Document(s) 8 of 19

More and more we learn (or do we?) that liberties, security and well-being can only be founded on well used lands, whose productivity is safeguarded and improved from year to year and generation to generation. But social justice . . . must also prevail. For injustices to farmers and peasants have in many times and places brought about the decay and decline of agriculture and with them social unrest.

— W.C. Lowdermilk
(introduction to Reifenberg 1955)

WATER HAS BEEN INTEGRAL to local and regional politics in the Middle East for centuries. Water was recognized by the early Zionists to be critical to the success of their dreams. The territorial — and water — claims made by Zionists early in the 20th century were predicated on “the requirements of modern economic life” (Weisgall, as quoted in Zarour and Isaac 1993). These requirements were based, in large part, on the availability of water resources. The World Zionist Organization’s submission to the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919 clearly delineated the proposed boundaries of Palestine to include the headwaters of the Jordan River, the lower Litani River in Lebanon, and the lower reaches of the Yarmouk River. These boundaries were initially drawn up by Aaron Aaronsohn, the head of an agricultural experiment station on the Mediterranean coast, and were based on watershed boundaries (see the interesting discussion of this in Wolf 1995). At the conference, Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first president of the State of Israel, stated that it is “of vital importance not

only to secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources” (Hurewitz 1959, as quoted in Lowi 1992, p. 39; see also Hosh and Isaac 1992, for more recent history). Weizmann later clarified this statement noting that the guiding consideration is economic and “economic” in this connection means “water supply” (Wolf 1995). Water was not simply viewed as a valuable natural resource, but as essential to the livelihood of the Jewish people and the viability of a Jewish state.

Until the 1930s, development in Palestine was easily accommodated with existing water supplies. By the middle of the decade, however, increasing settlement required the development of new sources. During the next few years, there were various surveys and initiatives developed in the region to assess the availability of water resources and to determine what an “equitable” apportionment might be to present and future residents. The most contentious issues at the time, however, were Jewish immigration and the carrying (or absorptive) capacity of the land.

Two detailed water resource surveys that were undertaken during the 1930s are worthy of note. This first was commissioned by the British government in 1930 to evaluate the potential for irrigation and hydroelectric power in Palestine. The focus was to be on defining this “absorptive capacity” of the land (and hence, the potential for Jewish immigration) without unduly affecting the then-existing Arab population. The report, prepared by Sir John Hope–Simpson, concluded that there were large tracts of cultivable land in Palestine, but it did not adequately assess the hydrology of the region and was, therefore, of little use (Doherty 1965). A second survey of water resources, focusing specifically on the Jordan Valley, was undertaken in 1937 by M. Ionides, a British employee of the Trans–Jordanian government. Although the plan proposed a diversion scheme for the Yarmouk River (later adopted in part by the Jordanian government), it also concluded that there were insufficient water resources in the river to sustain a Jewish state (Doherty 1965; Naff and Matson 1984).

While these two surveys were being conducted, supporters of a future Jewish state were also active. In the mid-1930s, the newly established national water company, Mekorot, developed a plan to supply

water to western Galilee, which then became its first construction project. Toward the end of the decade, Zionists in the United States, possibly alarmed by the Ionides report, convinced the American government to commission an independent study by W.C. Lowdermilk of the US Soil Conservation Service. The notion of comprehensive planning for development of the water resources of Palestine began to take hold and will be reviewed in more detail in the next chapter.

Although more detailed histories of the development of water resources and water institutions in Israel are available (see, for example, Wolf 1995), it requires only this brief overview to illustrate the strategic significance of water to this region and, specifically, to the State of Israel. The essential nature of water to the country — due largely to its ideological ties to agriculture and the importance of immigration — is as relevant today as it was in the early 1900s, as suggested by an incident related by Heller and Nusseibah (1991, p. 108):

So frightening was the spectre of future water diversion that in the mid- 1970s a Labour government generally opposed to Jewish settlement in the West Bank nevertheless decided to establish a small number of settlements in Samaria, a few kilometres east of the Green Line, in order to forestall the possibility that the initial catchments of the western aquifer would be turned over to foreign control.

Water Politics from 1948 to 1967

A secure supply of fresh water was an important goal for the early Zionists. It later became explicit policy for the State of Israel. The reason for this was clear; unencumbered access to fresh water was seen as a necessary condition for economic growth and security. The pursuit of this goal — dating back to early civilizations — had raised tensions between various states and factions in the region. Before the 1967 war, Israel and the neighbouring Arab states had occasionally feuded over access to Jordan River waters. Naff and Matson (1984), on the one hand, document a dozen water-related cease-fire violations in the Jordan River basin between 1951 and 1967. On the other hand, during this period, all of the Jordan River riparians more or less accepted the shares of water defined for them by the Johnston Plan in 1955. Despite increasing demands for water for agricultural, industrial, and domestic

purposes during the decade before 1967, the status quo seemed tacitly acceptable.

Although we do not subscribe to this view, some analysts have speculated that the need for more water was a major factor in Israel’s involvement in the 1967 war. Myers (1993, p. 38), for example, states that “Israel started the 1967 war in part because the Arabs were planning to divert the waters of the Jordan River system.” This contention is based on a discussion Myers had with General Moshe Dayan in the mid-1970s. Dayan apparently told him that “Israel unleashed its planes and tanks as soon as it learned that Syria and Jordan were moving to cut off water flows from rivers that originated outside Israel’s borders” (Myers 1993, p. 9). This contrasts, with a detailed analysis by Slater (1991, as cited in Wolf 1995) that Dayan was very reluctant to launch an attack on Syria and only after repeated pressure from his advisers and a visit from a delegation from the northern settlements did he take action, three days after the start of the war. Cooley (1984) states that “the constant struggle for waters of the Jordan . . . was a principal cause of the 1967 Arab–Israeli war . . . .” Naff and Matson (1984) note that “the increase in water-related Arab–Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the 1967 June War.” Bulloch and Darwish (1993) are even more explicit, stating: “the Six Day War was caused largely by competition for waters of the River Jordan.”

