Document(s) 7 of 19

Waters wear the stones.

— Job, 14:19

THE SECOND COMPONENT of Israel’s water crisis is less ancient but equally pressing: water quality. This component is part of a growing environmental problem that has been described as a “sharpening struggle” by Brooks and Shadur (1991). Water-quality problems are a result of many factors, three of which deserve to be highlighted: overpumping of aquifers, pollution of watercourses, and the limited size and protection of ecological preserves.

Overpumping of Aquifers

Overpumping of wells causes a decline in the water table. During the recent drought, when aquifers were pumped particularly hard, water levels in aquifers in Israel and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories were typically falling by 10–40 cm/year, a situation that everyone recognized as unsustainable. The term “mining” is used to reflect the fact that a renewable resource was being used in a way that made it nonrenewable.

A decline in the water table has several adverse effects. At a minimum, it adds to pumping costs and increases the amount of energy needed for pumping. More importantly, a lower water table reduces pressure in the aquifer and permits lower quality water to flow inward and contaminate the fresh water of the aquifer. The Coastal Aquifer in its natural state is 3–5 m above sea level, a level that, with the force of gravity, creates an outward pressure that blocks the inflow of seawater. Pumping, or more accurately overpumping, has lowered the fresh water

level below sea level so that this effect is reversed, and salt water from the Mediterranean can now be found 1–3 km inland. This situation changed recently with the unusually high rainfall during the winters of 1991 and 1992; it is believed, however, that this is temporary. An indirect effect of overpumping could also become apparent near the Dead Sea, which is receding as almost all of its fresh-water sources are diverted to other, mainly agricultural, uses on both sides of the Israeli–Jordanian border. With the fall in its level below –400 m, pressure could be so reduced in aquifers flowing into the Rift Valley that the outflows and losses of good-quality water from those aquifers will be increased.

The inflow of seawater magnifies the effects of using and reusing water for irrigation, resulting in 10% of the wells tapping the Coastal Aquifer producing water that is too salty for domestic use. This loss of potable water is growing at a rate of roughly 20 Mm³/year (Israel Environment Bulletin, Winter 1993). If World Health Organization standards for drinking water were observed in Israel (less than 250 mg of dissolved solids per litre), many more of the coastal wells would be declared unfit as sources of drinking water (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1991). And this situation is getting worse. Israel’s Hydrological Service estimates that one-fifth of the wells will soon be too salty even for agricultural irrigation (Gabbay 1992). Worse yet, intruding salty water corrodes the limy portions of the porous sandstones that make up the aquifer, so that they become blocked and are reduced in capacity or even destroyed. Some Israeli hydrologists have begun to argue that, given population densities along the Israeli coast and in Gaza, there is no possibility of keeping the Coastal Aquifer free of pollution. Accordingly, sources of drinking water should be sought elsewhere, with the Coastal Aquifer being devoted exclusively to agriculture and industry.

In the case of the Mountain Aquifer, which is the main source of drinking water for Israel, the problem is not seawater but nearby saline aquifers that can seep into the overpumped zones. Each of these zones contains some brackish water. Because it is composed of channels in limestone (“karst” structures), water (and pollutants) flows more quickly through the Mountain Aquifer than through sandstone aquifers with

small pores. The Ministry of Environment has proposed that a Mountain Aquifer Authority be established along the lines of the Kinneret Authority, but, to date, the response from the government has been noncommittal.

Water Pollution

Israelis have taken steps toward controlling air pollution, primarily because of the assertiveness of the Ministry of Environment (until 1988 the Environmental Protection Service) in an area where no other ministry had prime responsibility (Whitman 1988). This was not the case with water, where the ministries of Agriculture, of Industry, of Health, and of the Interior have constantly demonstrated support for vested interests and a lack of enthusiasm for protecting water quality. Dumping is common, sometimes directly into watercourses and sometimes into wadis, which allows contaminants to seep into the aquifers with the next rainfall. Cleaning a polluted river is difficult; cleaning a polluted aquifer is infinitely more so and, in some cases, not possible (Goldenberg and Melloul 1992). Only in 1991 were jurisdictional issues over water resolved, with the Ministry of Environment receiving responsibility for toxic and hazardous substances, pest control, and the prevention of nuisances. Some of Israel’s major water pollution problems are discussed below.

