Document(s) 8 of 21

From the first scoping meeting in October 2003 to the last workshop in May 2006, a recurrent concern of project participants was the role of the United States. The questions raised were fairly simple to state, but definitive answers were hard to come by.

Was the United States likely to support the proposal that a group of approximately twenty world leaders from both developed and developing countries (including their own President) should meet to take action on critical global issues? Assuming that the answer to this question was at best unclear, what steps needed to be taken to ensure that US support would be forthcoming? In the absence of US support, could the L-20 proposal be expected to proceed?

The context for this discussion lay in a volatile mix of recent history and American politics. After a dilatory and unfocussed first few months, the administration of George W. Bush was galvanized by the events of September 11, 2001. The President reacted to the tragedy at the World Trade Centre by declaring an all-out “war on terrorism”, with its initial target the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which had sheltered the main bases of the al-Qaeda network. At first, the President carried much of the world with him as he struck back at the organizers of 9/11 and their supporters. Sympathy for the victims in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC, was widespread, and the President was careful, after initial missteps, to specify that his target was a particular organization and not the followers of Islam. The war in Afghanistan was won (or at least the Taliban Government was ousted) with surprising speed.

And then the Bush Presidency began to unravel, at least from the perspective of many foreign observers. The new National Security Strategy issued by the Administration in September 2002 was understandably firm in the wake of 9/11 but, to many non-American ears, the religious, unilateralist tone was disquieting. The Strategy began with a triumphalist encapsulation of a century of history.

The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.¹

The message was clear, that this “single sustainable model” was a gift to the rest of the world which other countries might find difficult to refuse. The Strategy’s repeated references to the virtues of “freedom” and its Manichean characterization of the world as a theatre within which the struggle between good and evil played itself out generated uncertainty in societies with a less developed sense of national destiny and a different set of cultural traditions. And on a purely practical level, the bald statement by the single remaining superpower of its right to take preemptive action to defend its national interests sent a shiver of doubt through the international community.²

The Bush Administration had already indicated an inclination to stand apart from international agreements or activities which might constrain its ability to act independently. It refused to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and it declined to submit itself to limitations imposed by the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. On the military side, Washington abandoned the negotiations of a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and stood aside from the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. On the other hand, it maintained the nuclear testing moratorium and concluded the Treaty of Moscow on reducing nuclear weapons.

Then, in March 2003, the United States, in company with a rather sparse “coalition of the willing”, and without Security Council sanction, invaded Iraq. American forces remain in occupation (and under pressure) four years later, with little prospect of withdrawal before the next Presidential election.

President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address in January 2005 confirmed the Administration’s commitment to spreading freedom, in messianic terms which few other world leaders would choose.³ And by the time of the updated National Security Strategy issued in March 2006, that pledge remained intact.⁴ In President Bush’s accompanying letter, he laid out in the first sentence what had become the recurring theme for his entire Presidency.

America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people.⁵

This was the American perspective of which project participants had to take account in their consideration of a potential US response to proposals for an L-20.

The initial debate in workshops revolved around the question of whether full US participation was needed if the L-20 notion was to succeed. As this point was discussed through the meeting series, the majority view was that early American involvement was critical and indeed that, without it, an L-20 made little sense.⁶ That being said, a minority view held that the concept should be pushed on with, whatever the American attitude, and eventually the US would come on board to safeguard its own interests.⁷

Opinions on the receptiveness of the Bush Administration were mixed. Some thought that the President and his closest advisors (notably Vice-President Cheney and then-Defense Secretary Rumsfeld) were constitutionally averse to accepting the tedious task of alliance building and the potential limits on American flexibility which multilateral institutions might impose.⁸ On the other hand, even the Second Inaugural contained language praising US allies⁹ and, in the second Bush term, Secretary of State Rice spent much time and effort traveling the world to explain, listen and cajole. Some workshop participants held that an L-20 approach would give the United States the chance to re-engage with the international community and that, given the multiple challenges facing the Administration, this opening might be welcomed.¹⁰

Over time, project participants suggested a range of characteristics which they felt might make an L-20 initiative attractive to the US. A common theme in this regard was that the initiative should take full account of US security concerns and avoid any appearance of “ganging up” to thwart US objectives. Others were of the view that American interest would be higher if an L-20 were fairly simple in structure and process, avoiding a heavy bureaucratic “tail”. At the workshop on safe drinking water and sanitation, it was proposed that this topic would have advantages for the US in the L-20 context if it allowed for full private sector involvement, as well as opportunities for faith-based groups to contribute. The intention was to afford the US full visibility and the possibility of amassing public credit.¹¹ Finally, a recurrent concern was that an L-20 should not result in constraints being placed on the US and, on the contrary, that such an approach would have to demonstrate a capacity to be more effective from a US point of view than straightforward bilateralism (to say nothing of preemptive, unilateral action).

Among the strategies discussed for “bringing the US back into the tent” was the suggestion that security concerns be grafted onto proposals in specific issue areas. One such field concerned infectious diseases. In this case, the surveillance and rapid response systems needed to manage disease outbreaks could be attractive to the US as tools for combating bioterrorism.¹² Similarly, in the process of making Official Development Assistance (ODA) more effective, allowance could be made for US geo-political concerns so as to gain American support.¹³ On the other hand, in both instances, participants warned against the danger of having substantive or collective objectives overridden or distorted by US security priorities.