Studies of the history of water and politics in the region offer mixed support for the contention of a hydrologic imperative on the part of Israel (for example, Naff and Matson 1984; Beaumont 1994; Wolf and Lonergan 1994; Wolf 1995). It is true that throughout 1965 the Israeli army attacked construction attempts to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River in Syria. Skirmishes over Arab attempts to divert water from the Banias River into the Yarmouk River continued in 1966 and 1967 (Wolf 1995). These attacks were the result of tensions between Israel and Arab states over the withdrawal of Jordan River water. In 1964, Israel began operation of its National Water Carrier, withdrawing 320 Mm³/year from the Upper Jordan. The Arab states responded by planning two diversion schemes involving the headwaters of the Jordan River (although these diversions had been discussed for over a decade). The first proposed diverting approximately 50 Mm³

annually from the Hasbani River via a tunnel into the Litani; the second involved construction of a canal to divert both the Hasbani and the Banias rivers into the Yarmouk River for irrigation in both Syria and Jordan (Figure 11) (Doherty 1965). What makes the suggestion of a hydraulic imperative on the part of Israel even more confusing is Prime Minister Begin’s admission in 1982 that the 1967 conflict was not “a war of necessity, but a war of choice” (quoted in Ball and Ball 1992). Perhaps the most sensible statement appears in Heller and Nusseibah (1991, p. 107): “The development of Israel’s National Water Carrier and Syrian attempts to divert headwaters of the Jordan River played a part in the chain of events leading to the Arab–Israeli war of 1967.”

At the time of the 1967 war, Israel was tapping all of its available freshwater supplies and beginning to take more than its share of Jordan River water. During the war, Israeli planes destroyed a half-completed dam on the Yarmouk River between Syria and Jordan, and also the intake facilities for the East Ghor Canal (now called the King Abdallah Canal) along the Jordanian side of the Jordan River Valley. These structures would reduce (or would have reduced) flow to either the Upper or Lower Jordan Rivers and thus the water available for use in Israel. Whether these attacks were part of a considered plan or targets of opportunity chosen in the midst of a war is, however, unclear.

Water Politics After 1967

Occupation of the West Bank and the Golan Heights by Israel after the 1967 war significantly changed the dimensions of water demand and supply in Israel. (As a water-deficit region, the Gaza Strip was less important in this respect.) First, it increased Israel’s fresh water supplies by almost 50%. Second, it gave the country almost total control over the headwaters of the Jordan River and its tributaries, apart from the Yarmouk River, as well as control over the major recharge region for the Mountain Aquifer. Third, although the Banias River, flowing off the Golan Heights, is a relatively minor source for the Jordan River, control of the Heights makes Israel the upper riparian on the river, which has important political and legal implications, and which was likely part of the rationale for its annexation by Israel. In recent months, the new Labour government in Israel has offered to return a large part of the

Figure 11. The Litani River watershed and proposed Arab diversionsfrom the Upper Jordan River.

Golan Heights to Syria. It is not clear, however, to what extent the offer includes the sources of the Jordan River and, hence, to what extent it is strategic for water policy — or for that matter whether Syria is interested in any offer less than a return of the entire territory.

Finally, Israel solidified its position on the Yarmouk River (which forms the boundary between Jordan and Syria and then joins the Lower Jordan River within Israel at a point just below the outlet from Kinneret). Israel was always a downstream riparian on the Yarmouk, but now, as a result of the war, it controls half of the river, compared with 10% previously. This change allowed Israel to increase its use of Yarmouk water, and it now appears to be taking about 100 Mm³/year (this water is diverted to Lake Kinneret), most or all of which Jordan would like to regain to supplement its own very limited sources. More importantly, it made any upstream development of the Yarmouk dependent upon Israeli consent. Although secret negotiations between Israel and Jordan after the war permitted the latter to repair the East Ghor Canal on the Jordanian side of the river (Hosh and Isaac 1992), better use could be made of the Yarmouk if a dam were built to store high winter flows or to divert them to Lake Kinneret for later use in Jordan (Kally 1993). Either plan requires agreement, however, with both Syria and Israel, something that is unlikely, even in the context of a limited peace agreement. Syria has built 25 small dams to capture water draining southward to the Yarmouk and would not want the value of these structures compromised.

More recently, according to Naff (1990), Israel refused to allow Jordan to dredge the entrance to the East Ghor Canal, which has been silting since it was reopened two decades ago. By restricting the water flow out of the Yarmouk, the flow into the Jordan River is increased, which benefits Israel. The evidence for this allegation, however, is indeterminate. The problems with flow from the Yarmouk into the canal — as well as the diversion by Israel into Kinneret, situated downstream from the East Ghor Canal — are only apparent in the summer, during low-flow periods. It is rumoured that the Israelis and Jordanians meet on the banks of the Yarmouk for “picnic table summits” to decide on acceptable diversions for each country. Although these are “technical” discussions, they have not, for obvious reasons, been acknowledged by

either country. They do, however, underline the importance of even informal shared agreements when it comes to such a vital resource. Perhaps now with the end of hostilities between Israel and Jordan, informal meetings over a picnic table will be converted to formal meetings around a conference table.