Agricultural Runoff

Around 400 000 ha of land is being farmed in Israel (about a million acres or 10 times the size of Prince Edward Island). Roughly half of the land is irrigated and half is rain-fed, and 95% is sprayed with pesticides and fertilizers (see text box entitled “Irrigation and the Environment”). Annual inputs include about 875 Mm³ of water (down from 1 300 in 1984), and 90 000 t of fertilizer (4 400 m³ or 0.235 t/ha on average) (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1993). Given these data, it is no surprise that agricultural runoff is a major nonpoint source of many pollutants, including sediment, phosphorous, nitrogen, and pesticides. The per-hectare use of pesticides and fertilizer in Israel is among the highest in the world, and runoff is correspondingly high. To date, regulations on

Irrigation and the Environment

It is easy to understand why irrigation is popular among farmers. Roughly 18% of the world’s cultivated land is irrigated (a total of more than 350 million ha), but this land produces only one-third of the total harvest. Yet, it is becoming increasingly realized that irrigation also produces an array of environmental problems.

Irrigation systems interact with the surrounding environment in many ways, with some effects being positive and some negative, and some impacts flowing from the land to the water and some flowing from the water to the land. Irrigation systems withdraw water from a surface or underground source, affecting the downstream or downflow hydrology. As well, in the construction process, land is normally leveled, either by terracing or by remoulding. Depending upon the design of the irrigation system, water may seep into, or out of, the system, creating problems that are discussed in this section. The most profound problem with irrigation, however, is the tendency, particularly in arid areas, for waterlogging and salinization of soils. Salinity now seriously affects productivity on 7% of the world’s irrigated land (20–30 million ha), and this level is thought to be increasing at a rate of over 1 million ha/year (El-Ashry 1991). In the worst cases, large areas of formerly productive land have been rendered sterile, but more commonly the productivity of the land is simply reduced. Similarly, any pollution carried by the irrigation system will flow onto fields when the water is distributed, and pollution from surface (or less commonly underground) sources, pesticides, and fertilizers can flow into the irrigation system. The passage of waterborne pathogens is also commonly encouraged, if not directly spread, by irrigation systems. Inevitably, partly because of the irrigation system itself and partly because of the cultivation patterns it supports, there is a change in ecology, with the replacement of some species of plants and animals by others.

The popularity of irrigation and the increasing size of irrigation systems has forced planners to take more seriously the associated environmental implications. In one such attempt, the International Commission for Irrigation and Drainage has compiled a checklist of some 53 possible impacts of irrigation systems divided into eight categories: hydrology, pollution, soils, sediments, ecology, socioeconomics, health, and ecological imbalances (Mock and Bolton 1991). The purpose of the checklist is to help planners to anticipate (in the case of new irrigation systems) or to diagnose (in the case of existing systems) the type and extent of possible damages and then to adjust the design to reduce the adverse impacts.

pesticide use have been quite relaxed and all but nonexistent for agricultural runoff. Even some irrigation water, for which acceptable standards are well below those of drinking water, is now so contaminated with residues that it is unfit for use. Such problems are anything but inevitable. Practices such as conservation tillage, contour planting, terracing, and filter systems, among others, can control soil erosion and reduce phosphorous and nitrogen runoff by up to 60% (WRI 1992).

