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As those engaged in the L-20 project continued their exploration of the possible, the outside world moved inexorably onwards. From 2003, when the project was first designed to respond to Paul Martin’s ideas, to the present (mid-2007), the international context shifted, often in ways directly relevant to the project’s objective of testing a new approach to energizing international decision-making. To try to gauge the impact of these developments and to provide a kind of progress report on the project as a whole, organizers canvassed a panel of sixteen participants to seek their overall judgment on outcomes and prospects.¹ This unscientific but instructive sampling provides a logical transition to the final section of this account, which briefly outlines plans for future work.

L-20 in a Changing World

The overriding impression left by the interviews conducted after the conclusion of the workshop series was that the international situation had worsened since 2003. John Sewell² provided a list of problems to illustrate this trend, including the possible collapse of the Doha Trade Round (now probably a reality), the spread of avian flu, the threat of global financial imbalances triggering a global recession, and the difficult situations involving Iraq and Iran. Mukesh Kapila³ pointed to a very divided world, where business as usual was increasingly unacceptable. Paul Heinbecker⁴ picked up on the theme of division, particularly in the case of the United Nations, where he thought the atmosphere had never been more sour. Ralph Daley’s view⁵ was that UN reform had collapsed and, in that regard, he noted the divide between developed and developing countries. Tim Evans⁶ agreed that the UN had not adapted sufficiently and that a more nimble, capable world body was required. On the other hand, he did not see any serious competitors for the role which the UN should be playing. In organizational terms, Anne-Marie Slaughter⁷ saw growing recognition that international institutions were broken across the board, while Francisco Sagasti⁸ characterized existing international structures as cumbersome, flawed and not up to the task. In the specific field of water, Daley reported that global players were claiming that progress was being made, whereas he disagreed and thought that water issues needed to be reenergized. Andres Rozental⁹ noted as the great imponderable the impact which energy prices might have on the global economy. More generally, Catherine Day¹⁰ noted that it was never easier for a single person to cause huge destruction.

On a more positive note, Adil Najam¹¹ reported that the Millenium Development Goals had, somewhat unexpectedly, taken on a life of their own. He and John English¹² surmised that a number of world leaders were “in legacy mode”. Maureen O’Neil¹³ noted the expansion of Chinese and Indian interest in the poorer developing countries, and the overall impact of the emerging economies. A number of the interviewees emphasized the importance of the rise of China. Catherine Day saw the European Union as a body with huge potential power, quite different from that of other international organizations – she suggested that the L-20 might build on the regard in which the EU was held.

Finally, there were mixed views over the role of the United States. Ralph Daley found the evolution of US foreign policy more and more alarming. Paul Heinbecker stated that the invasion of Iraq changed everything, in particular, greatly reducing the willingness of many countries to cooperate with the US. At the same time, David Victor¹⁴ thought that the US was somewhat less allergic to multilateralism (largely because it had no choice), and Francisco Sagasti saw a paradoxical situation for the Americans – they were still strongly unilateralist by inclination, but were faced with weaknesses emerging on many fronts which might necessitate more collaborative tactics.

Turning to the project itself, the large majority continued to believe that the L-20 approach had merit and should be moved ahead (not very surprising; most had tended to be supportive from the beginning). Richard Cooper¹⁵ remained skeptical, however, in part because he saw it as “… too large a group for real dialogue, building significant personal rapport”. Anne-Marie Slaughter still saw a need for an L-20, but in a somewhat altered form from the original concept (i.e. probably a different group of countries for each meeting, depending on the subject matter). Tim Evans agreed that the number of twenty was not sacred and suggested that the group’s catalytic abilities were potentially its greatest strength. Geoffrey Oldham¹⁶ continued to be positive, but with the firm caveat that a good deal of homework was done beforehand. For some (Daley, Kapila, Rozental, Najam, Hein-becker, Sagasti, Victor, Kaul), developments in the last few years have made the idea more relevant than ever.