Control of the West Bank and the Golan Heights thus gave Israel access to additional water supplies and better control of existing supplies. As indicated in the foregoing, Israel had for many years been tapping aquifers that rise on the West Bank from within the Green Line. Since the war, the country has become acutely dependent on the aquifers in this region, particularly for drinking water. Almost immediately after the war, Israeli water policies and institutions were extended to the West Bank. As noted in Chapter 3, whenever existing water laws did not allow enough scope, military orders were invoked to ensure total Israeli control over the water resources of the West Bank. The result is — to use a provocative but, nonetheless appropriate term — de facto annexation of West Bank water resources.

In addition to direct use of water from the Mountain Aquifer from wells within Israel, West Bank (and Gaza) water is used to supply new Jewish settlements outside the boundaries of pre-1967 Israel. About 70% of the groundwater on which Israel is dependent, and more than 40% of its sustainable annual fresh water supply, originate in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, mainly in its aquifers. Such figures make it easy to understand (although not accept) the declarations of former Agriculture Minister Rafael Eitan (perhaps the most outspoken politician on the issue) that relinquishing control over water supplies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories would “threaten the Jewish state.”

Zarour and Isaac (1991, 1992), together with other analysts, provide figures that allow for rough comparisons of daily water use per capita within Israel proper and by various aggregations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Table 9; 100 L/person-day is generally taken as the minimum for adequate health and sanitation). In their view, Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are entitled to at least one-quarter of the water resources of the region. They are now getting between one-twelfth and one-sixth.

Table 9. Selected data on water use in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Source: Zarour and Isaac (1991, 1992).

A Potential Surplus on the West Bank

The salient fact about water on the West Bank is that only about 17% (105 Mm³) of the total underground supply is available to the people who have historically lived there (Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993). Israel pumps roughly 450 Mm³/year for its own needs, with another 40–50 Mm³ or so being extracted on the West Bank and going directly to Israeli settlements. Arab communities and farmers are said to get about one-third of their total use from wells; but data on withdrawals from wells are unreliable. The remaining two-thirds comes from river water, springs, and cisterns that collect runoff (Heller and Nusseibah 1991; Zarour and Isaac 1991). In short, only a small portion of aquifer water goes to Palestinians living on the West Bank, with the result that consumption in the more than 100 Jewish settlements is one-third that of the entire Palestinian population. These figures appear to be an accurate assessment of current water use on the West Bank. Lowi’s (1992) claim that water use in the Israeli settlements is approaching that of the entire Palestinian population seems overstated.

All water developments in the West Bank are carefully controlled by the Israeli Military Authority, working in collaboration with the Water Commission, which, as was noted, reports to the Minister of

Agriculture. Policies applied to Arab communities and farms on the West Bank are highly discriminatory (Lowi 1992). For example:

• No Palestinian Arab individual or village has received permission to drill a new well for agricultural purposes since integration, or even to repair one that happens to be close to an Israeli well. Some permits are granted to obtain water for domestic use.
• Palestinians are only allowed to drill shallow wells, around 70 m in depth. In contrast, Mekorot prefers to drill to depths of 300–400 m to get higher flow rates and better quality water. Mekorot wells each yield about 750 000 m³/year, whereas the Palestinian wells yield only 13 000 (Heller and Nusseibah 1991).
• Water allocations recognize only existing uses of water, which, so far as Arab agriculture is concerned, are those of 1968, and allocations are frozen at the 1968 level with only a small margin for growth.
• West Bank Arabs are not allowed to use water for farming purposes after 4:00 PM, despite the fact that evening is the traditional (and sensible) time to irrigate in arid regions.
• Reforestation is prohibited in the recharge areas of the aquifer, except on private plots, to promote maximum runoff and thus recharging of the aquifer.

These regulations are particularly severe because of the dependence of the West Bank on agriculture, and of agriculture on water. More than 85% of the water used in the region is for irrigation (Zarour and Isaac 1991). As noted, it is claimed that the deep wells that Mekorot tends to drill drain water from the shallower wells of Palestinian farmers. Pumped wells create a cone of low pressure that could have the effect of drawing water away from natural springs or from wells that are higher in the water table. The evidence is contradictory, however. Beschorner (1992) cites a half dozen examples of wells and springs that have gone dry or that began to flow intermittently after Israeli wells were drilled nearby. In contrast, Wishart (1989) cites evidence from a military report that in only one case from 1967 to 1980 was there any damage to a Palestinian well, and in that case compensation was offered. Although other effects, such as the prolonged drought, may also be playing a role, the balance of evidence suggests that in at

least some cases the claimed losses are real. Because Mekorot does not accept responsibility, no compensation has been offered in recent years.

To compound the regulatory discrimination, Jewish settlements receive heavy subsidies for water to promote the extension of agriculture. Naff (1990) calculates that the typical Israeli settler farms 50 ha and irrigates for 250 days a year. The farmer pays $0.10/m³ for water that costs $0.34, with the total subsidy cumulating to $29 500 (1988 US dollars) per year. In contrast, West Bank Palestinians receive no subsidy at all. Palestinian farmers pay about the same amount for irrigation water that settlers pay for drinking water. Water supplied by local Arab authorities is even more expensive, as high as $1.20/m³ (Zarour and Isaac 1992). Given that per-capita income on the West Bank is only about one-fifth of that in Israel (and in the Gaza Strip even lower), the inequity is even more pronounced.

Land rights on the West Bank are controlled by the Civil Administration almost as closely as water rights. Land registration by Palestinians has been blocked since 1967, and Palestinians living outside of the Territories can no longer inherit land (Lesch 1992). All land transactions must be approved — and many proposals are rejected. Moreover, through various regulations and military orders, the Israeli government now controls roughly one-half of all land in the West Bank and about one-third of that in Gaza (Lesch 1992). In addition to former Egyptian and Jordanian state land, highways, parks, etc., these lands include large areas reserved for military use and land owned by anyone who was outside the Territories in June 1967.