The most thoroughgoing suggestion for “reframing” the L-20 proposal to take into account US antipathy towards multilateral processes came during the February 2006 workshop in Princeton on financing global public goods.¹⁴ The approach put forward was to make the small-“c” conservative case for increasing ODA and financing global public goods. This might include deleting references to international “taxes” from the public discourse, emphasizing the benefits of encouraging stability and predictability in the international economic and financial systems, emphasizing the risk management aspects of an L-20’s work, and endorsing the promotion of new, market-based tools and private initiatives where previously government interventions had dominated. Even more directly, the L-20 agenda might be cast as focusing on a series of specific US foreign policy goals – for example, dealing with avian flu, containing and defeating terrorism, supervising and reforming existing international organizations, and enforcing intellectual property rights. Some or all of these elements might be included in a “grand bargain” among governments on the basis of which the L-20 could be established.

Perhaps not surprisingly, no consensus emerged on the efficacy or advisability of this kind of packaging, but a consistent theme throughout the workshops was the desire not to leave the United States in an isolated position. Even if the current Administration was not enthusiastic, the next two years could be used to develop and disseminate the L-20 concept, seeding the idea among the next generation of US politicians, Republicans and Democrats alike.

Implicit in these conversations about the United States over two and a half years was the recognition of American dominance in military and economic terms. The one remaining superpower casts a long shadow; arguably the L-20 proposal itself represents an attempt to provide a mechanism within which the US can exercise its power in a more orderly fashion. Project participants acknowledged that “9/11 changed everything”,¹⁵ certainly strengthening those elements in American politics which already saw the outside world as an uncertain and threatening place. Non-Americans at the workshops were caught between concerns over US unilateralism and worry over the potential for a disastrous US retreat to a form of pre-World War II isolationism. American participants sought to explain the mysteries of US politics and noted the range of views which went under-reported in the face of a determined, ideologically-driven Administration.

Ironically, many of the international institutions which now seem ineffective in the face of new circumstances were originally established during the last great period of American ascendancy, immediately after the Second World War. The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the instruments of collective security such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization all gained much of their initial impetus and legitimacy from US support. In a novel approach to the exercise of power on a global scale, the United States acted for several decades through this international apparatus, notionally constrained but in practice with great effect. A common thread in participants’ discussion of US intentions was that a similar approach would probably serve the US well again. As one of the participants in a later workshop observed, “…the US will not keep power unless it shares it”.¹⁶

One major difference between the American experience in the immediate post-War period and their current situation may lie in the very different nature of their actual or potential partners. In the late nineteen forties, the US worked to build international institutions with a relatively small group of allies (and former adversaries) who generally shared a set of cultural values and a history of earlier (if not always friendly) relations. The institution designers worked from a common vocabulary and, coming out of the maelstrom of two world wars and a catastrophic depression, a desperate desire for peace, stability, and steady economic growth.

By contrast, some workshop participants doubted the level of awareness among current American leaders of the concerns and aspirations of many other countries, notably in the developing and Islamic worlds.¹⁷ The task of refurbishing international institutions already fractured along North/South lines may be more difficult for an America increasingly turned inward, and isolated from the rest of the world by the glare of its own dominant media. Even the democratization born of the communications and internet revolutions may present problems for the US policymakers. Sixty years ago, it might have been sufficient to convince a fairly limited foreign policy establishment in the major universities and on Capitol Hill of the advisability of an initiative. Carrying the viewership of the Fox News channel along in a given direction, however, especially if that direction involves apparent constraints on US power, calls for a higher (or perhaps different) order of persuasion.

To return, then, to the questions originally posed about the likely US reaction to the L-20 approach, American support is certainly not guaranteed although, if the circumstances were propitious (for example, if a crisis of global dimensions was looming), even an Administration wedded to unilateralism might see it in its interest to collaborate. As for whether the L-20 proposal could proceed without meaningful US involvement, the short answer is – probably not.

Endnotes

¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002. Washington DC, 2002, p. iv.

² “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive action to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, op cit., p. 15.

³ “So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” The Address concluded – “When the Declaration of Independence was first read in public and the Liberty Bell was sounded in celebration, a witness said, ‘It rang as if it meant something.’ In our time it means something still. America, in this young century, proclaims liberty throughout all the world, and to all the inhabitants thereof. Renewed in our strength – tested, but not weary – we are ready for the greatest achievements in the history of freedom.” President George W Bush, Second Inaugural Address, 2005. Washington DC, 2005. Retrieved May 30, 2006 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html

⁴ The updated strategy began with the following sentence – “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006. Washington, DC, 2006, p. 1.

⁵ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, op cit., p. i.

⁶ Bellagio, p. 7; Ottawa I, pp. 12, 27–28; New York, p. 3; San Jose, p. 1; Alexandria, p. 1.

⁷ Ottawa I, p. 12.

⁸ Waterloo, p. 7.

⁹ “And all the allies of the United States can know: we honor your friendship, we rely on your counsel, and we depend on your help. Division among free nations is a primary goal of freedom’s enemies. The concerted effort of free nations to promote democracy is a prelude to our enemies’ defeat.” Bush, op cit. Retrieved May 30, 2006 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html

¹⁰ New York, p. 5.

¹¹ Alexandria, p. 8.

¹² San Jose, pp. 3–4.

¹³ Petra, p. 3.

¹⁴ Princeton II, pp. 3–4.

¹⁵ Livermore, p. 1.

¹⁶ Washington, author’s personal notes.

¹⁷ Livermore, pp. 3–4.

Document(s) 8 of 21