopment cooperative and the construction company provided them with a settlement area in Pocheon, Kyong Ki province, 30 km from the eviction area (Figure 4). In May 1986, 134 households settled in that area. But the tenants who had organized the movement refused to move to the Pocheon area, demanding a place with better living conditions.

The government forcefully evicted the people remaining in Sang Kye Dong on 14 April 1987. Several households had left individually, tired of the struggle. Ultimately, 374 tenants' households moved out; 73 tenants' households remained struggling, but they later moved their sites to Myong Dong Catholic Church, appealing to public opinion. In June 1987, with some financial aid from the Church, 39 households were able to leave the temporary settlement. The new settlement they moved to was located in a greenbelt area in Namyangju county, about 4 km from the redevelopment area (see Figure 4). The 34 households that resisted until the end moved to the outer part of Pucheon city, Kyong Ki province, in January 1988, with the support of the construction company.

The research

As shown in Table 3, this study covered 457 households (30% of the total 1 528 households involved). Because of the difficulty detecting the individual movers, who were all scattered, only 20% of the total owners put to analysis were found to be resale owners, and 23% of the tenants were found to be individual movers. The collective movers were much easier to survey because of geographic conditions.

With the help of the Dong Residence List, provided by the Dong administrative office (the lowest local authority), the Illegal House List, and the List of Actual Residents in the Apartments, it was possible to trace the movers and confirm which households had actually moved in. The status of social welfare (whether or not the people were scattered) and the level of housing were determined through face-to-face interviews and questionnaires.

The effects of the joint redevelopment on owners and tenants

Changes in the level of home ownership

Most couldn't afford to pay for the house or to cover the management expenses. The new apartments were much too large for the poor people. The government standard for poor peoples' houses was 24 pyong, but the supply of houses close to that size was far too low. The demand amounted to 817 households, whereas the supply was only 330. This situation occurred because large houses were more profitable to the construction company.

Tenants, receiving no housing subsidy at all, faced a disastrous situation. In the joint redevelopment, only the owners had rights to participate in the cooperative, which left the tenants with no right to protest. But it made no sense to them to have no claims at all:

This area was developed 20 years ago when the Seoul Metropolitan Government moved the evicted people to governmental land, and it thus became a liveable place. So we also have the right to participate in this area's redevelopment program. The market price of the land is 600,000 won and the government is paying 300,000 won for it, but the benefits all go to the owners. Until now if the owners have paid the government rents, we have paid much higher rents to the owners. In fact, we were the people who occupied the governmental land, as tenants, and not the owners, who didn't even live there. We also have rights concerning Sang Kye Dong.

EFFECTS ON HOME OWNERSHIP: A SYNTHESIS — The redevelopment directly affected housing ownership and rent levels of the residents of the area. The Sang Kye Dong redevelopment affected ownership in four possible ways — some owners remained as owners, some owners became tenants, some tenants became owners, and some tenants remained as tenants (Table 4):

• Of the original home owners, 29% bought new houses. Most of the houses bought were in squatter areas, and after purchase, most owners rented them out to subsidize the payment for the house.
• Of the original home owners, 71% became tenants after redevelopment. They either sold their right to purchase or returned the deposit to former tenants, which left them with just enough money to rent another house at a higher price. Before redevelopment, as owners, they had no worries about rent or moving expenses, but in the course of redevelopment it turned out to be otherwise.
• Tenants who became owners after redevelopment constituted less than 1% of the total households. In most cases, these tenant households had secondary incomes from family members, and the tenants were merely carrying out their previous plans to purchase a house through the redevelopment.
• Tenants who were still tenants after the redevelopment fared the worst. Most of them mot only had to pay high rents and moving costs, but also lost their employment-information network; 99% of the tenants were in this category. They moved to nearby squatter areas, causing rents to rise. In the Sang Kye Dong area, the rents rose by as much as 100%. Of the tenants, it turned out that 78% of them paid higher rents after redevelopment; 19%, the same; and 3%, lower. 

Geographical mobility of owners and individually moving tenants

The movers moved only 2 km from their original residences (63% of the owners and 67% of the tenants, as shown in Table 5). The short distance was due to local advantages, such as employment, schooling, and other facilities.

Effects on housing welfare

Owners had more or less the same or better housing conditions and neighbourhood facilities after the redevelopment as they had had before. But they had difficulty with degree of access. According to Table 6, 44% of the respondents indicated that their housing conditions had improved, and 40% said these conditions had remained the same. The number of rooms and the floor space remained the same or increased. The number of households sharing a house was the same.

Tenants who moved individually experienced the worst changes in housing conditions. They moved to new squatter settlements near their former homes. The number of households sharing a house increased by 90%. The floor space available to each household decreased, and 84% of households experienced a decrease in the number of rooms — they now had one, instead of two. The rents increased, but the overall housing conditions were similar or even worse. The marketplace was not as convenient. The supply of electricity remained the same. The degree of access to employment decreased. Unemployed people searched for their former housemates to obtain employment information. Commuting and attending schools was difficult because people started to use public transportation, increasing transportation costs and time — formerly, they had walked.

Households had to pay the psychological price of leaving their community and adjusting to a new atmosphere. People who moved out later were sometimes called "demonstrators" in their new neighbourhoods.

Effects on collectively moved tenants: those most adversely affected

Those who participated in the antieviction struggles moved collectively. The three groups of collective movers differed in their degree of struggle. Those who moved out last were the ones who struggled the most. They were moved out of Seoul into Kyong Ki province. In May 1986, tenants moved to Pocheon county; in June 1987, to Namyangju county; and in January 1988, to Pucheon city (see Figure 3).