These (and other) discriminatory practices are enforced through the application of Israeli law to the West Bank. According to Zarour and Isaac (1991): “Although the new legislation conforms to the Israeli water law, it is not consistent with the rights of an occupying power under international law.” Clearly, the dispute is in effect over sovereignty, not just over the division of water supplies.

Disturbing as this system is, it is important that it not be exaggerated. The issue is one of economic development, not of thirst. When he was Water Commissioner, Meir Ben Meir stated the issue starkly: “If the demand is for drinking, we must say ‘yes’; we do say ‘yes’. But we are not going to stop irrigating our orchards so they can plant new ones.” This

position appears to be consistent with international law. Baskin (1992, p. 6) notes that “international law on belligerent occupation . . . only demands that the domestic water needs (home use) be accounted for. Industrial and agricultural development are beyond the definitions of the accepted international law.” Even domestic water supply, however, has failed to grow with the population; since 1967, water allocations for domestic use have been increased by about 20%, whereas the population of the West Bank has grown by 84% (Baskin 1992). Nevertheless, the principal concern is not that Palestinians will have insufficient water for household use; rather it is that they will have insufficient water to establish a viable economy.

The need for West Bank water in Israel, and therefore its dependency on this resource, is hotly contested. Former Water Commissioner Tsemach Yisahi agrees with Rafael Eitan and claims that Israel must hold onto the West Bank “to make sure that Tel Aviv’s taps don’t run dry.” In October 1993, a panel of experts told the Knesset Committee on Economics that “giving up the water sources in the territories as part of a peace agreement would be disastrous” (Mideast Mirror, 19 October 1993). Furthermore, current Water Commissioner Gideon Tsur stated that “Israel could not accept any reduction in either the quantity or the quality of the water available to it” (Mideast Mirror, 19 October 1993). Gideon Fishelson of the Hammer Institute (University of Tel Aviv), however, argues that were there more rational policies in Israel, there would be no need for West Bank water. Similarly, Arie Issar (Professor of Water Resources at the Blaustein Institute) says that there is more to be gained in sharing than hoarding water resources (cited in Pearce 1991). Tahal seems to be coming to the same conclusion. In 1991, Tahal, in conjunction with the University of Tel Aviv’s Centre for Strategic Studies, prepared a report that indicates how Israel could withdraw from the Occupied Palestinian Territories without jeopardizing its security of water supply. A review of this document, which was classified as secret by Israeli censors until late in 1993, and a broader discussion of Israel’s “hydro-strategic” boundaries are provided in Chapter 8.

Some analysts suggest that there could be a surplus of water on the West Bank. Zarour and Isaac (1991) indicate that the “water

potential” for conventional sources of water is 850 Mm³/year, of which 620 Mm³ is “easily available” — which presumably means at moderate capital costs. This statement conforms closely to a figure from Heller and Nusseibah (1991), who state that aquifers wholly or partly located under the West Bank have a renewable flow of 615 Mm³/year. As previously indicated, Israeli wells within the Green Line take about half of this amount; Israeli wells that supply settlements account for another 40–50 Mm³; and Palestinian wells account for another 50–55 Mm³. Thus, both Zarour and Isaac (1991) and Heller and Nusseibah (1991) have concluded that the West Bank has a water surplus of about 200 Mm³/year, even excluding the water that is drawn from the nearly 300 springs in the area and by cisterns and tanks that hold rainwater and runoff. The implication of this situation is that there is considerable room for expansion of irrigated agriculture on the West Bank while still providing for industrial and population growth.

Not everyone agrees with the foregoing analysis. Starr and Stoll (1988) state that water in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is currently being exploited to its limit, and Naff (1990) states that the water of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is being overexploited at a rate of 150 Mm³/year. Both statements presumably include the Gaza Strip, but elsewhere in the same document Naff states that the deficit in Gaza is 70 Mm³, so that in the West Bank must be 80 Mm³. These conclusions may have been based on earlier data, before hydrological studies indicated the full extent of West Bank water resources. Shuval (1992), however, who is fully aware of these data, concludes that the entire region is already, or soon will be, short of water, and that the only solution to this problem would be to bring in additional sources of water from outside the region in a “Regional Water-for-Peace Plan.” Kally (1993) concurs with this view. Most Israelis attending the First Israeli–Palestinian International Academic Conference on Water held in Zurich in December of 1992 (Isaac and Shuval 1994) seemed to agree with Shuval and Kally. Palestinians were more cautious and argued that, were the distribution of water resources equitable, and were they able to manage these resources themselves, the West Bank could manage without outside water.

For the next few years, the volume of water resources potentially available to the West Bank is probably less important than the capital required for the expansion of water-supply and water-delivery systems. High capital costs are the reason why such systems were not built in the past, when water shortages were perennial. Even today, water shortages persist in some parts of the West Bank. Farmers and communities with inadequate capital must rely mainly on springs and shallow wells (supplemented by river water and storage of runoff in cisterns). A lack of access to capital — or, more accurately, a lack of access to capital at reasonable interest rates — is also the reason that Palestinian farmers have used and continue to use inefficient irrigation methods.