The panel’s views on the topics which might appear on the first L-20 agenda mirrored those of the workshop participants as a whole. High on the list were health issues (especially avian flu) and energy security, with many suggesting that nuclear proliferation issues might also work. Panelists emphasized, however, that the precise agenda would depend very much on events. Francisco Sagasti provided a useful typology for the three sorts of topics which might be on an initial L-20 agenda. The first set of issues would be of direct interest to the global community, including both developed and developing countries (for example, coping with pandemics or managing natural disasters). From these items would come concrete agreements to take action. The second sort of agenda item would tackle more contentious issues, about which there would be a good exchange of views but probably no specific agreement (for example, energy security, climate change). The third type of agenda item would involve the leaders agreeing that more infor­mation should be generated, possibly by a sub-group of interested countries (for example, impact of the transition to knowledge societies, capacity-building in developing countries).

On the vexed question of how to engage the Americans, the group was divided along fairly standard lines. A number suggested that little progress could be expected for the moment, and most of them saw no reason not to push ahead with an L-20 in any event. Under the circumstances, Inge Kaul¹⁷ suggested that former President Clinton be recruited as a “prime mover” in support of the project. Several panelists thought that, with the US running into such difficulties internationally, a properly structured agenda (i.e. one which included an item or two of direct American strategic interest) had a chance of attracting President Bush’s support. As Anne-Marie Slaughter pointed out, however, the exercise would have to be strictly results-oriented to appeal. For many, a group along the lines of an L-20 was probably inevitable, and the US would eventually decide to join in, however grudgingly.¹⁸

To sum up, the participants surveyed after the workshop series ending in May 2006 confirmed a number of key points that had already emerged as a result of examining the L-20 proposal in detail.

1. The gaps in global governance which generated the L-20 approach in the first place still exist and are, if anything, worse than in 2003.
   
   
2. The L-20 approach, i.e. bringing together a group of world leaders more representative than the G-8 to deal directly with key global issues, is valid and deserves to be acted upon.
   
   
3. The workshop series successfully narrowed the focus of the project’s exploration of the approach, both in terms of the possible subjects which leaders might usefully address and in terms of the operational challenges facing L-20 proponents.
   
   
4. The time for research and review is over, and the emphasis must shift to practical efforts to launch the first meeting of an L-20 (or an L-20-like body) within the next three years.

The Next Stage – Breaking Global Deadlocks

The Centre for Global Studies is continuing the work necessary to make a broader representative group of leaders a reality. This new phase is concentrating on a limited set of topics (climate change/energy security) and a smaller group of countries (fourteen). This “L-14” is composed of the existing G-8, plus the “Gleneagles 5” mentioned in the previous chapter (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, Mexico), plus a major mid-Eastern country, Egypt.¹⁹

The purpose is to investigate whether a well-prepared L-14 meeting could identify a package of potential win-win initiatives in a global problem area that is currently characterized as intractable. The technique employed is to involve former government officials, subject experts, opinion leaders and former senior political figures in a “mock” summit process in order to demonstrate the merits of the approach and encourage those in power to implement it. The intent is to develop an array of pragmatic solutions to the global warming deadlock, using a preparatory process modeled on that which now supports the G-8. This process includes multiple meetings during which political “sherpas” (leaders’ personal representatives from each country) refine the problem being addressed and debate possible solutions. The sherpas’ draft communiqué is in effect a draft “grand bargain”, which forms the basis for eventual discussion and decision by heads of government.

In this case, the Breaking Global Deadlocks summit exercise involves seven preparatory meetings, modeled in part on the G-8 process, leading to a high-profile final wrap-up. The role of the political sherpas is filled by representatives from prestigious and influential think tanks and universities, many of whom actually functioned as sherpas earlier in their careers. CFGS’ partners include CIGI, the Brookings Institution, Tsinghua University, the OECD Secretariat and the Leaders Project (the Gilman Foundation).

