Document(s) 6 of 21

INTRODUCTION

It is well known that infrastructure is one of the principal casualties of war. It is targeted and destroyed by combatants in pursuit of strategic objectives. It is not possible to maintain it because of war. New infrastructure cannot be built in times of conflict, either because the combatants prohibit it, or because the risks to investment and personnel militate against it. Even after cessation of hostilities, major risks remain, in the form of the possibility of conflict reoccurring and/or inadequate maintenance of law and order. Costs of building and maintaining infrastructure and providing services in post-conflict areas tend to be higher because other infrastructure is lacking (for example, electricity may not be available to power base stations and roads may be in poor condition) and because of the need to provide extra security or pay former combatants for protection. Crocker (2004) noted the commonplace sabotage of infrastructure projects in post-war Iraq, to the extent that successful projects had to be kept hidden to prevent a similar fate. Crocker also reports of the delays in, and in some cases cessation of, reconstruction projects due to sabotage. High insurance costs can pose further challenges in the reconstruction process.

Yet, the greatest need for infrastructure is also in post-conflict areas. The war-weary survivors cannot put their lives back together if they are deprived of basic necessities such as roads, transport, safe drinking water, electricity, and telecom. Without some kind of peace dividend in the form of improved life conditions, the risks of slipping back into war are that much higher. The best peace dividend is restoration of infrastructure. Furthermore, as a survey of Afghanistan's private sector showed access to infrastructure will be a key determinant in drawing investment back into the affected area (World Bank, 2005).

Post-conflict countries have the opportunity to leapfrog into the mobile age, rather than reconstruct what was originally there: often an incumbent owned fixed network. Countries like Lebanon have chosen to do this, encouraging private participation in the process (Jamali, 2003). This can enable the sector to pick up quickly, given the relatively short time needed for wireless communication infrastructure deployment. Afghanistan's fast growing mobile sector is evidence to this. Schwart and Halkyard (2006, p. 3) note that private sector infrastructure investment in post-conflict countries follows a particular sequence, with the mobile sector usually being the only sector to attract 'significant investment' immediately after a conflict because of the 'rapid cost recovery allowed by the sector's economics'. This is partially attributable to high demand, caused possibly by the uncertainties engendered by the conflict itself.

Sri Lanka has suffered from two decades of civil war. Separatist forces of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) have been pursuing an independent state in the North and East of the island for several decades. The economic cost of Sri Lanka's civil war has been estimated to have been as high as US Dollars (USD) 20.6 billion up to 1996, 169 percent of that year's GDP. The component relating to the cost of infrastructure loss is LKR 90 billion or 13 percent of the country's 1996 GDP, including loss of public infrastructure and damages to houses (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya and Kelegama, 2001).

The cessation of hostilities between 2002 to 2005 provided a unique opportunity to seek to understand what telecom meant to the population of a post-conflict region. Analysis of the findings of a unique government survey conducted in 2004 and a sample survey of telecom users at the bottom of the pyramid (BOP) in the Jaffna District conducted in early 2005¹ can shed light on connectivity in post-conflict conditions.

JAFFNA

Jaffna is the historical and cultural center of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. Along with the rest of the North and East of the island, it has suffered from two decades of civil war. The armed struggle since 1983 has severely affected the economy of the North and East. There has been no infrastructure development; instead, a significant deterioration has occurred. Loss of human life has amounted to over 65,000. Over 800,000 internally displaced persons have lost their homes and livelihoods (CCIY, 2005, February). Many people have emigrated to countries such as Australia, France, Canada and the United Kingdom. It is estimated that as many as 80 percent of the families in Jaffna district have at least one family member living abroad or in the southern part of the country that has been shielded from the war for the most part, except for periodic terrorist actions by the LTTE.

Before the conflict, the Jaffna District (one of 25 major administrative units within Sri Lanka) was well endowed with infrastructure. It had one of the highest densities of roads in the country as a result of high population density and flat topography. The daily express train serving Jaffna, the 'Yal Devi', was the highest revenue earner for the Ceylon Government Railway. The Department of Posts and Telecommunications considered the Jaffna district one of its highest sources of revenue. This was because Jaffna, with its educated populace, was heavily represented in the government and private sectors in the southern part of the country. Generally families remained in the peninsula while the wage earner worked in the south. The resultant 'remittance economy', taking an intranational form in this first instance, created a strong demand for transport and communication.