Pesticide residues are an added problem. As stated in the Israel Environment Bulletin (Spring 1993, p. 8): “The agricultural community represents, for all intents and purposes, a large group of exterminators — but a group which is exempt from the licensing and training requirements of pest-control operators.” The entire system for controlling pesticides is complicated by overlapping jurisdictions among (and differing interests of) the ministries of Agriculture, of Health, and of Environment. An official from the Ministry of Environment emphasized that the government controls only pesticide registration and labeling; beyond this, there is no regulation. In contrast, an official from the Ministry of Agriculture claims the ability to trace “almost every molecule that is released” and states flatly that “there is no residue problem” (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1993). Both of these statements may exaggerate the situation. On the one hand, new regulations on spraying and disposal came into effect in 1991; they outlaw spraying within 300 m of a water source and prohibit any emptying or rinsing of pesticide containers near watercourses. On the other hand, there are no standards for permissible levels of pesticide residues in drinking water, and food destined for Israeli and Palestinian consumers is known to exceed permitted levels (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1993). The Ministry of Health is responsible for monitoring and testing food for local consumption but does so only irregularly. In contrast, food products destined for export are rigorously monitored.

Comparing the tests on food consumed locally with those on exported produce would certainly be instructive. Even tests done on local products, however, are seldom available to the public. Only occasionally do relevant stories make the news; the example of the Ministry of Environment making public its discovery that pesticides were being stored in water-pumping stations on some farms is a rare one. In the

past year, the ministries of Environment and of Health seem to be working toward closer collaboration, which might improve the situation (or might just indicate a political alliance against the Ministry of Agriculture). It is still the policy of the Ministry of Health, however, that the results of its water-quality tests are not available to the public. It is for this reason that the Israel Union for Environmental Defense and other public-interest groups have joined in a coalition to secure passage of a Freedom of Information law in Israel.

Two additional problems are unique to the Occupied Territories. First, even if the labeling (which includes directions on use and cautions) is adequate for Israeli farmers, there is no requirement that labels be bilingual, a disadvantage for Arabic-speaking farmers, most of whom live on the Palestinian side of the Green Line. Second, there is a great deal of evidence that pesticides banned in Israel are moved across the Green Line or are exported directly to the Territories, adversely affecting human health and leading to the contamination of watercourses.

The situation is not much better in terms of fertilizer residues than in terms of pesticides. Over the past two decades, nitrate concentrations in the Coastal Aquifer (from both fertilizers and recycling of sewage effluents) have doubled (Gabbay 1992). A 1991 survey by the Hydrological Service of Israel found that one-third of the wells in the country contained nitrates at levels “that would exclude them from drinking purposes according to European standards” (45 mg/L) (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1993), a statement that implies that many, if not most, of these wells continue to be sources of drinking water. On the coastal plain, the intensive use of nitrogen fertilizers is responsible for 70% of the nitrates found in the groundwater. The problems are magnified in greenhouses, which are widespread in Israel and in the Occupied Territories. Greenhouses are periodically rinsed with as much as half of the fertilizers going directly into the soil. If built appropriately, the greenhouse can be removed from contact with groundwater and it is possible to reuse the rinse water, but this practice is not yet common. In addition, the widespread poultry-raising operations create their own set of runoff problems. In this case, the water carries manure with a high organic content that should be, but seldom is, recycled.

The growing use of brackish water can increase soil salinity, a problem that is already evident in certain parts of the country (Gabbay 1992). Washing out the salts with fresh water can alleviate local problems, but this is done at the expense of allowing the salts to drain into watercourses or aquifers, potentially causing longer term problems. Regulations have yet to be developed to deal with this problem (except for limitations on the use of brackish water just above sensitive parts of the Coastal Aquifer).

In an otherwise technical article, Vengosh and Rosenthal (1994, p. 389), from Israel’s Hydrological Service, condemn the lack of concerted attention being given to the contamination of Israel’s water supply by saline sources:

The newly established groundwater flow regimes have facilitated the migration of saline water bodies, their participation in the active hydrological cycle and the progressive contamination of fresh groundwater. These processes which were not anticipated by planners and water resources managers emphasize that large-scale groundwater exploitation was undertaken without giving sufficient consideration to the occurrence and subsurface migration of saline water and brines.