The first meeting in the series took place at Tsinghua University in Beijing on December 5–6, 2006. CFGS convened representatives from prestigious and influential think tanks and universities in the L-14 countries. The background material included three notes provided by the OECD Secretariat (on climate change, energy security, and the Doha Round), and papers by Dr. David Victor and Dr. Ted Parson suggesting a framework and elements for a “grand bargain”. The symposium explored the global context, the requisite process characteristics (in this case, process is substance), and the criteria and structure for constructing a global “package deal” around international efforts to mitigate global warming.²⁰

The second meeting took place at Langdon Hall, near Toronto, Canada on January 28–30, 2007. This session, attended by retired G-8 sherpas and their counterparts from other countries in the L-14, focused on a draft “non chair non text” outlining an inventory of potential elements for the grand bargain package. The agenda replicated the proceedings at a summit sherpa meeting – background materials and “national interest” position papers (from the 14 countries) were available as the basis for debating options for inclusion on a summit agenda.

The third meeting occurred in Paris on March 12–13, 2007, hosted by the OECD and chaired by Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary-General. This meeting was conducted under the Chatham House rule; serving officials joined with selected participants from the preceding two meetings to prepare the agenda and briefing materials for a possible Leaders Forum. The meeting narrowed down further the elements for a practicable “grand bargain” package.

Four more preparatory meetings will culminate in the wrap-up meeting in the spring of 2008. Interestingly, even as the focus of the exercise narrows in terms of subject matter and countries participating, several additional factors have emerged (or, more accurately, re-emerged) which must be taken into account if this initiative is to be productive in a real-world setting.

The first of these – the question of how best to ensure that an L-14 leaders group receives credible, consistent intellectual support (apart, of course, from the briefings leaders receive from their own government officials) – was canvassed at a retreat on September 5–6, 2007. A recurrent suggestion (see Chapter 8 above) is that a network of think tanks be established to generate cutting edge research, and even more importantly, to develop a common information base for leaders from very different backgrounds. Leaders need the collective ability to assimilate new information and recognize emerging international patterns of policy and practice, inside and outside government. To ensure a level playing field of facts, policy analysis and differing points of view, this intellectual “value added” must be brought to bear.²¹

Knowledge mobilization on this scale and for this specific sort of purpose has not yet been systematically attempted, but especially in the climate change field there are several efforts underway to bring expert knowledge and political pragmatism together. These include the ongoing Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development established at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit,²² a scenario building exercise involving both experts and decision-makers being developed by the World Conservation Union,²³ a High-Level Task Force to seek a new climate change framework recently organized jointly by the United Nations Foundation and the Club of Madrid,²⁴ and an International/China Economic Forum on Climate Change jointly established by the Stockholm Environment Institute and the Chinese Economists 50 Forum.²⁵ Representatives from all four of these initiatives were included in the September 5–6 meeting.

Another recurring theme, the need to engage with civil society, was also considered at this meeting. To develop practical solutions to real-life problems, the number of people at the decision-making table must be restricted to a number that encourages a meaningful informal conversation. Concerns have repeatedly been expressed, however, about the potentially undemocratic characteristics of any “exclusive” format (see Chapter 5 above), and the credibility of an L-14 probably requires an openness to receiving the views of civil society representatives.²⁶ As a step towards addressing this issue, representatives of prominent non-governmental organizations with a proven research capacity (e.g. the World Conservation Union/IUCN) attended.

The Chair of the September 5–6 meeting discerned the following consensus emerging from the discussion.

• Dealing with the complex and inter-related climate and energy sets of issues requires decisions that only heads of government can make.
  
  
• It is clear that the G-8 is insufficiently representative to negotiate a deal.
  
  
• But nor will the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process on its own be sufficient.
  
  
• Therefore, the world needs a leader-driven process more representative and well prepared to deal with the currently effectively deadlocked negotiations.
  