The war led to the systematic destruction of the connecting infrastructure, exemplified by the ripping up of the rail track beyond Vavuniya and the use of the railroad ties to build bunkers by the LTTE. The principal highway connecting Jaffna to the rest of the country became one of the bloodiest battlefields of the war and the port and airport located in the Jaffna peninsula became the most valued and heavily guarded strategic assets of the government.

The area was further affected by a partial economic embargo which the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) imposed from 1990 to January 2002. This, along with a lack of power supply, severely hampered productive activities in the region (Sarvananthan, 2003). These negative forces have been reflected in the area's per capita income. The Northern Province (with Jaffna as the largest district within it) had the lowest per capita income in 2000, approximately USD 384 (LKR 37,206), slightly more than half the national per capita income of USD 651 (LKR 63,000), according to unpublished data from the Department of Census and Statistics (as cited in Sarvananthan, 2003).

Historically, Jaffna's education, health and income levels had been higher than other districts within the Northern Province. Jaffna is one of the most urbanized districts in the country. It was estimated to have had a total population of 596,000 (approximately 3 percent of the country's population) in 2004 (CBSL, 2005; Statistical Appendix, Table 55), and the highest population density within the Northern Province in 1981, 2001 and 2003 (see Table 3.1). The civil war hit Jaffna the hardest, in terms of physical, material and human losses (CCIY, 2005, February).

Table 3.1
Area and Population of Jaffna, (1981–2003)

Source: CCIY (2005).

In a rare statistical snapshot taken in 2004, just before the conflict restarted, the Consumer Finance Survey of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka captured household access to services and amenities in the two districts that were under government control in the Northern Province (and which held most of the population), Jaffna and Vavuniya. The relative positions of these two districts in relation to the provinces with the highest and lowest levels of access to the different amenities are given in Figure 3.1.

Jaffna and Vavuniya are lowest in a few categories, but in not as many as one would expect after 20 years of war. They are highest in the use of bicycles, an artifact which suits the flat topography and the resilience of this mode of transport under war conditions. While lowest in TVs and second lowest in radios, the two districts are surprisingly good performers in access to telephones (fixed and mobile) and computers. From the last position before the cessation of hostilities in January 2002, the two districts had leaped to third place by 2004, still below the national average, but considerably higher at 19.7 and 2.8 percent of households having a telephone (fixed or mobile) and a computer, respectively, than the lowest province which had 9.1 percent households with a telephone and 0.5 percent households with a computer.

Figure 3.1
Access to Amenities in Jaffna and Vavuniya Districts of Sri Lanka, Relative to Highest/Lowest Provinces

Source: Central Bank Consumer Finance Survey (CFS), CBS 2005.

The high interest shown in interactive Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the war torn regions is understandable, given the high levels of emigration and family fragmentation. Prior to the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) of January 2002, provision of telecom service (fixed or mobile) was prohibited in the Northern and Eastern province to all operators other than the incumbent, so in effect these areas were artificially excluded from the telecom revolution unleashed by liberalization (Samarajiva, 2004).

The leading mobile operator, Dialog Telekom (then MTN Networks), started work on extending the network to the government controlled areas in the Northern Province within weeks of the cessation of hostilities, offering connections within 90 days of the CFA. Over 150,000 new connections were given in the North and East alone in 2003, according to Dialog Telekom (August 2005). The rapid uptake illustrates the large unmet demand that existed in the North and East. By the time the networks were again made non-operational by the armed forces in August 2006, Dialog Telekom was serving 220,000 customers in the North and 200,000 in the East (Dialog Telekom, 2006). Mobile use dwarfed fixed use, which had risen to 22,127 by mid-2006 for the entire Northern Province (TRC, 2006) with a significant proportion being in the southernmost part of the Province, Vavuniya.

TELECOM USE AT THE BOP IN JAFFNA

This section looks at telecom use at the BOP in the Jaffna district in Sri Lanka, at some of the unique features not seen in the other districts of Sri Lanka surveyed.

What Modes of Access do People at the BOP in Jaffna Use?

People at the BOP in Jaffna primarily use mobile and public access (public call offices, payphones and phones in post offices) phones, as shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2
Modes of Telecom Access Used at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Note: Respondents may use more than one mode.

Compared to the other areas, fixed phone use in Jaffna was low, just 7 percent. This reflects the low number of fixed phones available in the Jaffna district, and the Northern Province as a whole, which had 8,021 fixed lines at the end of 2001 (TRC, 2002).