Drinking Water and Sewage

Piped drinking water and sewer systems are extensive throughout Israel, as is piped water in urban areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. With the support of a World Bank loan, the water and sewage system in Israel expanded rapidly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Today, 93% of municipal wastewater within Israel is collected in sewers, and nearly 80% receives secondary treatment. As a result of several billion dollars in grants and loans from Japan, sanitation systems are also being extended in the West Bank and Gaza.

These apparently positive statistics, however, obscure serious problems. As is the case in many North American cities, most of the sewage collection and treatment systems have either begun to deteriorate or cannot handle growing demand. Only about one-third of the sewage is treated to a high standard, about 10% ends up in septic tanks, and another 10% receives no treatment at all. The city of Jerusalem still discharges half of its wastewater untreated into dry riverbeds.

Fortunately, the city’s high elevation allows wastewater to be highly aerated by in-stream turbulence and thus considerably improved in quality by the time it falls to the level of the coastal plain. A new wastewater treatment plant has been approved to stop this pollution. In an interview shortly after he was appointed Minister of Environment in early 1993, Yossi Sarid identified pollution from sewage and rehabilitation of Israeli rivers as his second and third priorities, respectively (solid waste was number one). In his words: “If people truly understood the nature and extent of the problem, they would shudder” (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1993, p. 3). Minister Sarid’s position was immensely strengthened by powers granted to the Ministry of Environment to intervene in local sewage disposal decisions.

The Ministry of Health tests extensively for bacteriological contamination, and quality standards for drinking water were tightened in 1989. A small percentage of tests shows excess contaminants, mainly because of antiquated and leaking sewage pipes in the northern part of the country. Older systems are being replaced, but progress is slow because of budget constraints. In addition to Jerusalem, new treatment plants have been planned for the expanding cities of Carmiel, Netanyah, and Ashdod, with the last planned as a demonstration solar-powered plant. The Dan Region plant for the Tel Aviv area (already the most modern in Israel) will also be expanded to handle peak storm loads.

Not surprisingly, Israeli investment in water supply is concentrated within the Green Line. Mekorot has connected Palestinian towns and larger villages close to the Green Line and within the Gaza Strip to the National Water Carrier (Bruins et al. 1991). Nevertheless, drinking water quality is generally poorer on the West Bank and significantly poorer in the Gaza Strip, where many residents routinely drink contaminated or saline water or a mixture of both (Zarour and Isaac 1991; Shawwa 1992). Half of Gaza’s sewage (which totals 20–22 Mm³/year) goes directly into the Mediterranean Sea with no treatment; the other half goes to settling ponds, where it gets only primary treatment and aeration.

Today, 20% of West Bank villages still have no regular water supply (Al-Khatib 1992), and many residents are experiencing health

problems because of inadequate (or nonexistent) sewage disposal. It is hard to think of any excuse for this situation. Water-supply and water-treatment systems for small communities are well known, if expensive (per person served). Israel has extended water-supply lines to cover just over 60% of the households of the West Bank and is now beginning to extend sewage lines (Sbeih 1994). For example, a sewage project is being built to serve Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, and Beit Jala in the West Bank (Zarour and Isaac 1991). The new sewage projects, however, come with a trade-off: Israel gets the sewage, which it then reclaims for its own use. The same wastewater could make a much greater addition to output if directed to Palestinian farms, which have limited irrigation water (Zarour and Isaac 1991) and cannot generally afford to install the capital-intensive irrigation techniques that characterize Israeli agriculture. This may be the reason why Nablus has not been able to build an adequate sanitation system despite repeated requests to Israeli authorities.

In both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, conditions tend to be worse in the refugee camps. This is partly due to levels of population density: many camps have close to 50 thousand people per square kilometre; some have even higher levels. Most of the water and sewage systems in the refugee camps have been financed by United Nations agencies, and the systems deliver on average less than 100 L/person-day — in some camps less than half that amount. In recent years, however, camps near cities have been connected to the water supply networks and, in such cases, service is equivalent to what other residents receive. Sewage still remains a problem, with many camps served only by open canals.