The resettlement area in Pocheon county was 30.5 km north of Sang Kye Dong. It took more than 1 hour to get from Seoul by bus, which ran every 2 hours. Those who were moved on 30 May 1986 were allocated 10 apartment houses that had been converted from poultry farms and pigsties into housing for 145 households: 4- to 5-pyong shelters built on a 3116-pyong plot of land.

It was evident that the houses were inappropriate for human dwelling. The walls were too weak and thin for protection against the cold or the heat. The neighbourhood smelled of leather, furniture, machines, cement, and straw bags, and there were no convenient utilities nearby. For medical or administrative services, residents had to walk for more than 30 minutes or take a taxi. It took 30 minutes to get to the local market; 85% of the residents went to the markets in Seoul instead. Access to educational institutions was poor. Schools were nearby, but 25% of the middle-school students and 100% of the high-school students went to schools in Seoul. Despite the transportation difficulties (the money and time involved), high-quality education was the only hope for these people's children: of the heads of households, 67% were labourers; 13% were in small-scale trades; 7% were factory workers; 7% were drivers; 3% were janitors; and another 3% were office workers.

At first, the only job opportunities were in Sang Kye Dong. Thus, people had no choice but to bear the transportation costs and physical fatigue of commuting. As time went by, old people and women changed job sites to nearby leather, furniture, straw-bag, and veneer-board factories. But even at the time of this research, more than 80% of the men were still commuting to Seoul and Sang Kye Dong. The residents had been given 600 000 KPW for settlement fees, provided that they not move again for 5 years. Consequently, they could not move to other places; nonetheless, 27% secretly left their houses empty and rented other houses in Seoul.

Doksong Rhi, a new settlement in Namyangju county, was in the greenbelt area in Kyong Ki province, about 4 km from Sang Kye Dong. The government tore down the new settlement every 15 days or so, claiming that construction was forbidden in that area. The residents called this place Borum house (which means "15-day house"). Registration of permanent-address transfer wasn't permitted, which greatly inconvenienced people receiving mail, etc. In this settlement, 65% of the heads of households were labourers; 17% were in commerce; 12% were factory workers; 4% were drivers; and 2% were janitors.

The houses in Nare village (meaning "let's live here with wings wide open") were made of vinyl. They were originally built for people raising crops. The neighbourhood had one supermarket and one nursery. The marketplace, hospitals, pharmacy, and administrative office were all 4–5 km away, up in Sang Kye Dong. People used the mountain stream for water supply. Schools and workplaces were all in Sang Kye Dong, and the transportation was very inconvenient. The area had no public telephones, let alone any cultural facilities.

Kokang Dong was in Pucheon city, Kyong Ki province, about 40 km from Sang Kye Dong. Here, on an 850-pyong land tract, was where the final strugglers — the "39 households" — settled, in January 1988. Soon after they moved here, the government of Pucheon city tore down their temporary shelters. The reason it gave was that the area was near the highway where the Olympic Torch was to be carried. The government was worried that this settlement of homeless people might lower the country's reputation. Before three temporary tenements were built in July 1988, the people were forced to live in underground caves.

The condition of the public housing was as follows: The houses were built with thin blocks, and each house was about 8 pyong, with a temporary screen to separate the kitchen from the main room. At first, they had no water supply or sewage system. Also, no electricity was available. However, public medical service was better than in the other two resettlement areas. The market was nearby, but the school and work sites were very far, causing transportation problems. Seventy percent of the people commuted to Seoul, and 80% of the middle- and high-school students attended schools in Seoul as well. Of the heads of households, 68% were labourers; 11% were in commerce; 13% were factory workers; 4% were janitors; 2% were drivers; and another 2% were unemployed.

THE JOYS AND SORROWS — The reclaimed community was built through sacrifice. The most important secondary effects of the evictions were poverty, the destruction of families, and the loss of humanity. For instance, an elderly woman moved with the collective movers, but her two sons moved out individually. As normal domestic and work life became impossible, four couples divorced: one each in Pocheon and Namyangju counties and two in Pucheon city. Some people showed mental disorders. Many felt intimidated by the harsh treatment.

But the children suffered the most. They witnessed their parents demonstrating, being taken away by the police, and being beaten up. Children would scream in terror on seeing a hammer. "They are going to tear our houses down!" However, external oppression sometimes results in internal solidarity. Several autonomous organizations and a community life developed in the villages. Students', young people's, men's and women's, and parents' associations provided places for discussion of various topics concerning the village. Support for the elderly was one of the most important concerns.

Their common experiences enabled the people to share their sorrows and joys with one another. The solidarity of the residents was strong, and they also maintained ongoing relationships with other urban-poor associations in Seoul. They never lost hope for the future. They named their places Saiteo ("new land") and Narai ("wings",) and Boram ("fruitfulness") for hope. The collective movers who moved to Saiteo, in Pocheon county, were planning to construct three 15-story apartment buildings in 1992: 165 households were to move into 20-, 24-, and 30-pyong apartments. This plan was executed without any outside aid.

The Narai village, in Namyangju county, was left with transportation and public-facility problems. In October 1990, 25 households moved into the new permanent-rent public-housing apartments in Shinheung Rhi 4, Namyangju county. Each house was 13 pyong and required a rent-deposit of 1.280 million KPW and monthly rent of 50 000 KPW. Thirty percent of the workers commuted to Sang Kye Dong; 50%, to Seoul; and 20%, to Kyong Ki province.

The Boram village of Pocheon used to have extremely inconvenient and neglected buildings. For some time, the people who moved there received help from the urban-poor associations, but soon a conflict arose. Some moved to nearby tenement houses, and the other 11 households (mostly Roman Catholic) stayed in the community village. Their intention was to construct community houses for other poor people like themselves.

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Document(s) 7 of 11