Table 3.3 shows the distribution of service providers used by people at the BOP in Jaffna, compared with the other Sri Lankan samples. On the mobile side, Dialog GSM (now Dialog Telekom) was the main service provider, given their early entry into the Northern Province. On the fixed side, incumbent Sri Lanka Telecom Limited (SLTL) was the main provider, although it is quite possible that the SLTL figure is overstated by respondents who assume that the established partially government-owned operator is the supplier to all public communication bureaus. This pattern contrasts with the other localities studied in Sri Lanka, where other service providers have a significant presence. Mobitel and Suntel, who subsequently commenced operation in Jaffna, appeared to have a limited presence among respondents at the time of survey.

Table 3.3
Service Provider to Phone Owners at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Note: Respondents may be using more than one operator's services.

After the implementation of the CFA, the restrictions on mobile service provision in the North and East were lifted. Dialog Telekom (then MTN Networks) was able to capture the market, giving 150,000 new connections in the North and East within two years (Dialog Telekom, 2005). Consequently, Dialog GSM was used by 43 percent of teleusers at the BOP in Jaffna, a much higher percentage than in the other locations.

Although only 7 percent of respondents in Jaffna stated that their mode of access was 'fixed', many of those who use communication bureaus may have given 'Sri Lanka Telecom' as their service provider, as this is the kind of phone that is assumed to be used in many of the communication bureaus. SLTL was the only operator present in the area until 2002.

Mobiles not only offer quick connection, but in the case of Jaffna, they are far more economical. A new SLTL fixed line can cost up to LKR 50,000 (approximately USD 500) in Jaffna compared to LKR 20,000 (approximately USD 200) in Colombo. This is because this company charges for installation based on the distance from the customer's premises to the nearest distribution point.²

In the first year that Dialog GSM entered the North and East, it gave 150,000 new connections in this area alone, 32 percent of the new connections in the entire country (PIPU, 2004). Prior to 2002, there was no cellular coverage in the North and East of Sri Lanka as found by the survey, with zero respondents having owned a mobile for more than three years (in contrast to 22 percent in Badulla, 7 percent in Colombo and 10 percent in Hambantota³).

The principal reason given by 80 percent of respondents for choosing mobile in rural Jaffna was 'that there is no waiting time involved'. This was similar to the response in the remote locations, Hambantota and Badulla, and quite different from urban Jaffna and Colombo, suggesting that waiting time for fixed phones was a greater problem in rural areas (Table 3.4).

Another reason why teleusers at the BOP in Jaffna obtained mobile phones was so that other family members could use it; this indicates that the mobile was obtained more as a household phone, possibly because of the difficulty in obtaining a fixed phone. However, the 'community' use of mobile phones was limited to family members, with no BOP mobile owners in Jaffna allowing people outside their family to use their mobile. This contrasts with the other locations, where some mobile owners allow non-family members to use their phone to make and receive calls (10 percent in Badulla, 1 percent in Colombo, 16 percent in Hambantota and 10 percent on an average in the Indian samples). However, a significantly greater proportion of mobile users in Jaffna send and receive messages for other people on their mobiles 'most of the time', compared with the rest of the country (Table 3.5).

Table 3.4
Reasons Why the Respondent Obtained a Mobile Phone at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Table 3.5
Sending and Receiving Messages for Other People through Mobiles at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Interestingly, fewer mobile users in Jaffna (compared with the rest of Sri Lanka) cited the reason for obtaining a mobile as it being 'easier than any other kind of phone'. This could be evidence that there really was not much choice in terms of the mode of access, that is, that obtaining a mobile was the only option. Concern for financial factors did not feature, except for 'no rental charges' in rural Jaffna.

Convenience appears to weigh most when obtaining a mobile phone in Jaffna. The ability to carry the phone around and the ability to use it at any time were very important in both urban and rural Jaffna; this could be perhaps because many people work in other areas of the island, probably Colombo. Having a mobile allows them to be contactable, and to be able to call home at any time. The importance of mobility and the ability to use the phone at any time may be related to the lack of security in the everyday lives of its inhabitants.

About 50 percent of rural respondents in Jaffna use public access telephones. The reason they give is that there is no other choice.

Affordability of Telecom

A larger proportion of teleusers at the BOP in Jaffna stated that mobile communication was less affordable than in the other Sri Lankan locations. No one in Jaffna found the cost of mobile communication to be 'affordable', unlike in the other localities; this could indicate a lack of other options.