A further problem for Palestinians stems from the neglect of adequate sewage treatment in some settlements in the Occupied Territories, particularly those along Hill Ridge, south of Tulkarm. Being located at higher elevations, the sewers simply discharge into wadis or onto Palestinian fields. It has been alleged that funds were provided to the settlements for sewage systems but that they were diverted to other purposes.

As noted in Chapter 3, some 70% of municipal sewage in Israel is recycled as irrigation water. This process is critical to Israel’s water

balance. Reuse of sewage, however, has its own problems; two-thirds of the reused water receives minimal or no treatment and even that which is treated contains high chemical loads (Israel Environment Bulletin, Spring 1991; Gabbay 1992). This fact creates contamination problems for farm workers and, in some cases, for crops.

Chemicals

It is difficult to know the extent of contamination of Israeli surface and underground water. Mekorot does sample water for quality from more than a hundred wells each year on a rotating basis, covering some 1 000 wells in all. More than a hundred tests are done on these samples, but the results are not generally made public. Moreover, the test wells are keyed to agricultural needs and may not catch the worst industrial pollution. Spot checks by the Ministry of Environment have found concentrations of specific contaminants at levels that are a few to 100 times the allowable levels in other industrial countries. Some 70% of Israeli industry is located along the coast, and sections of the Coastal Aquifer near Ramat Hasharon and Holon, both in the Tel Aviv area, are badly contaminated with heavy metals from industrial waste. Some wells are now closed, but this is a minor problem compared with the fact that “contamination [of the aquifer] by heavy metals is nearly irreversible except by very expensive methods” (Israel Environment Bulletin, Winter 1993, p. 9; see also Goldenberg and Melloul 1992).

As late as 1989, it was estimated that only about half of the hazardous waste produced in Israel was arriving at the Ramat Havav disposal site south of Beersheba, and that figure does not take into account domestic harzardous wastes (Narkis and Kornberg 1990). Solvents, petrochemicals, gasoline products, and other wastes (some of them known or suspected carcinogens) are routinely dumped by municipalities and industries into any nearby watercourse. For example, the Kishon River in Haifa receives 10 000 m³ of industrial wastewater every day — so much that parks along its banks are considered dangerous to human health (Hirschberg 1991). Olive oil mills, an otherwise excellent way to increase the value added from farming and to provide employment in rural areas, have both solid and liquid residues. The

former can generally be put back on fields, but the latter has such a high BOD — or biological oxygen demand — that it is generally dumped.⁸ No data on the extent of this problem have been found for Israel or the Occupied Territories, but the impact of some 40 mills in Jordan is equal to that of a city of one million. Contamination by heavy metals and synthetic organic chemicals is still reported to be low and limited to industrial areas, but more serious problems are expected in the future (Gabbay 1992). Thousands of tonnes of waste lubricating oil are also estimated to reach watercourses each year, but new regulations prohibiting the pouring, burning, or dumping of waste oil should reduce the problem significantly.

The Ministry of Health is just now considering whether to establish standards on maximum levels of organic and inorganic compounds (“micropollutants”) in drinking water. The Ministry of Environment has proposed regulations to deal with industrial dumping and is moving to establish new regulations to deal with toxins. Still, Israel is a long way from a “polluter pays” principle. The country’s one official toxic waste disposal site (Ramat Hovav) was so poorly designed and so limited in capacity that disposal pools have overflowed after heavy rains and contaminated nearby reservoirs (Whitman 1988). Worse yet, evidence suggests that toxic wastes have been seeping downward into the aquifers that are vital to Israel.

Nature Reserves

Although Israel has a higher proportion of its land (about 18%) in national parks and nature reserves than most other countries, the protected areas are necessarily quite small. Freshwater areas come under intense pressure, particularly during the hot summer months, from both domestic recreational use and international tourism. They are also subject to encroachment, as illustrated by the proposal to build an industrial park close to Kabri Springs (a plan that was blocked by legal action).

⁸Biological oxygen demand (BOD) is an indication of the oxidizing power of the waste stream. Liquid wastes with a high BOD draw all of the oxygen from water so that other forms of life, both animal and plant, suffocate.