A Deficit in the Gaza Strip

The water balance in the Gaza Strip is much worse than that on the West Bank. The region is mining its groundwater, and there are severe problems as well with water quality. In addition, economic development is well short of what would be necessary to allow for adequate standards of living, and far shorter of what would be necessary to improve the quality of life. According to a Dutch government report, Mekorot is supplying water to much of the area, including the towns, larger villages, and certain refugee camps, through the National Water Carrier (Bruins et al. 1991). Some of the water Mekorot is supplying to the Gaza Strip is simply Gaza water pumped up and into the Carrier; however, some, estimated at 2–3 Mm³/year, is a net addition to Gaza. The situation is complicated because Palestinians claim that Israeli wells to the east of the Gaza Strip have extracted water that would otherwise have flowed westward through the aquifer underlying the region, a claim that the Israelis deny (Elmusa 1993b). Israel does have about 20 wells located within a kilometre of the Gaza border, but they are, according to Arie Issar (personal communication, 1993), tapping saline water and thus actually improving the quality of water in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian hydrologists in Gaza, however, claim otherwise. As well, some Israeli hydrologists argue that overpumping of the aquifer began before the occupation by the Egyptian administration, and that new regulations have prevented an even worse situation. However, as

Elmusa (personal communication, 1993) points out, the situation has continued to deteriorate, and Israel cannot evade some responsibility.

What is clear is that the water situation in the Gaza Strip is desperate from both quantity and quality perspectives. There is no surface water, except immediately following a rainfall, and the two shallow aquifers that underlie the Strip, one sweet and one saline, are both being overpumped. The portion of the Coastal Aquifer that underlies the Gaza Strip (see Figure 5 on p. 26) is particularly sensitive because of the low rainfall and because it is the only indigenous source of drinking water. Water is pumped from over 2 000 wells, primarily for irrigation purposes, and total withdrawal is estimated at between 84 and 130 Mm³/year. The wide range of estimates is disturbing, but even the lowest estimate of withdrawal is far above the natural recharge of 25–65 Mm³/year (UNDP 1993). Indeed, even the total existing quotas for agricultural extraction from existing wells appear to exceed (or at best equal) recharge, and everyone admits there are hundreds of illegal wells and extractions beyond quotas, to say nothing of uncontrolled municipal wells. Israeli officials do not permit the drilling of more wells for irrigation (new wells and higher pumping rates are permitted for drinking water), but the water level in the aquifer continues to fall by 15–20 cm/year.

In addition to the mining of its aquifers, groundwater quality in the Gaza Strip is threatened. The shallow, unconfined nature of the upper, sweet aquifer makes it vulnerable to contamination from all sources. Overpumping has permitted saline intrusion, both from the coast and from depth; heavy fertilizer use is leading to high nitrate concentrations and heavy pesticide use to other residues; and what is probably the poorest sewage control in the region adds to the problems. As a result, the salinity of the main aquifer has doubled over much of the region in the last decade, and a good proportion of the residents of the Gaza Strip are already drinking contaminated or excessively saline water or both (Zarour and Isaac 1991; Shawwa 1992).

Conditions in the Gaza Strip are an example of what happens when several of the four types of water stress identified by Falkenmark et al. (1989) are present. Falkenmark distinguishes among four types of scarcity: too little rainfall (Type A), erratic rainfall resulting in

recurrent droughts (Type B), desiccation of the landscape as a result of the poor or disturbed permeability of the soil surface (Type C), and overpumping of aquifers caused by population (or economic) growth (Type D). In the Gaza Strip, three of these situations exist. Rainfall is less than 200 mm/year in the southern region and is variable both seasonally and annually (a problem that may be exacerbated by global warming, as noted earlier). Overexploitation, mainly for agriculture, has resulted in salt-water intrusion. To this list, we might add a fourth type of scarcity (different from Falkenmark’s) — deteriorating water quality not simply from overpumping, but from inadequate wastewater disposal and overfertilization of agricultural lands.

It would seem that any reasonable resolution to the water problem in the Gaza Strip must include transfers of water from Israel or, as some propose, from the Nile (Kally 1993). Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Israeli water policy for Gaza is different from its policy for the West Bank. Israeli policies and institutions were not extended to the Gaza Strip, as they were on the West Bank. Rather, old Jordanian Law No. 40 on soil and water is administered by the military authorities (Bruins et al. 1991). Just as on the West Bank, however, Palestinians and Israelis tend to have sharply different prescriptions for dealing with the problem. Many Israeli analysts argue that the situation is so severe that immediate construction of new pipelines or desalination plants is appropriate. Palestinians are skeptical of this megaproject approach, in part for fear that they will get stuck with expensive sources of supply, and in part because it diverts attention from the inequitable distribution of existing supplies.

One approach that is conceptually simple would be the construction of a pipeline to transfer what appears to be surplus treated wastewater from Israel to the Gaza Strip. The wastewater could replace some of the irrigation water now being pumped from the aquifers. If it is true, as commonly stated, that recycled water from Israel is being released to the sea at Ashqelon, a trunk line only some 25 km long would bring this water within reach of many farmers in Gaza. Given the opportunity costs of supplying additional water to the Strip, such a transfer of treated wastewater is both socially and economically attractive. Currently, however, there is very little incentive for farmers in the Strip

— most of whom hold permits to pump water — to purchase recycled water from Israel.

Here too the difference in approach also incorporates differing views about sovereignty over land and water resources. It is clear, however, that the Gaza–Jericho Agreement (see Chapter 9) will bring significant investment into Gaza for infrastructure (including water supply and wastewater treatment), which should improve the situation. But it is important that this be undertaken within the context of a detailed water resources management strategy, now lacking for the Gaza Strip.