Rural Jaffnaites were unhappier about the cost of communicating, shown by the large percentage stating the cost as 'extremely high'. Users in Jaffna were the least 'happy' group in the Sri Lankan sample with regard to mobile costs. Table 3.6 provides the mean value of the perceived cost; a higher mean indicates that the users find it more affordable, and vice versa. As Figure 3.2 illustrates, users in the other Sri Lankan localities find the cost of mobile communication more affordable than those in Jaffna. Using mobiles in urban Jaffna was perceived to be slightly more affordable than in rural Jaffna at a 95 percent confidence interval.

Table 3.6
Mean Value of Perceived Cost of Using Mobiles at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Note: 1 = extremely high, 2 = very high, 3 = high, and 4 = affordable.

Figure 3.2
Views on the Cost of Using Mobiles at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Heavy Use of Phones in Jaffna

Table 3.2 showed that there were very few fixed phone users in the Jaffna district among teleusers at the BOP, but a large number of public access phones users; from here on, this chapter considers both of these categories as one, given that it is likely that the public access phones in question are actually fixed phones. Furthermore, while the general patterns in the calling behavior reported are based on the respondent's recall, as Appendix 1 notes, this is subject to a degree of inaccuracy (also resulting in relatively higher numbers of respondents who did not answer questions on call frequencies and durations); however, the numbers can be considered as indicative of the actual calling patterns.

In general, Jaffnaites appear to be heavier users of the phone than those in the rest of the Sri Lankan samples, given the more frequent calls being made and received on all modes (fixed, public access and mobile).

Jaffna's calling patterns diverge dramatically from the other localities with regard to international calls: 55 percent of teleusers at the BOP in Jaffna receive more than one international call per month, and 18 percent make more than one international call per month; while these numbers are still low (that is, one call per month), they are considerable when compared to the other Sri Lankan samples, as seen in Figure 3.3. This is probably due to the high number of migrants from Jaffna. There are very few respondents in the Jaffna sample who never or rarely receive international calls on fixed/public access lines.

This pattern corresponds to the unofficial estimate that about 80 percent of the total households in the Jaffna district have members who have left Jaffna and now reside abroad.⁴ Many families are fragmented and telecom helps them to stay in touch, and also, very importantly, provides a means of securing financial remittances, which is an important reason to keep in touch, for many.⁵ Foreign remittances may be a significant source of income for most households in Jaffna. However, official statistics on this category of income are not available.

Within the Sri Lankan samples, Jaffna stands out, with a high frequency of international calls being made and received. Figure 3.4 shows that a significant percentage of users among mobile users at the BOP in Jaffna receive more than five calls a month.

Figure 3.3
Frequency of International Calls on Fixed/Public Access Phones at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities: Incoming and Outgoing

Figure 3.4
International Calls on Mobile Phones at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities: Incoming and Outgoing

A majority of respondents in Jaffna claim to use the phone to 'keep in touch with friends and family abroad', as shown in Table 3.7. This is explained by high international migration and fragmented families. When looking at the stated purpose of 'keeping in touch with family and friends abroad', the geographical dispersion of families becomes more evident in Jaffna as compared to the rest of Sri Lanka.

Table 3.7
Use of the Phone to Keep in Touch with Family and Friends Abroad at the BOP in Sri Lankan and Indian Localities

Note: n/r-percentage not reported due to low base.

Jaffna's higher use of phones for keeping in touch with people abroad has some similarities to Kasargod in South India, which also has a high migrant population; this is also seen in Colombo and Mumbai, the large metropolis, where a significant part of the population is formed of migrants from other parts of the country.

Table 3.8 shows the frequency of international calls on mobiles in the Sri Lankan localities. Mobile users at the BOP in Jaffna clearly make and receive more international calls to keep in touch with family and friends.

It is also interesting to note that keeping in touch with friends and family abroad is more significant with mobiles than with other modes. This is so in Sri Lanka due to the liberalization of the international telephony market in 2003, which brought down international calling rates by around 70 percent (PIPU, 2004). For example, the per-minute tariff to Canada was LKR 55 to LKR 70 before liberalization, whereas it has fallen to LKR 11 per minute or lower, depending on the package, three years later. Furthermore, prepaid mobile users can make international calls without a large deposit as long as sufficient credit is available in the account.