Moreover, in its effort to assure adequate and growing supplies of water, Israel has regularly violated its usual concern for the protection of nature and the Biblical landscape (Brooks and Shadur 1991). Waste now contaminates many beaches, and those near Herzliyyah and Netanyah, among others, are regularly closed to bathers during the summer. Flow in the Jordan River has been reduced to a fraction of its former volume. There is a plan to dam (albeit for electricity rather than, directly, for water) the last free-flowing stretch of the Jordan River. Ironically, the plan is being advocated by a kibbutz. In contrast, site-specific regulations defined as part of the Mediterranean Coastal Plan differentiate carefully between those river mouths that were to remain natural and others where changes in hydrology would be permitted (Brachya 1993).

In spite of these problems, however, nature preservation remains highly valued in Israeli politics. Growing recognition of the economic potential of ecotourism is adding to the forces against encroachment. For example, because of its location at the junction of three continents, Israel is a funnel for tens of millions of birds that migrate south in the fall and north in the spring. Thousands of bird-watchers come to view the storks, pelicans, raptors, and other species. Israeli courts are increasingly open to legal arguments in favour of maintaining existing states of preservation, if not always to those for extending protection to new areas. What still appears to be missing, however, is widespread acceptance of the ecological services of natural areas in protecting the quantity and quality of water outside the reserves.

Some Hopeful Signs

There are exceptions to the generally dismal picture of water quality in Israel. Lake Kinneret has been under a unified management plan that prohibits dumping and restricts uses of water from the lake. As a result, Kinneret has retained its quality (it is the source of half of Israel’s drinking water) and its beauty. The power of Mekorot is such that it could impose similar restrictions on other areas of the country, but that would conflict with vested interests. Even Kinneret is not fully protected from agricultural runoff, and one result is that nitrate content in the water,

and thus the content of algae, has been rising. New regulations on spraying, however, will greatly reduce the level of pesticides draining into the lake.

Another potential exception involves the Yarkon River, which flows through Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city. Coastal rivers are the most seriously degraded ecosystems in Israel. The Yarkon is typical. Only 27 km long, its flow is greatly reduced because the springs that fed it have been diverted to the National Water Carrier. As a result, industrial wastewater and urban runoff are no longer flushed away. Now the Yarkon will serve as the test case to determine both the physical and economic feasibility of reversing this situation. In late 1988, a special authority was set up to undertake remedial activities and restore the river to a condition that would permit recreational use. So far, efforts have been directed mainly at the cleanup of trash and debris and at restrictions on new dumping.

The program to clean up Israeli rivers has been given additional impetus from an apparent shift in priorities with the appointment of Yossi Sarid as Minister of Environment and from the recognition of their economic potential by the Ministry of Tourism. Tentative plans have been announced for clean-up work to extend to the Kishon, Alexander, Tanninim, and Lachish rivers during 1994.

In addition, in what appears to be a landmark decision, a judge ruled that the financial problems of a factory and nearby kibbutzim discharging wastes into the Na’aman River (south and west of Acco) were not legitimate reasons for failing to meet pollution-control requirements. The case was brought to court by a coalition of community and public-interest groups, which argued that the Water Commissioner and lower level agencies were failing to use their authority to control pollution. In ordering the Water Commission to take action, the judge evidently accepted the coalition’s position that public interests had to be placed ahead of private interests.

Israel does have a well-established environmental impact assessment (EIA) process (Brachya 1993). Lodged in the Ministry of Environment, an EIA is highly recommended, and for all practical purposes required, in the construction of new main water carriers, dams and reservoirs, and sewage-treatment plants. There are gaps, however, in the

requirements, and by no means all activities that may affect surface or underground watercourses are subject to an EIA. Still, Israel’s EIA process is relatively effective, and by now several hundred EIAs have been conducted. EIA processes in Egypt and Jordan are much younger but are slowly becoming institutionalized (Salem 1994). Given that the environment was identified as a sector requiring its own institutions in the Peace Accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (see Chapter 9), rapid adaptation of EIA processes to regions under Palestinian control can be expected. In 1994, a Canadian mission was sent to the region to identify the likely needs for EIAs and the local capacity to undertake them, and Canadian-funded training programs to help raise capacities to meet needs are going to follow.