Pretensions to the Litani River

Although not connected to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel’s incursion into Lebanon and the establishment of the “Security Zone” in the early 1980s allows it access to the lower reaches of the Litani River (which flows within 10 km of the Israeli border). These actions, coupled with past unsuccessful attempts by Israel to reach an agreement with Lebanon to share Litani water, have led to great Arab concern that Israel will unilaterally divert the Litani into the Jordan River. Certainly, the value of the Litani was recognized by Zionist planners (Lowi 1992) and, as was noted earlier, the proposal by the World Zionist Organization to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 included the Litani River within the Jewish state (Figure 12). In a letter to the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, Chaim Weizmann noted that Lebanon “is a well watered region . . . and the Litani River is valueless to the territory north of the proposed frontiers . . . . It can be used beneficially in the country much further south” (Weisgal 1977, as quoted in Amery and Kubursi 1992). This interest in the Litani continued through the 1950s, when both Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan, Israel’s Chief of Staff, advocated Israeli occupation of Lebanon up to the Litani River (Amery and Kubursi 1992). The fact that Litani water is very high in quality with a low mineral content only enhances its value — and the perceived threat.

The Litani River rises and flows entirely within the borders of Lebanon (Figure 12), but its possible use by Israel or Jordan or both has increased its international importance. Israel has long claimed that the

Figure 12. Border proposals for a Jewish state, 1919–1947 (adapted from Wolf 1995).

Litani is actually part of the Jordan River watershed, because there is some geological evidence that the lower Litani may provide water for the Hasbani River and the Dan Spring, which form the headwaters of the Jordan (Kolars 1992a). The Litani can be divided into three sections: the upper, lying in the Bekaa valley of eastern Lebanon; the middle, beginning near Qar’oun; and the lower, which flows into the Mediterranean. The natural flow of the river, from springs, runoff, and other inflows, is roughly 920 Mm³/year (Kolars 1992), of which 500 Mm³ reaches the Mediterranean. The rest is withdrawn for irrigation, lost to evaporation or seepage, or diverted for hydroelectric power production.

Currently, Israel (or any country other than Lebanon for that matter) has no claim to Litani River waters, and it seems unlikely that Israel would attempt a diversion of the Litani without an explicit agreement with Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon originally placed great priority on developing the river to generate electricity, and more than half of the river’s total annual flow is already diverted through the Markaba tunnel below the Qar’oun Dam to the Awali River (also entirely within Lebanon) to increase capacity at generating stations on that river. The Litani is also used for irrigation, primarily in the upper and lower sections, but construction of major irrigation systems has been delayed largely because hydroelectric facilities were more profitable (Naff and Matson 1984).

The issue of water transfers from Lebanon to Israel raises a number of sensitive issues. First, some authors (such as Amery and Kubursi 1992) claim that this water will be needed by Lebanon to service the country’s economic growth in the future. Any long-term agreement involving the diversion of water to Israel, therefore, should be avoided. Second, there are political sensitivities involved in selling water to the Israelis. Third, Israel would not be willing to build up a dependency on Lebanese water. Fourth, and last, Lebanon would, in turn, be hesitant to allow Israel an interest in water that might be used as an excuse for military intervention in the future. As a short-term solution to water problems in the region, however, the Litani River could play an important role.

In recent years, there have been unsubstantiated claims that Israel has been withdrawing water from the Litani River. The best evidence indicates that there have been no Israeli withdrawals of water from the Litani River to date, or even construction of infrastructure to facilitate such withdrawal (Kolars 1993; Wolf 1995). If anything, southern Lebanon receives small quantities of water (about 0.6 Mm³/year) from wells within Israel (Wolf and Lonergan 1994). Occasional articles in the Arab press, and some in the United States, claiming that Israel is withdrawing water from the Litani (see, for example, Naff 1990) appear to be in error.

Nevertheless, uncertainty and tension over this issue remain. The most recent claim that Israel was withdrawing Litani River water was made at the May 1994 ministerial meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), a regional body consisting of Middle Eastern states from Egypt to the Gulf, but excluding Israel (ESCWA 1994). This report asserted that, since 1978, Israel has been using 215 Mm³ of water per year from the Litani and Wazzani rivers. The report also claimed that, after its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israel drilled an 18-km tunnel linking the Litani River to Israel. A priori, one wonders how such an engineering structure could be hidden so completely from public view. More instructive, the Lebanese reaction was remarkably mild. According to the Mideast Mirror (1 June 1994), Lebanese Foreign Minister Fares Bouez said: “Until now, I can’t say that we have evidence that there is a direct theft of water in the South.” In response to questions by a journalist about the specific rivers identified, he said “We will study this file carefully and we will have a stand.”

The lack of any evidence supporting the claim of an Israeli diversion of Litani River water does not mean that some Israelis do not covet the Litani River. It is the only nearby source of surface water that would allow Israel to maintain its present consumption rates and avoid the difficult choice of whether to reallocate water away from agriculture.

If the political situation in Lebanon continues to stabilize, agricultural, industrial, and population demands will likely place more pressure on water resources. Given current conditions, however, the high quality of Litani water will probably be maintained, and demand will not reach

unmanageable levels for some time (Naff and Matson 1984). Still, Lebanon remains dependent on the Litani as a source of water, and if the state is to prosper it must continue to develop and harness the resources of the river. Despite upstream diversions, the Litani gathers more water in its middle and lower sections, and it still carries a volume equal to the flow of the Jordan to the sea. As noted, most Lebanese analysts now believe that the Litani can (and should) be fully utilized for economic development within Lebanon itself. A minority, including apparently Dr Seliom Maksud, who heads the Litani River Administration, do see an interim opportunity to sell Litani River water to Israel and the Palestinians, with Lake Kinneret used as an “international water bank” (Gruen 1994). Maksud immediately goes on to note his worries that, once having established a market, it would be hard to recapture the water 25 years later to meet Lebanon’s domestic needs, a position with which Canadians should be very sympathetic. Even if the Maksud option becomes politically feasible, interim solutions will likely be seen as second or even third best by both Israelis and Palestinians, and the Litani is unlikely to play any role in their future water balances.