Table 3.8
Frequency of Calls to Keep in Touch with Family and Friends Abroad (Incoming and Outgoing) per Month for Mobile Users at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Incidentally, urban Jaffna had the highest Internet use among the samples in Sri Lanka, significantly more than any of the other samples at a 95 confidence interval. Fourteen percent of teleusers at the BOP in urban Jaffna used the Internet, as compared to one percent in rural Jaffna, 3 percent in Colombo, and 2 percent in Badulla and Hambantota. This reflects the higher demand for international communication in Jaffna, being satisfied through a cheaper alternative, Internet telephony—an alternative that may not be available in rural Jaffna, owing to the lack of infrastructure (that is, fixed lines).

Another reason attributed to the high use of telecom, both incoming and outgoing, national and international, in Jaffna, is that many residents from the neighboring 'uncleared' or rebel-held areas of the Vanni come to Jaffna to make calls abroad. Even though SLTL has given a limited number of telephones to the towns within the LTTE-controlled areas, vast areas of the Vanni are still out of bounds for both mobile and fixed phones. Charges in Kilinochchi (the center of LTTE administration) are very high, especially for overseas communication. Therefore many of the residents go to Jaffna (or Vavuniya) to make calls.⁶

Expenditure on Telecom

People in Jaffna seem to spend more on mobile communication, on an average, than the other Sri Lankan locations, as Figure 3.5 shows.

A higher percentage of Jaffnaites spend more than USD 8 per month on mobile communication. This is explained by the fact that they make the most international calls. Even after the lowering of international rates since 2003, they are costlier than local and national calls.

Similarly when fixed and public access users are considered, it can be seen that expenditure levels are as high among the Jaffna teleusers at the BOP as for those in Colombo (Figure 3.6).

If it is assumed, conservatively, that all the high spenders were earning USD 100 a month, the results indicate that 59 percent of mobile users at the BOP and 14 percent of fixed users at the BOP in Jaffna spent at least 8 percent of their income on telecom. This is considerably higher than what is normally expected. As Chapter 1 discusses, research is beginning to show high numbers such as these. However, caution must be exercised with this finding because it is possible that the respondents may have been understating their monthly income, especially because they may be receiving sporadic remittances that are not always included in answers regarding the monthly income.

Figure 3.5
Expenditure on Telecom by Mobile Users at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Note: The LKR amounts have been crudely converted to USD, at the exchange rate of LKR 100 to the USD.

Figure 3.6
Expenditure on Telecom by Fixed and Public Access Users at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Note: The LKR amounts have been crudely converted to USD, at the exchange rate of LKR 100 to the USD.

The calls made by Jaffnaites appear to be longer as compared to those in the other three localities, which could be one of the major contributors to the higher spending.

Use of SMS

Jaffna had the highest use of SMS among the Sri Lankan localities studied, with 57 percent of mobile users using SMS locally, and 6 percent also using it internationally, as seen in Figure 3.7. Domestic use was similar to that in Colombo, but the use of international SMS was significantly higher. SMS offers a cheaper way of communicating across borders as compared to calling.

Call Duration

It appears that in general, Jaffnaites spend more time on the phone, especially mobile users, speaking for longer than those in the other Sri

Figure 3.7
Use of SMS by Mobile Users at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Lankan samples on both incoming and outgoing calls, except in the case of outgoing international calls, where a marginal number spend more than five minutes on calls; this is perhaps a result of cost-consciousness given the higher call rates. The average call durations among mobile users, as reported by the respondents, are given in Table 3.9. Those for fixed and public access users are given in Table 3.10.

In the light of the fragmented nature of Jaffna families, this is an expected outcome. The calls are likely to be of a longer duration because the calls that are made, or received, are to/from the many friends and family who are outside the district.

Social Status and Fashion

It appears that at the BOP in Jaffna using a mobile phone is associated with improved social status, particularly among urban BOP users, 21 percent of whom chose to use a mobile as they perceived that it improved their social status. This percentage is higher than in other Sri Lankan locations, which range from 0 percent to the highest of 10 percent for Colombo (Table 3.11). This is in sharp contrast to the Indian samples that were also studied, where using a mobile phone was perceived to improve social status among 57 percent of mobile users.

The same is true with regard to carrying mobile phones as a form of fashion. In Jaffna, 11 percent of the urbanites think it is fashionable. This again differs from the rest of the Sri Lankan samples. Among the Indian samples, 60 percent felt that is more fashionable to use a mobile phone. This is perhaps due to the fact that the mobile is more of a recent phenomenon in Jaffna, as it is in India.