In retrospect, had an EIA process been in place in the early days of Israel’s existence, some projects that effectively reshaped the land, and that are now recognized as at least partially in error, might have been avoided. The drainage of Lake Hula and surrounding marshes (1 000 and 6 000 ha, respectively) was accomplished in the 1950s, the young nation’s first megaproject. The gain was about 6 000 ha of fertile agricultural land and some 50 Mm³ of water per year. As well, breeding grounds for malaria-bearing mosquitoes were eliminated. However, a unique ecology was also destroyed (only partially conserved in the Hula Nature Reserve). In addition, the underlying peat was allowed to dry out, resulting in the spreading of slow-burning fires that ignite spontaneously as the peat oxidizes and in the leaching of nitrates that flow to Kinneret. Although these problems were recognized as early as 1970, only in 1988 did the idea to reflood part of the region begin to take shape as both economic and environmental criteria indicated the need for restoration of part of the Hula to a wetland (Avnimelech et al. 1992).

Finally, a modest beginning has been made at introducing organic agriculture to Israel, with a corresponding reduction in runoff. A couple of kibbutzim have found that ready markets and higher prices can be obtained with organically grown vegetables, and it has been suggested that this is an option that might attract Palestinian farmers, once export markets are open to them. Even nonorganic farms are reconsidering their pesticide use. During the 1980s, cotton came under heavy price

competition, and the area in Israel devoted to cotton production declined. Faced with a cost–price squeeze, farmers became more efficient: production per hectare climbed, but use of organophosphates (the main pesticide used), and particularly the more toxic organophosphates, declined. Although motivated by profits rather than by ecological considerations, all such reductions in the application of chemicals also reduce farm runoff, with almost immediate improvements in water quality.

Public Support and Public Action

There is growing public demand in Israel for a reduction in water pollution. Israel has always had strong and widely supported nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in the environmental field — most notably, the Society for the Preservation of Nature in Israel (better known simply as SPNI) — and their work has been critical. On occasion, the Israeli environmental movement has been able to bring international pressure to bear on the government and win some significant victories. A notable example involved long-standing joint plans by the United States and Israeli governments to build a powerful Voice of America transmitter in a sensitive area of desert; the struggle lasted more than 5 years until the project was finally canceled in early 1993. Most environmental organizations, however, are underfunded and overburdened, and, just as with the Ministry of Environment, the environmental movement has been more successful at protecting flora and fauna than watercourses.

Growing support for focusing attention on water quality as well as quantity in Israel is reflected in the increasingly vigorous use of the court system to protect environmental values. An environmental NGO — the Israel Union for Environmental Defense — has been formed specifically to use the legal system, much in the manner of the US Environmental Defense Fund. Some of its activities have been cited earlier. As well, the Ministry of Environment has begun to take legal action against polluting firms and even polluting communities, and its hand was strengthened with a 1991 amendment to the 1959 Water Law that applies personal liability and permits individual charges for

violations. In 1993, the Ministry of Environment took several communities and a regional council to court to stop water pollution from the Mod’in landfill.

Despite growing awareness and stronger political support, difficult issues remain, including cleaning up older problems and responding to demands to cut corners to mitigate housing problems or create jobs for new immigrants. For example, during the period of rapid immigration of Soviet Jews in 1990 and 1991, the number of communities without sewage-treatment systems actually doubled (Israel Environment Bulletin, Winter 1993). Moreover, differences across the Green Line remain stark. The Ministry of Environment did not even have a local environmental unit in the Territories until 1993 (there were 22 in Israel at that time). Although others are scheduled to be established, they come too late to avoid serious problems. Nevertheless, there are grounds to think that Israel may have turned the corner in terms of recognizing that water has a quality as well as a quantity dimension.

Document(s) 7 of 19