The Current Negotiations

Officially, little happened to resolve water issues between 1967 and the start of the multilateral negotiations in 1991 (see Chapter 9). Unofficially, Israel and Jordan have been meeting at “picnic table summits” to discuss joint water concerns; for example, Israel has apparently allowed some dredging of the East Ghor Canal. It is unclear, however, what of lasting consequence has been accomplished at these meetings; the Israelis feel that they are a major step toward interbasin cooperation, whereas the Jordanians note that they are of little use and have had no effect on Israeli behaviour relative to water. Clearly, Israel and her neighbours have quite different approaches to negotiations over water.

These differing views are evident in the current multilateral talks over water that are carried on parallel to the higher profile bilateral Middle East peace talks. In these discussions, Israel focuses on “low politics”; that is, they emphasize that, whatever other conditions exist,

there is a great deal to be gained by joint management of shared water resources to realize limited but significant gains in efficiency and welfare (Rothman and Lowi 1992; Lowi 1994). The Palestinians and the Jordanians, in contrast, focus on “high politics”; that is, they emphasize the need for overall peace agreements and strategic management of people and economic development before resolution of tactical water issues.

Some analysts see ulterior motives in the “functionalist” Israeli approach. Zarour and Isaac (1991) suggest that Israel uses the water issue to keep talking without really resolving anything. Rothman and Lowi (1992) tend to agree that functionalist low politics are inadequate in the case of intense, protracted, and culture-laden conflicts. Elsewhere, Lowi (1994) has argued that what surfaces as a dispute among riparians takes on the attributes of the greater conflict and that, therefore, the riparian dispute cannot be resolved or even mitigated to a substantial extent in the absence of some sort of ideological consensus, which in this case would have to involve the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Water, however, is so essential to life that it can promote cooperation as easily as conflict. Even in the absence of consensus on high political issues, there may be benefits from cooperation on water management and supply. Thus, Rothman and Lowi (1992, p. 69) go on to suggest that, with the parallel bilateral and multilateral tracks of the current peace process, we may at last be witnessing the “iterative process by which progress beginning at the political process — that is, the Arab–Israeli peace process — requires concrete progress at the practical level — for example, sharing water resources — for both consolidation and fruition.” Shuval, a hydrologist rather than a political scientist, comes to the same conclusion from a different perspective: “Just because the situation is so desperate, the partners to the dispute may finally realize that only by joining hands in a cooperative effort can they survive” (Shuval 1992, p. 143).

Security of water resources is a major objective of all countries, but hydrology, economics, and politics combine to make it particularly important to those in the Middle East. The options presented in the next chapter must be assessed both in terms of long-term environmental

and demographic change occurring in the region and in terms of how they might affect the security of the water supply to Israelis and to Palestinians.

Data Quality and Data Availability

When you look at it through my eyes,

You’ll see a different point of view.

Everything changes;

Every fact wears some disguise.

— James Keelaghan, songwriter

Introduction

One of the most important issues faced by analysts and professionals alike, and now being addressed by the multilateral Working Group on Water Resources as part of the Middle East peace process, relates to the availability and quality of data. In the introduction to this book, we elevated problems with data to a fourth “crisis.” Because water is considered a security issue by the Israeli government, information on water availability and use (including aspects of hydrology, engineering, economics, and management) is often considered confidential. There has been much discussion in recent years over the unwillingness of the Civil Administration in the Occupied Territories to allow Palestinians access to data on water for strategic reasons. Accurate and reliable data are crucial to development planning, and the inadequacy and lack of data on water resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has been a major source of concern for everyone involved.

Concern over data is not limited to the water sector, however. The most recent population census for the Territories was conducted in 1967, just after Israeli occupation. All population estimates are based on these 1967 data, and there are claims made by Palestinians that present Israeli data underestimate the Palestinian population by 10–15%. There exists a disparity even in the reporting of simple, aggregate data, such as the population of Israel. Kolars (1992a) reports the current total population of Israel to be 4.4 million persons, whereas the Statistical Abstract of Israel (Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics 1992) reports it to be

5.1 million. This is more than simply a discouraging discrepancy. It brings into question virtually all of the data reported.

Data Quality

Because the quality and availability of data are major issues in the peace negotiations, it is worth examining them in the context of the Middle East. The quality of data, in general, is based on six factors:

• Accuracy: How closely does the measurement reflect reality?
• Precision: What is the degree of detail in the data?
• Completeness: Are there gaps in the data, either spatially or temporally?
• Timing: When were the data collected?
• Lineage: How much time elapsed between data collection and data use?
• Control and access: Who controls the data and how are the data distributed?

Separately, each of these factors presents problems when using data, particularly for the Occupied Palestinian Territories; collectively, they present a huge barrier to future water resource management in the region.

Accuracy — One of the most obvious cases of inaccurate reporting relates to water consumption data. Data on “consumption” are typically measured at the point of dispatch, not at the point of use. This is a particular problem in the Occupied Territories, since water losses are generally 50% or greater (with the exception of the Jerusalem Water Undertaking, which has reported losses on the order of 25–30%). This “unaccounted for water” stems from three causes: water seepage from decayed infrastructure, broken or malfunctioning water meters, and “black water” or unreported withdrawals of water. Water authorities in the Territories have estimated this last category of water “theft” to account for half of the water losses.