Table 3.9
Average Duration of Outgoing Calls on Mobiles at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Table 3.10
Average Duration of Outgoing Calls on Fixed and Public Access Phones at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

Table 3.11
Reasons for Choosing to Use a Mobile at the BOP in Sri Lankan Localities

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study demonstrates that the people in post-conflict societies, such as Jaffna, despite considerable financial constraints, have a higher demand for telecom services than people in areas directly unaffected by conflict. Understandably, a greater share of the income of people in post-conflict societies is spent on keeping in touch with family and friends.

Areas that have suffered extended periods of violent conflict are often characterized by a significant proportion of the population migrating to non-conflict regions as refugees or otherwise. The civil war that affected the Jaffna peninsula for two decades led to a net loss of around one-third the pre-conflict population; many fleeing the district, and even the country. Families left behind are fragmented. The need to keep in touch, as well as the need for financial support in the form of remittances from relatives abroad have driven demand for telecom services to a level that is dramatically higher than in other areas of Sri Lanka. People make and receive many more international calls, and calls are longer than in other parts of Sri Lanka. The need to secure financial remittances further increases the importance of keeping in touch with those living away from home. The telephone is not just an instrument to keep in touch, but one that secures the livelihood of these conflict-affected people.

The need for keeping in touch has proved to be a top priority, even where costs are perceived to be high, and service problems exist. The data suggests a more inelastic demand for telecom services than in other parts of the country. Although people are willing to spend larger amounts of their regular monthly income on telecom, none of the respondents perceive the cost to be 'affordable' unlike respondents in other areas. This indicates a lack of choice.

Limited telecom options during the time of conflict, as a result of government restrictions as well as limited infrastructure, contributed to a large pent up demand for telephones. As in the case of Jaffna, once operators are able to commence service in such an area, connections will surge; low cost wireless technologies, such as Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), can play a critical role in getting people connected quickly. Connections can be provided immediately, especially where prepaid approaches can be adopted. The wire-line alternative can be slow and costly, especially where infrastructure is not only limited, but most likely damaged as a result of conflict. Furthermore, while people have previously been heavily reliant on shared means of fixed access, through public call offices for instance, mobile telecom service may be preferred for its virtue of mobility, despite higher call costs. Mobiles allow people to make calls, as well as be contactable at any given time as long as service is available, which can give users a greater sense of security.

NOTES

¹ Further details on the study can be found in Appendix 1 of this book.

² http://www.slt.lk/data/forhome/011telecon_new.htm#

³ Note: bases are small.

⁴ M. Sarvananthan, Personal Communication, August 2005.

⁵ M. Sarvananthan, Personal Communication, August 2005.

⁶ M. Sarvananthan, Personal Communication, August 2005.

REFERENCES

Arunatilake, N., Jayasuriya, S. and Kelegama, S. (2001). The economic cost of the war in Sri Lanka. World Development, 29(9), pp. 1483–1500.

Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) (2005). Central Bank Annual Report 2004. Colombo: CBSL.

Chamber of Commerce & Industries of Yarlpanam (CCIY) (February 2005). Identification of Economic Opportunities for Children Affected by War in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. International Labour Organisation's International Programme on Elimination of Child Labour. Retrieved November 30, 2006, from http://pointpedro.org/category/research-studies/

Crocker, B. (2004). Reconstructing Iraq's Economy. The Washington Quarterly, 27(4), pp. 73–93.

Dialog Telekom (2005). Dialog GSM/Dialog Telekom press release. Retrieved October 12, 2007, from http://www.dialog.lk/en/corporate/press/releases/pressRelease.jsp?id=31

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Samarajiva, Rohan (2004). Sri Lanka's telecom reforms of 2002–03. SAFIR Newsletter, issue 17, pp. 5–9. Retrieved October 15, 2007, from http://www.safirasia.org/safir/files/Newsletter/Issue17.pdf

Sarvananthan, M. (2003). An Introduction to the Conflict Time Economy of the North & East Province of Sri Lanka. Point Pedro Institute of Development Working Paper 01, May 2003. Point Pedro Institute of Development Point Pedro, Sri Lanka.

Schwart, J. and Halkyard, P. (2006). Postconflict Infrastructure: Trends in Aid and Investment Flows. Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note number 305, issue 305.

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Document(s) 6 of 21