  
• A network of think tanks (and individuals) could be helpful, particularly if it was plugged into, but not a creature of, official climate change negotiations.
  
  
• The network should result in the creation of a “safe space” to push the envelope of the possible.

The second meeting, on September 25, 2007 in New York, is scheduled to coincide with the third international session of the Clinton Global Initiative. At the invitation of former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin and former President of Brazil, Fernando Enrique Cardoso, 20–25 international opinion leaders will focus on the unique role that leaders can play in breaking global deadlocks and the need to develop an expanded, more representative international architecture to go beyond the existing G-8 summits.

The third meeting will occur on October 25–26, 2007 and will have a dual focus – the question of how to ensure corporate input and the need for generating greater awareness of summit-related issues in the broader public. The corporate-driven nature of globalization strongly suggests that ignoring the interests and potential contributions of business is simply unrealistic. This is especially the case when attempting to come to grips with climate change/energy security issues.²⁷ At the same time, the defining characteristic of the L-14 approach is that its key participants will be heads of government. The credibility and usefulness of an L-14 requires that corporate buy-in and private sector potential initiatives receive their due weight. Corporate champions must be enrolled while avoiding subservience to a “business agenda”. To address the “public education” aspect, an array of prominent opinion leaders from the broadcasting and print media in the L-14 countries will also participate in the October 2007 meeting. Their presence alone is calculated to give greater currency to the ideas generated by the project as a whole.

The final installment in this four meeting series will return to a subject repeatedly discussed in project workshops – the actual or probable role of the United States. More specifically, this meeting in spring 2008 will look at the matter from the perspective of the upcoming US Presidential election. The plan is to engage a group of knowledgeable American observers of and participants in the political scene (including advisors to the leading Presidential candidates), together with some prominent foreigners, in a debate over the options for US leadership in the international effort to re-make the key institutions of global governance. The timing for such an exchange is ideal. And the stakes are high. After all, the 2006 US National Security Strategy notes that America’s relations with “the main centers of global power”

must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them.²⁸

To summarize, the objective of this reality-based series of meetings is to provide a definitive “proof of concept”. The hope is that government officials involved in this exercise will leave it convinced of the merits of the approach and determined to apply it as soon as circumstances permit. At that point, the L-20 (now L-14) idea may finally begin to leave the realm of theory and acquire operational credibility as a technique which can be usefully applied to solving the shifting, complex challenges of global governance in the twenty-first century.

Final Thoughts

It has been some time since kings and queens led their forces into battle personally; George II in 1743 was the last English king to do so.²⁹ More recently, the trend has been for the head of state (and government) to leave war and its less bellicose offshoot, diplomacy, to the professionals.

On occasion, however, circumstances have arisen which called for the direct involvement of government heads or their immediate representatives to resolve international disputes. On three famous occasions, government leaders and their emissaries have been closely engaged in efforts to re-shape the diplomatic map and to chart the route to more stable relations among states. In 1814 and 1815, the Congress of Vienna re-drew Europe’s boundaries in an attempt to establish stability in the wake of years of destructive wars with Napoleonic France. In Paris in 1919, the victors of the First World War met to perform a similar task after the defeat of imperial Germany. And emerging from the Second World War, the allies laid down the new institutional basis for international relations – the Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) in 1944, the United Nations in 1945, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947.

Heads of government became personally involved with these three efforts because they concerned issues of the greatest importance to their respective countries. In all three cases, the objective was to re-construct or re-establish a world laid waste by war, famine and disease.

Central to the L-20 project is the contention that in the current circumstances, there are sets of key, deadlocked issues which require the personal intervention of a relatively small group of government leaders to resolve, or at least to move forward. Careful review of the international landscape has revealed that only a few of those issues would benefit from or merit the attention of a new leaders’ forum. Not surprisingly, much of the focus in this regard has turned to threats of potentially monumental proportions – those from climate change, nuclear proliferation, and pandemic disease.