Exacerbating this problem is the fact that socioeconomic data in the Occupied Territories are generally based on surveys of the Palestinians by Israelis. Generally, there is an extremely poor response rate on the part of the Palestinians — or a problem of inaccurate

responses — which leads to inaccurate reporting. This is a specific aspect of the general concern with measurement error relating to questionnaire design and implementation. There is always a difference between what one wishes to measure and what is actually being measured. Any survey-based data in the region must be considered of dubious quality at best.

There is also a secondary problem of accuracy in reporting data. In many cases, because water data have strategic value, data are “political.” Different countries will report different measurements for the same variable. Although this is not unique to the Middle East, it is particularly exasperating when trying to build a suitable database for development planning. In some cases, however, it is not clear that there is a political motivation behind the reporting; the data are just “different.” An example is the flow from the Upper Jordan River into Lake Kinneret. On the one hand, Naff and Matson (1984) report this flow to be 790 Mm³/year, based on additions from springs in the Hula Valley. Inbar and Maos (1984), on the other hand, report this flow to be 500 Mm³. Kolars (1992a) reports this flow to be 540 Mm³, an estimate that has been accepted by other authors and that we used in Figure 10 (p. 44).

Precision — The accuracy of reporting data in Israel and the Occupied Territories also reflects on the precision of reporting. Water consumption data are generally reported by aggregate economic sector: industry, commercial establishments, and households. Even these data are sometimes difficult to find, particularly for the Territories. Israel publishes very disaggregate water-use data (for 96 sectors) in its system of national accounts, although these data are in dollars (or NIS) worth of use rather than in physical units. Because there are considerable variations in pricing, estimating water use in physical units is tenuous at best.

Hydrological data in Israel, we suspect, are very detailed; again, problems relate to the availability of such data (for example, recharge rates of aquifers and pumping rates from Israeli settlements in the West Bank) for the Palestinians.

Completeness — Before 1967, water resources in the West Bank were administered by the Jordanian Water Department, a decentralized unit

of an agency then called the Natural Resources Authority of Jordan. The Water Department collected data on wells and springs, was responsible for all water-development projects, and licenced water withdrawals of more than 5 m³/h. Landowners had rights to water on and under their own land and could extract it for their own use or offer it for sale provided that doing so did not infringe on the rights of others. Water-supply networks were the responsibility of municipal councils.

The Gaza Strip (then the District of Gaza) was administered by the Egyptian army from 1948 to 1955, and subsequently by an Executive Council appointed by the Egyptian authorities. Water came under the jurisdiction of the Director of Municipal and Rural Affairs. The municipalities of Gaza and Khan Yunis operated their own water-supply systems.

In both regions, hydrological and climatological data were readily available. After 1967, as we have noted previously, the Civil Administration took over control of the Water Department and all data came under the control of the Israeli government. Effectively, this resulted in an absence of publicly available data after 1967 for the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Even today, the various partial time series of data on water in the Territories have yet to be merged into a complete and consistent set. It would be highly valuable to do so.

Timing and Lineage — Despite the limited amount of water data available for the Occupied Territories after 1967, excellent hydrological and climatological data do exist, based on previous studies. Rainfall records for Jerusalem, for example, date back to 1846. The detailed studies that were compiled on water resources in the region before 1955 all include useful data on both surface water and groundwater flows. Although these data are helpful, contemporary information on aquifer recharge, surface water flow, and so on, is available only to the Israelis. This presents an almost insurmountable problem of using 30-year old data to develop contemporary water-management strategies. An even more extreme example of the timing/lineage problem was given earlier regarding the fact that population estimates for the Occupied Territories are based on a 1967 census.

Control of and Access to Data — Central to the issues of data quality and data availability is the control — real and perceived — exercised by the Israelis over all types of data relating to the Occupied Territories. Major disagreements over removal of water from West Bank aquifers, diversion of Yarmouk River water, Israeli extraction of water flowing into Gaza, or simply the size of aquifers are unresolvable without independent corroboration of data. Each party to disputes over water has its own set of figures; there have been reports of misleading data being published, and articles on water issues in the region reflect an unusual lack of consistency over water data. Resolving these data issues is important not only to diffuse the mistrust that exists between the parties, but for effective water-resource planning in the future.

Problems of data accessibility for the Palestinians may change significantly in the next few years. The Joint Aquifer Management Workshop sponsored by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace (Truman Institute) at the Hebrew University and the Palestine Consultancy Group (held in Jerusalem in June 1994) resulted in commitments from participants to remove barriers to data access for the Palestinians, something that has become feasible now that Israel has declassified much data on water formerly considered security information. Data have already become more accessible, according to Taher Nassereddin, Director of the Water Department of the West Bank. It was also noted, however, that problems of data access are masking a larger problem of insufficient data.

Summary

The “crisis” with data on water in the Middle East has been mentioned by numerous authors, and there have been calls for the establishment of regional data centres or a regional information clearinghouse (Kolars 1992b) to help alleviate this crisis. The problem, however, stems as much from the use of data by parties with their own vested interests as from the lack of data (whether caused by a lack of measurement and monitoring or by Israeli control). In addition, sloppy reporting by analysts, researchers, government agencies, and the media has exacerbated the crisis. In this book, we have tried to present data that are accepted by the majority of professionals working in the field, or at least we have

provided detailed citations for the sources of data that may be of questionable quality. It is clear that the poor quality of data and the limited availability of data are issues that will not be eliminated in the near future. But it is also clear that cooperation in the water sector between the Israelis and the Palestinians (and, indeed, other riparian states in the region) will require an agreement on baseline data and a comprehensive plan for sharing data on water availability and use.

That the data are important is clear from the attention directed to it at the multilateral meetings. What is most significant, however, is that this issue is considered a key part of the negotiation process itself.

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