This project represents an act of faith born of experience – that relations among nations have matured to the point that government leaders can come together to play a constructive role before and not just after global catastrophes.

Endnotes

¹ The list of participants who agreed to these post-workshop interviews is in Appendix D, together with the six questions they were asked. Sound files containing the interviews are accessible via the L-20 website – remarks attributed to the interviewees are taken from these recordings.

² Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC.

3 Senior Advisor, World Health Organization, Departments of Health Action in Crises and HIV/AIDS, Geneva.

⁴ Director, Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy at Wilfrid Laurier University and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Canada.

⁵ Director, United Nations University, International Network on Water, Environment and Health, Hamilton, Canada.

⁶ Assistant Director General, Evidence and Information for Policy, World Health Organization.

⁷ Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

⁸ President, Agenda:PERU.

⁹ President, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁰ Desk Officer for European Union External Relations, Cabinet Office, UK Government.

¹¹ Associate Professor, Tufts University, The Fletcher School.

¹² Executive Director, CIGI, Waterloo, Canada.

¹³ President, International Development Research Centre.

¹⁴ Director, Stanford University, Program on Environment and Sustainable Development.

¹⁵ Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics, Harvard University.

¹⁶ Chair of Trustees, Science and Development Network (SciDev).

¹⁷ Director, Office of Development Studies, United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁸ It will be recalled that former Prime Minister Martin had the opportunity while in office to raise with well over a dozen counterpart heads of government his proposal for an L-20. In a personal interview on August 30, 2006, Mr. Martin confirmed that the reaction was overwhelmingly positive. This response seems to confirm the suspicion of many workshop participants that in the end the United States would see the advantages of joining an L-20 sort of initiative, if not at first, then certainly as it evolved.

¹⁹ It should be noted that questions of composition remain vexed. In the particular case of African representation, for example, the presence or absence of Nigeria is bound to occasion debate.

²⁰ Conference materials are at http://www.l20.org/libraryitem.php?libraryId=26

²¹Simon Maxwell, Director of the Overseas Development Institute, has written of the need for think tanks to work together across national boundaries if they are to influence policy-making internationally. ODI is helping to pioneer a new way of doing this, using a model known as “policy code-sharing”, following the model of an airline “Star Alliance”. (See http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/opinions/20_bridges_july04.html

²² See Chapter 9 above.

²³ The World Conservation Union is also known by its earlier name, the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources); for a description of its activities, see its website at http://cms.iucn.org/about/

²⁴ The Task Force will be chaired by Ricardo Lagos, President of the Club of Madrid (and formerly the President of Chile), and Timothy E. Wirth, President of the UN Foundation, and facilitated by Mohamed El-Ashry, former CEO and Chairman of the Global Environment Facility. The Club of Madrid is an independent organization dedicated to strengthening democracy around the world by drawing on the unique experience and resources of its Members – 66 democratic former heads of state and government (see website at http://www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid/index.php?id=1). The UN Foundation was created in 1998 to support UN causes and activities. The UN Foundation builds and implements public-private partnerships to address the world’s most pressing problems and also works to broaden support for the UN through advocacy and public outreach (see website at http://www.unfoundation.org/).

²⁵ See the SEI website at http://www.sei.se/index.php

²⁶CFGS has undertaken a research activity aimed at increasing the effectiveness, accountability, inclusivity and credibility of decisions made in intergovernmental forums through more effective articulation of civil society information and positions. This research focuses on the means to enhance the influence of civil society, particularly in informal global decision-making forums, such as summits. A key question is how civil society can develop a process to form the largest possible coalition, reach a coordinated position and be represented by a single spokesperson. (See http://www.global-centres.org/projects/CivilSociety.php).

²⁷ Recall, for example, Dupont’s change in attitude which led to the success of the 1989 Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer.

²⁸ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006 Washington DC, 2006. Retrieved April 3, 2007, from the White House website at http://www.white-house.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionVIII.html.

²⁹ At the Battle of Dettingen during the War of the Spanish Succession.

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